Creativity, Agency, and AI

Helliwell, Alice C (2024) Creativity, Agency, and AI. In: Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: The State of the Art. Synthese Library. (In Press)

Abstract

Abstract: We can formulate an argument against AI creativity from agency. By some accounts, creativity requires agency, and agency is, many think, not possible for AI. This is due to the typical conception of agency as a capacity for intentional action. Intentional action is thought to require mental states, a severe challenge for machine intelligence. On the face of things, the agency argument seems to provide a straightforward route to argue for the impossibility of AI creativity. However, this path, I argue, is not so clear. In this paper, I outline the agency argument against AI creativity, before calling into question the apparent simplicity of this argument. I argue, ultimately, that the reasoning behind the inclusion of agency in accounts of creativity does not necessitate the use of intentional action, but can instead be satisfied by a minimal teleological account of agency.

Text phai2023-HELLIWELL.pdf - Accepted Version Restricted to Repository staff only Download (354kB)

Item Type:	Book Section
Disciplines:	Humanities > Philosophy
Depositing User:	Alice Helliwell
Date Deposited:	24 Mar 2025 16:07
Last Modified:	24 Mar 2025 16:07
URI:	https://nul.repository.guildhe.ac.uk/id/eprint/2449

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• Creativity, Agency, and AI. (deposited 29 Jan 2025 08:43)
  • Creativity, Agency, and AI. (deposited 24 Mar 2025 16:07) [Currently Displayed]

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