# The Muslim Spectrum

# An examination of fundamentalism and the liberalist/extremist dichotomy in the contemporary Muslim world

By

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# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

## Background

On the question of Islam and the Muslims, two political and ideological forces are in evidence today. These are the forces of extremism and the forces of liberalism. From a political perspective, it is clear in a post 9/11 world that the Muslim world (perhaps together with China) is at the forefront of western political strategic thinking. Domestic and international concerns about Islam and Muslim societies, Islamic radicalism and the threat of extremist violence are at the head of home and foreign affairs issues in many countries in the west. Among Muslims, the consequential form of political governance has given rise to a dynamic tension on an individual, as well as collective basis.

The resurgence of religion in the latter quarter of the twentieth century was largely unexpected, since the global trend was clearly towards contemporary secularism. Hefner (2001) notes, "A key feature of world politics in recent years has been the resurgence of religious issues and organisations into public affairs. Whether with the Christian Coalition in the U.S., Hindu nationalism in India, militant Buddhism in Sri Lanka, or Islamist movements in the Muslim world, the end of the twentieth century demonstrated convincingly that high modernist reports of religion's demise were, to say the least, premature."

This resurgence was manifested in two forms, nationalist or fundamentalist and, much to the surprise of Orientalist scholars of the time, led to piety amongst the poor, as opposed to revolution, and acceptance of the patriarchal society in women (Riesebrodt, 2000:266-267). These shifting sands of political thought which included the middle-elite in the Muslim world in particular, was summed up by Gaffney (1992:47), who says, "In the 1970s, the Islamicist agenda began to find a newly receptive public especially among that same educated class that had imbibed the imported tonics of liberating socialism or liberal capitalism, only to find them toxic." The message was clear. They had experienced or understood all potential models for existence, but chosen Islam as their 'way of life.' But for what reasons?

The past twenty years, Muslims in particular, have been defined by a considerable shift in terms of the impact and relevance of Islamism on and within nations across the world. From the standpoint of the Arab world, the first period, from circa 1989 to 2001, witnessed governments across this region being forced to take defensive positions against Islamist expansion. The Islamist regime in Sudan, which took hold of power through a military coup d'état in 1989, the near grasp of power by FIS, who won democratic elections in Algeria in 1991, followed by Tunisia denying Islamist participation in elections through fear of Islamist gains similar to their neighbours, Islamist parliamentary gains were also observed in liberal Arab states such as Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt, Hizb Allah gains in Lebanon in 1992, Salafist pressure being brought to bear on the House of Saud, PLO on the defensive against Hamas in the Palestinian territories are all examples of this phenomenon. The only exceptions in the Arab world were the Ba'thists in Syria and Iraq, with Islamist resurgence appearing in those nations beyond this period (Mandaville, 2007).

In the west, this period was signified by a simplicity of understanding about the Muslim world, seen as a region of tragedy, civil war, killing, bombing and extremism; which was summed up as 'Islamic fundamentalism' (The Prince of Wales, 1994:137). Huntington's (1993) prophecy, that not all societies, and especially Muslim societies, were likely to develop democracies, as democratic values conflict with core values, or fundamentals, of the culture to which they are being aligned, was coming true.

The second period, from 2001 until the present day, has been defined and shaped by the events of September 11, 2001 and the actions that followed. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have refashioned the political landscape of the Middle East with respect to Islamism, and have had a tremendous impact on the psyche of Muslims across the world, with an emphasis on liberalisation of the masses and extremism becoming progressively more marginalised. Thus the terrorist atrocities of 2001 have acted in some way as a catalyst for making distinctions amongst Muslims, as The Prince of Wales stated in 1994, saying, "we need to be careful of that emotive label, "fundamentalism", and distinguish, as Muslims do, between revivalists, who choose to take the practice of their religion most devoutly, and fanatics or extremists, who use this devotion for political ends" (The Prince of Wales, 1994:139). It is apparent, therefore, that even

thinkers in the Western world were beginning to develop an understanding of the 'fundamentalism spectrum', which will be examined in detail in this work, even before 2001.

This work thus investigates twenty-first century Islamic fundamentalism in depth and examines the liberalist/extremist dichotomy and their driving forces, such as political governance, media, the worldwide web and sport.

## Aims

This work aims to examine the challenges facing Muslim societies in the early part of the twenty-first century. Key issues to be examined are tensions between liberal interpretations of Islam and extreme views within a globalisation paradigm and how these are changing. Specifically, the work investigates how the spotlight on Islam and its followers in a post 9/11 world, has manifest within Muslim individuals, groups and nations and how these have changed to accommodate the shifting global frame of mind towards Islam and the Muslims. Though the research is intended to cover the Muslim world, two cases, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Britain are highlighted, to examine the impact on Muslim majority and minority environments respectively.

## Objectives

The objectives of the research are to:
- Define Islamic fundamentalism
- Analyse liberalism and extremism in contemporary Muslim societies
- Evaluate the impact of 9/11 on global Muslims
- Investigate the driving forces in the liberal/extreme paradigm
- Develop a model through which the continuum of Islamic political and socio-cultural environments can be understood
- Examine the model through case examples in Muslim majority and minority environments
  - British Muslim society within this context
  - Explore UAE society within this context

- Draw lessons from the model and case examples

# CHAPTER 2: THE FUNDAMENTALISM CONTINUUM

## Introduction

This chapter thus examines the term 'Islamic fundamentalism' and hypothesises it carries significant meaning in modern-day society with a strongly negative and political connotation in popular culture. The chapter begins with an examination of the definition of the term fundamentalism, its general religious and specifically Islamic context, before exploring the political implications of Islamic fundamentalism in which the term is being used. The chapter then addresses misconceptions commonly found in the understanding of Islamic fundamentalism ahead of outlining a model developed to illustrate the breadth of the issues through an 'Islamic fundamentalism spectrum', or continuum. An examination of whether or not non-fundamentalist Muslims exist is given as well as a recent chronology of the growth in Islamic fundamentalism. Finally, the chapter looks at how reformation amongst Muslims ties in with Islamic fundamentalism.

## Defining Islamic fundamentalism

Fundamentalism in general, is often articulated as a meeting of faith and politics with an emphasis on literal interpretation and strict adherence to some religious scripture in a present-day setting. It has been defined as "contemporary religio-political movements that attempt to return to the scriptural foundations of the community, excavating and reinterpreting these foundations for application to the contemporary social and political world" (Euben, 1995:161). However, this generic notion of fundamentalism has taken on a far more distinct understanding in a post 9-11 context as it singles out Islam in its characterisation. Thus, Soanes and Stevenson (2003:701) define fundamentalism as the "strict maintenance of the doctrines of any religion, *notably Islam*, according to a strict, literal interpretation of scripture."

Historically, the term fundamentalism was first used to describe a backlash amongst Protestant sects to growing modernity within Christianity consequential to the acceptance of Darwinist

theory, in the early decades of the twentieth century (Halliday, 1995:399; Riesebrodt, 2000:269-270). Furthermore, "Islamic fundamentalism appeared in the 18th and 19th centuries as a reaction to the disintegration of Islamic political and economic power, asserting that Islam is central to both state and society and advocating strict adherence to the Koran (*Qur'an*) and to Islamic law (*Sharia*), supported if need be by jihad" (Soanes and Stevenson, 2003: 701). Fundamentalism thus carries outward and inward characteristics. Inwardly, it is an individual's stringent observance of orthodox tenets of a particular faith. Outwardly, it is a public opposition to liberalism and materialism (Ghosh, 1996: 1115). More recently, fundamentalism as a global phenomenon is almost exclusively reserved for use in relation to Islam, as seen in the earlier definitions, though the relationship with all Abrahamic faiths remains (Lehmann, 1998: 607), albeit at more localised levels. Examples of this would be the use of the term in relation to al-Qaeda global operations, as opposed to Irish republicanism, which is geo-centric to the nations of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Thus, the term Islamic fundamentalism is very much in use today to describe Muslim revivalism and neo-traditionalism (Lawrence, 1994:163), with the media utilising the term with a negative connotation in order to "devilise" (Helie, 1993:2454) its adherents.

Although many use the term Islamic fundamentalism interchangeably with Islamism, they are distinct, as Islamism denotes Islamic fundamentalism with a political agenda (Albertini, 2003: 455). Thus, an Islamist is an Islamic fundamentalist, but not necessarily vice versa. However, others, such as Butko (2004) use the term deliberately to mean political Islam, particularly in the context of movements expressing views opposing authoritarian one-party states, in particular in the Middle East. Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab world is thus narrated as the tool which counteracts cultural, social and intellectual stagnation (Khashan, 1997:5). Euben (1995:162) interprets her definition, given earlier, as being composed of two essential elements; firstly, an emphasis on politics and fundamentalism being intertwined, thereby excluding mystic forms of Islamic devotion such as Sufism; and secondly being part of a scriptural tradition, in the case of Islam, the Qur'an.

It is also true that the use of the term Islamic fundamentalism within popular news media can conjure up notions of militancy, extremism, violence and even terrorism. Thus, the impression

left in the minds of many is that all Muslims are an intolerant, backward and ignorant people. Images such as book burning British Muslims on the streets of Bradford in 1989 at the height of the Rushdie affair (Al-Azm, 1991; Piscatori, 1990) or celebratory Palestinians distributing festive sweets in the immediate aftermath of 9-11 (The Guardian, 2001) and a plethora of other similar images engraved in the minds of television viewers the world over, only serve to reinforce this notion.

Though this merely alludes to perceptions amongst those who have little knowledge of the diversity of views amongst Muslims as well as the rich historical contribution Islam and Muslims have made to broader civilisation, amongst Muslims themselves, there exists an historical "tension between Islamic fundamentalists and liberal Muslim intellectuals" (Najjar, 2000:177). Furthermore, Albertini (2003:455) argues that both Islamists and fundamentalist Muslims are "anti-intellectuals" by Islam's own standards of religious scholarship through a rejection of both *ijtihād* and freethinking, both of which are traditional scholarly values among classical Islamic thinkers. He further discusses the reason for this as having credence due to Islam's current scholarly vacuum (ibid. 456).

## Misconceptions surrounding Islamic fundamentalism

Appleby and Marty (2002) examined the misconceptions that surround the term fundamentalism in its general sense. Their findings are explicit and argue that:

1. All fundamentalisms are religious, rejecting scientific or secular fundamentalism since these do not have an ultimate concern which affects their actions in the way religious fundamentalists, spurred on by the promise of an eternal reward, are.

This is accurate to a certain extent, but in considering actions of groups and individuals driven by specific issues, such as animal rights or environmental activists, it can be seen that their actions are based on a form of fundamentalism, the fundamental rights of creatures or the planet in these cases. Their actions, like religious fundamentalism, is manifest across a range, or spectrum of activities and behaviour, for example, intellectual, protest, disruption, anarchy and violence.

2. Fundamentalism is not restricted to monotheist traditions, but is manifest elsewhere, in Hindu and Sikh religions, for example.

In terms of fanatic fundamentalist religious groups and sects turning to terrorism, unlike Islamic and Christian extremists, others operate, for the most part, in the confines of associated geographical limitations; Hindu and Sikh extremists in India, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan and Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas are god examples.

3. Fundamentalists are not literalists, rather the interpretation of scripture, law and tradition emphasises a reliance on hermeneutics.

In Islamic fundamentalism, it is precisely the interpretation of scripture that extreme forms of fundamentalist use to justify their methods and goals.

4. Fundamentalism does not attract only the uneducated poor, but also the educated, skilled and gainfully employed.

This is the case from both the narrow perspective of the media-driven view of fundamentalism as tantamount to violent extremism, where many active members have been shown to be well-educated and affluent affiliates, and the broader view that fundamentalists include devotional people with a strong scriptural belief. This is also true across religions.

5. Fundamentalism does not necessarily lead to violence; rather socio-cultural factors are strongly deterministic.

In the immediate aftermath of 9-11, the idea that 'Muslim equals terrorist' surfaced albeit briefly in the US. Mamdani (2002:766) writes that the absence of distinction between terrorist and civilian, in favour of a distinction on the grounds that a Muslim was either a "good Muslim" or a "bad Muslim" (and all good Muslims are non-fundamentalists, all bad Muslims are fundamentalists) in US popular discourse at the time, is extremely grave and potentially enduring. In the intervening years, this has languished into a loss of trust between Muslim and Western communities, as the unspoken feeling is that many people continue to believe or feel the phenomenon, though it is no longer articulated publicly. This point further develops Appleby and Marty's view, that all fundamentalists are not the same, rather that they exist across a range of people of social, cultural and economic backgrounds with differing political persuasions, which requires greater depth of investigation to understand than merely that purported by the mass media.

6. Fundamentalists do not oppose change but rather seek change, albeit to counter godlessness in society.

Socio-cultural norms that surround communities are thus influential on the identity of individuals and social groups within them, which in turn drives change.

7. Personality cults do not drive fundamentalism.

Personalities may be instrumental in setting or affecting agendas, or be motivational in their own right, but their *raison d'être* is to argue a case, perhaps violently, to traditional values. Thus, fundamentalist icons and cult leaders are not the same.

These outcomes are supported in part by Euben (1997), who states that fundamentalists, all too often dismissed as irrational dogmatists, with reinforcement through mass media, must actually be regarded as rationalists, who carry a "compelling yet dangerous ethico-political vision". In understanding the misconceptions, however, it becomes clear that, rather than assuming a monochromatic view of fundamentalism in Islam, it is necessary to examine and analyse the 'spectrum' of views which collectively define fundamentalists.

## The spectrum of Islamic fundamentalism



**Figure 1.** The Islamic political spectrum of fundamentalism (adapted from Dekmejian, 1995:175).

Figure 1, which Dekmejian (1995:175) discusses within the context of Islamism within Egyptian society, can be used as a model by which the examination of the context of Muslim psyche in a post 9-11 world can be understood. To define the continuum modelled, Ordinary Muslims represent the majority who practice Islam to varying degrees of regularity; Populist Muslims are those who believe in revivalism and are regular in their observance of the acts which demonstrate their faith in a conspicuous manner (prayer, fasting, Hajj etc); Social/Spiritual

Revivalists introduce organised forms onto the spectrum, movements which organise study groups, collective acts of spiritual development and simplistic forms of outreach and propagation of their faith and beliefs, mainly towards Ordinary Muslims further to the left, they are commonly devoid of political discourse; Political Gradualists represent a section of the population who are often Social/Spiritual Revivalists with an added political dimension, though non-confrontational and unchallenging of the national administration, who express themselves through organised conferences, with identifiable scholars, and often hark back to early Islamic history to illustrate deficiencies in contemporary thinking; Political Activists are Political Gradualists, who are confrontational with the administration in power, mostly through challenging current policy, political public demonstration and published works which challenge the status quo; finally, Revolutionary Jihadists are those who take up arms against the ruling elite, calling for uprising and insurgency with the view to bring about change through insurrection and follow belief structures founded on a return to an Islamic Caliphate through hostility and conflict.

Table 1 highlights broad distinguishing features across the fundamentalism spectrum, with examples. One additional entry is that of Internet usage. An interesting note of commonality across the spectrum is that, for a variety of reasons, the use of information technology, in particular the Internet is well utilised amongst Muslims globally. With limited exceptions, the Internet is viewed pragmatically, where, in contrast to say television, which is seen as demonic in some quarters, the value of the Internet as a means of 'getting the message across' seemingly trumps any criticism it may receive across the entire spectrum.

| Position on Spectrum | *Ordinary Muslims* | *Populist Islamists* | *Social/Spiritual Revivalists* | *Political Gradualists* | *Political Activists* | *Revolutionary Jihadists* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Expression of political views** | Secular Muslims, often nationalists | Individual revivalists | Collective revivalists | Expression of Islamic politics through knowledge-based revivalism | Expression of Islamic politics through demonstration, protest and 'city centre dawah' | Religious fanaticism, rejectionist philosophy, violent |
| **Level of practice** | Limited or non-practicing (inward) | Building personal character and morality through individual practice (inward) | Practicing and propagating practice (inward/outward) | Practicing Organised study groups/'circles' (inward/outward) | Practicing Propagation of desire for Islamic caliphate Methods seen as offensive and hostile (outward) | Practicing Methods seen as aggressive and irrational Propagation of political philosophy is clandestine (outward) |
| **Broader affiliations** | Identify with broader social or cultural groups Develops own sense of Islamic understanding but largely evidentially baseless | Absence of affiliations Develops own sense of Islamic understanding based on reading and reason | Organised Muslim groups Focus on collective worship and propagation Strong South Asian, North African influences | Organised conferences Identifiable contemporary scholars Strong Saudi Arabian/Yemeni/Egyptian influence | Rallies, demos and public gatherings Media target Strong Middle Eastern influence | Methods involve covert tactics and long term terrorism strategy |
| **Goals** | Integration with surrounding socio-political environment | Mutual co-existence and engagement with surrounding socio-cultural environment | Reformation of Muslims based on spiritual revivalism, covert and separatist existence within surrounding socio-cultural environment | Reformation of Muslims based on intellectual revivalism | Caliphate on the basis of nation | Caliphate on the basis of *Ummah* |
| **Example associations** | Individual ethos outside an Islamic framework Will not draw from other Islamic groups and organisations Males do not frequent local mosque | Individual ethos within an Islamic framework May draw from many other Islamic groups and organisations Males frequent local mosques, females attend conferences and grow domestic libraries | Tabligh Al-Jamaat or similar | Salafi movements or similar | Hizb ul-Tahrir, Khilafah, UK4Islam | 'al-Qaeda' |
| **Internet usage for religious purposes** | No use for religious purposes, perhaps very occasional use of *fatwa* banks, organising a Hajj trip or finding a mosque for Eid prayer | Tool for acquiring knowledge about Islam Use of *fatwa* banks Simplistic forms of networking Information about organised events | Simple forms of dissemination of ideas, not funded Forums, blogs and networking sites in common use Creation of simple *fatwa* banks | Permanently resourced and well-funded *fatwa* banks, websites, blogs etc Online universities and other educational resources, such as Arabic language learning, Imam training programmes | Organisation of events, rallies Dissemination of ideas, literature and other media, often to counteract popular media and rebut criticism Recruitment | Indoctrination and recruitment Broadcasting of terrorism information Communication of extreme media, including weapons manufacturing literature, training videos |

**Table 1.** Analysing the fundamentalist spectrum.

A point of interest across this spectrum is that the commonly held belief in the West, that of Islamic 'exceptionalism', which is that fundamentalists reject the three defining political

characteristics of modernity, namely democracy, secularism and nationalism (Kazemzadeh, 1998:52), does not hold across this entire spectrum. This again reinforces the distinction between political Islamism, where this rejection exists and apolitical fundamentalists, who subscribe to one or more of these characteristics.

Of course, the issue of fundamentalist versus non-fundamentalist is a source of debate and cannot be represented, by definition, on a fundamentalism spectrum. Further, scholars appear to vary in opinion as to whether all Muslims belong somewhere on the fundamentalism spectrum, or that the spectrum is limited, and other Muslims exist, who are not fundamentalist. Certainly, in terms of extremism, nothing further could possibly exist to the right of Revolutionary Jihadists. The debate is therefore whether or not liberality amongst Muslims can exist to the left of Ordinary Muslims on the spectrum.

In answering this issue, Monroe and Kreidie's (1997) empirical evaluation of fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist thought and practice is helpful. Through the examination of certain characteristics tested through interview, they delineated between fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist Muslims. These characteristics included level of religiosity; comprehensiveness of religious worldview; reason and revelation; conversion; identity versus choice; and cost/benefit calculus. For example, in terms of their level of religiosity, fundamentalists undoubtedly organised their lives around the Qur'an, prophetic traditions and Sharia, indicating Populist Islamist classification as the furthest left on the spectrum. In contrast, non-fundamentalists interviewed by Monroe and Kreidie, each identified with the first pillar of Islam (testimony of faith), in terms of their religious tradition, but fell short of any form of ritualistic practice, such as prayer or fasting. Other interviewees, however, saw religion as an insurance policy for the afterlife or preferred not to be labelled 'Muslim' at all, emphasising self-improvement, thus not practicing Islam to any degree outside moral or ethical norms of civilised society. This latter group, according to Monroe and Kreidie's evaluation, and supported by others, constitutes non-fundamentalist Muslims as they appear nowhere on the fundamentalist spectrum, being further to the left of Ordinary Muslims. The issue is one of perspective. Fundamentalists themselves argue that Islam, unlike Judaism, is not a racial identity and so non-fundamentalists could be considered to have left the 'fold of Islam', which, ironically, supports

the argument that all Muslims fall on the spectrum as, according to them, all others were 'apostates'. However, if the individual considers him/herself a Muslim, this could either merely expand the definition of what constitutes an Ordinary Muslim, or allows for the possibility of the existence of non-fundamentalists being to the left of the spectrum.

## A recent chronology of Islamic fundamentalism

The resurgence of religion in the latter quarter of the twentieth century was largely unexpected, since the global trend was clearly towards contemporary secularism. Hefner (2001) notes, "A key feature of world politics in recent years has been the resurgence of religious issues and organisations into public affairs. Whether with the Christian Coalition in the U.S., Hindu nationalism in India, militant Buddhism in Sri Lanka, or Islamist movements in the Muslim world, the end of the twentieth century demonstrated convincingly that high modernist reports of religion's demise were, to say the least, premature."

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neighbours, Islamist parliamentary gains were also observed in liberal Arab states such as Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt, Hizb Allah gains in Lebanon in 1992, Salafist pressure being brought to bear on the House of Saud, PLO on the defensive against Hamas in the Palestinian territories are all examples of this phenomenon. The only exceptions in the Arab world were the Ba'thists in Syria and Iraq, with Islamist resurgence appearing in those nations beyond this period.

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## Islamic reformation and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism

If we now understand that Islamic fundamentalism is much broader than its paradigm as portrayed by the mass media, that it encompasses all or nearly all Muslims across a spectrum of thought, practice and activism; consequently, that it is inclusive and not all unconstructive; we need to understand how it fits with the wider picture of Islamic reformation in recent decades. Is

it a repetitive cycle where fundamentalism and reformation are intertwined, with one driving the other, and as a by-product result in continuous growth?

In order to answer this question, it is worthwhile to examine a single issue pertinent to both reform and fundamentalist thinking across the spectrum. One such example, though many could be given, is Islamic banking.

The world of banking has witnessed an exponential growth in Islamic banking in recent years. The seeds of contemporary Islamic banking itself were sown as long ago as 1952, by the government of Saudi Arabia, with the establishment of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, which had regulatory oversight over the banking sector and carried currency issuance capability without the use of interest. This was followed by the 'real' emergence of Islamic banking in Egypt in 1963 (Roberson, 2003). The sector has continued to grow since, with growth in just the past decade, exceeding the half-century prior to it. Even conventional banks in parts of the Muslim world have converted to Islamic banking because of demand - examples include Emirates Bank, now Emirates Islamic Bank; Sharjah Bank, now Sharjah Islamic Bank. Even in the United Kingdom, where Islamic banking products were already available through Islamic-arms within conventional banks, such as HSBC and Lloyds TSB, the latest addition is a Sharia compliant bank in its entirety, called The Islamic Bank of Britain.

In terms of free market economics, this emergence must be fuelled by demand. The demand for Islamic banking as opposed to conventional banking which was already widely available indicates that fundamentalist thought, in the paradigm of the wider view articulated, is at the root of the demand. Ergo, fundamentalism must, by definition, be on the rise to generate this demand. In turn, the emergence of Islamic banking into the mainstream has caused moderates, or Ordinary Muslims and Populist Muslims on the spectrum, to reconsider their banking options, as an Islamic alternative is now available. Consequently, the act of moving money from conventional to Islamic banking plays a small, but significant part in moving the individual further to the right on the fundamentalist spectrum. Add to this a range of other issues, for example, other financial products, such as Islamic insurance, regulation and wider distribution of halal products, state funded Islamic schools and so on, the picture becomes clearer. Ever-

increasing availability of Islamic products and services, results in greater participation of them by Muslims, which in turn results in more demand, and so the cycle continues. Thus, it is clear that reform and the fundamentalist spectrum are interrelated.

## Chapter summary

In examining and defining Islamic fundamentalism, it can be argued that Islamic fundamentalism exists; that it is negatively stereotyped but is only partially a negative force; that it is inclusive of a broad spectrum of Muslims and their diverse range of views; that it is interrelated with reform in the Muslim world; and that the contemporary paradigm of Islamic fundamentalism needs to be re-examined.

This chapter has therefore argued that Islamic fundamentalism is a relevant, though deviated term, which is inclusive of perhaps all Muslims across a broad spectrum of ideas and practice. The outcome, however, is not that the term exists or its relevance, but rather to extend the discourse as to whether or not there is compatibility and potential for harmony between the spectrum of Islamic fundamentalism and the broader global community, in particular the West, and if so, can issues, such as "rationalism, humanism, secularisation, democracy and globalisation" (Hoebink, 1999:29) be reconciled, in particular between the West and political Islamic fundamentalists. This reconciliation requires deep insight as essentially the divisions are based on two opposing paradigms; those of understanding the world through divine sovereignty or a world defined by human supremacy and understanding (Euben, 1995:157). With such an extreme dichotomy of paradigms, peace, harmony and mutual co-existence, which are admirable aspirations but evidently hard to achieve, should remain at the forefront, in spite of the fact that the reality seems to be moving away from these noble goals.

The following chapters thus examine the fundamentalism continuum in more detail through a set of case studies and ask, what are the driving forces that underlie this model and how do these forces encourage adherents to Islam to move within it? To examine drivers of liberalism, the example of global sport is investigated (Chapter 3); and to understand impact in a broader context, two nation cases are examined (Chapter 4).

# CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY ON SPORT

## Introduction

What the fundamentalism continuum illustrates is that Muslims not only exist on this spectrum, but that there understanding, interpretation and implementation of Islamic teaching and values can result in movement within the continuum. However, in order for this to occur, there must be in existence forces, or drivers, which either covertly or overtly encourages such movement to occur. This may occur through the mass media, through well-funded projects, through globalisation, through sport and through agenda propagated by state apparatus.

It can also be hypothesised that underlying social conditions may affect movement on the continuum. For example, poverty and unemployment may make Muslims feel disenfranchised by the state, which develops a strong sense of inequitable treatment leading to more extreme views. British Muslims who were responsible for the London bombings of 2005, came from socially deprived towns in the north of England, are often cited to support this view. The opposite may also be true, that belonging to the middle class, with good educational and career opportunities results in moderation of values more in line with liberal, secular and capitalist values.

Within this discourse is the role of the media, which includes the print media, television and more prominently, the worldwide web. The Internet specifically, is utilised across the fundamentalism continuum with extremist groups vying to radicalise young men in particular, with more moderate organisations concentrating on education, with pluralism and morality found in Islamic teaching being pronounced.

To evaluate all these drivers is beyond the scope of this work. The focus is therefore on one important area of growing importance in the liberalisation of society, that of sport. In general, sport is considered to be a great leveller in terms of bridging cultural, social and economic divides. It also carries with it prestige and honour in all civilisations if one is seen as successful at it. Globally, no society is averse to sport and the growth in certain sporting activities to global status, coupled with investment and media participation, has made selective sporting occasions

into events of worldwide importance. Consequently, the ability to promote political, economic and social transformation at local, national and international levels has never been greater. The ability for sport to transcend physical and mental achievement of individuals and teams into a weapon for the cause of liberality is now well established.

Though sport theorists have examined global politics in relation to sport (for example, see Allison, 2005) there is a clear absence of research in the area of the Muslim world in this regard. This chapter therefore details global sporting mega-events, and by asking whether Muslim nations can go beyond mere participation to hosting such events, the views of the Muslim and the western worlds can be bridged. The chapter illustrates through examples that this tactic has been used to great effect in the past and that sport does indeed play a role in movement on the continuum toward liberalisation.

## Sport

### Global sporting events

Understanding the Islamic world has been regarded in the west as necessary for varying reasons throughout the last millennium up to the present day. Conquest, governance, exploitation and most recently engagement have been primary motivators (Ramadan, 2007). In modern times, sport, and in particular the Olympic Games, has been one amongst a number of mechanisms for promoting engagement (Carroll and Hollinshead, 1993) with politically and ideologically hostile nations from the standpoint of pluralist capitalist democracies. Prominent examples include communist and fascist regimes. Today, in a post 9/11 world, with an emphasis by the west on promoting moderation within and liberalisation of Muslim societies across the globe (Akhavi, 2003; Esposito, 2005; Rehman, 2005), it is likely that in addition to existing high levels of participation in sporting events from Muslim countries, that the world soon witnesses a global sporting event, such as the Olympic Games or FIFA World Cup Finals hosted by a city or nation in the Muslim world.

## The Olympic Games

Awarding the Olympic Games to a host city in the Muslim world would send a clear indication from member nations of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) of a desire by the international community to engage with Muslim nations on a level that transcends sport. The purpose of this analysis, therefore, is to answer the question; will a city in the Muslim world ever become host to the greatest sporting spectacle on earth, and, if so, which is most likely to receive it, when and why? Consequently, what lessons do we learn about the fundamentalism continuum based on the willingness, interest and ability of countries to consider hosting such a global event?

To gauge the potential of cities in the Muslim world hosting the Olympics Games, the approach of this chapter is to examine the merits of former host cities and then qualitatively comparing these with member countries of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) that have a majority Muslim population.

The research findings indicate that there are five cities in the Muslim world likely to be awarded at least one of the coming six summer Olympics up to the year 2040 (beginning with 2020). The broader implications of the study are that, in examining Muslim nations of the world from the point of view of a global mega-event, we can probe their development and advancement capability in the modern world. More significantly, this examination allows for a broader understanding of nations in the Muslim world.

For cities and nations in the Muslim world, there are potential and lasting political, socio-cultural and economic gains to hosting global sporting events, with reputation, global marketing opportunities, infrastructure development, travel and tourism, urban regeneration programmes and city re-branding all being key areas where hosts seek to benefit (Berg, 2008; Gold and Gold, 2008).

In order to understand the viability of greater Muslim world participation, this section focuses on the feasibility of a city in the Muslim world hosting an Olympic Games. Examining the potential of hosting a global mega-event provides insights on developmental characteristics of a city and nation. An examination into political, historic, cultural, economic and other issues is useful in

gauging the progress of the Muslim world in comparison to other developed nations. Furthermore, the awarding of an Olympic Games to a city in the Muslim world sends a clear indication of a desire to engage with it and would open a discourse that would be of value to scholars and interested parties in diverse fields such as Islamic studies, international politics, sport, economics, international development and beyond.

### *Historical purpose of the Olympics*

In modern times, the Olympic Games, as with other mega-events to lesser degrees, such as the FIFA World Cup football tournament, appear to have been defined by city-marketing, the demand for a sustainable legacy, nationalism and political issues, rather than sport. As Berg (2008:15) points out, "sport may be the style of the Olympics, but nationalism and geo-politics are (its) content." It is unclear at what historical point sport did become a sideline issue for the Olympics. Legend has it that the ancient games began with five brother-gods in Olympia who were merely seeking recreation. The eldest brother duly contrived running races with the winner awarded a crown of leaves (Papantoniou, 2008:33), thus introducing the element of competition, often found between brothers of lesser deity. This spirit of recreation and sporting competition, should be, but is certainly not the *raison d'être* of the Olympics today.

The founder of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and instigator of the modern Olympic Games, beginning with the 1896 games, Pierre de Coubertin, clearly articulated the doctrinal vision of universality as the cornerstone of the Olympic movement. Though, on the surface a noble sentiment, in practice, universalism meant that the absence of any form of discrimination and the assumption of universal ethical and moral equivalency, resulted in dictatorial communist and fascist regimes being awarded the games, to whom the success of their bids translated to being a green light to propagate their political agendas on a world stage (Berg, 2008:16). These include, most infamously, Nazi Germany (host city Berlin in 1936), as well as more recently the Soviet Union (Moscow 1970) and China (Beijing 2008). It can be argued that although these nations are representative of objectionable values at the time of hosting the games, their future was altogether different. Germany and Russia are now democratic nations with elected representation of their people. Though a direct link between hosting mega-events and political change is tenuous and cannot be substantiated, the global exposure hosting the

Olympics provides can be a contributing factor to the shifting sands of political movement in the longer term (Westerbeek, 2009). Thus, an argument for moderation and liberality within Muslim nations would likely be a covert underlying message to the Muslim world in selecting a host city within it.

For democratic nations, Olympic critics focus on political agendas of governments and individuals, with the games being used as a tool to give prominence to their hallmark cities on a world stage. Though long-term economic benefits are questionable, short-term attention-seeking strategies appear to be the main goal (Matheson, 2002). Examples of host cities proclaiming a strategy of long-term economic benefit include the Rome (host of the 1960 games), Munich (1972), Los Angeles (1984) and Barcelona (1992), all of whom delivered notably successful infrastructure and urban regeneration programmes (Pitsis *et al.*, 2003); the Sydney games (2000), which emphasised drawing increased future revenue from tourism (Berg, 2008:17; Eager, 1997); and London (2012) which has its accent on urban regeneration and city re-branding (Gold and Gold, 2008:300).

Another feature of the Olympics very pertinent to the Islamic world is that of terrorism and security. The grandiose scale of the Olympic Games in recent years has increasingly attracted two main challenges to its security. The first is as a consequence of public demonstration and the second resulting from the threat of terrorism. The Tlatelolco Massacre, which occurred during a student protest for greater human rights prior to the Mexico Olympics of 1968, resulted in approximately 300 people being killed (Berg, 2008:17). Demonstrations in the run up to the Beijing Olympics of 2008 included human rights and pro-Tibetan independence protests which marred the torch lighting ceremony in Athens as well as numerous legs of the torch relay around the globe. There were also counter demonstrations from pro-Chinese activists, in addition to demonstrations by the Chinese Muslim Uyghur population in Xinjiang province for greater autonomy and greater religious freedom. Munich saw the first instance of international terrorism at the Olympic Games in the form of hostage taking (Gold and Gold, 2008:305). A pro-Palestinian group took 11 Israeli athletes and officials' hostage inside the Olympic Village during the games. In a bungled attempt at rescue by poorly trained West German police, all 11 hostages were killed along with 5 of the 8 hostage takers and one police officer. This incident

reflected very badly on Olympic organisers as they were seen to be negligent in preparations for such an eventuality. In the case of the Munich massacre, inaccurate initial reports of all terrorists being killed and all hostages surviving the ordeal only served to exacerbate the harm to the reputation of the organisers.

### The Olympics and Muslim nations

The mythology surrounding the ancient Olympiad raises controversy and debate amongst Muslims as to its acceptability and relevance from the perspective of Islamic tradition. This is due to the pagan and polytheistic foundation of the tradition that envelops the history of the games coming into conflict with the monotheistic tradition of Islam, which is seen by Muslims as being sacrosanct. Much of the Olympic tradition preserved as part of the ceremony during the Olympics is a reflection of this conflicting tradition, which many Muslims find contravene their own beliefs to the extent of negating participation. However, this sentiment is largely articulated on an individualistic level, but there is growing interest amongst the nations of the Muslim world vis-à-vis partaking in global sporting events, both as event participants represented through an Olympic team and establishing a National Olympic Committee, as well as aspiring to put forward potential host cities. The general view of the Olympics is therefore participatory and positive, with Muslim nations having a long history of involvement and, more recently, entering bidding contests to host future games. The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) themselves, also recognising the importance of sport to development, whilst attempting to balance Islamic conservatism preventing female participants from entering other global events or public sporting activities, began a multinational, multi-sport event of its own in Saudi Arabia in 2005, called the Islamic Solidarity Games. The event was envisaged to run every four years, though Iran is due to be the next host in 2010, following a five-year gap. Additionally, Iran continues to host the Women's Islamic Games, with four games having been held since 1993. The popularity of these games has steadily increased, from only 10 participating OIC member nations in 1993, to 44 nations in the latest games held in 2005.

*Methodology*

The methodological framework of the research is exploratory and followed a process-based method for creating a shortlist of candidate Muslim cities as illustrated in Figure 2.

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│  Member nations of  │              │ Olympic host city data │
│        OIC          │              │   from 1960 to 2016 │
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                           │ Analysis of OIC nation │
                           │  shortlist against │
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                           │ Selected Muslim host │
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
**Figure 2.** Process flow diagram for method of potential host city selection in the Muslim world.

*Results and analysis*

There are 56 member states of the OIC, which has its headquarters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Member countries have Muslim populations of a minimum 10%. Table 2 lists only those countries that have majority Muslim populations (50% or more) and are member states of the OIC. Population and governance data is also included. Additionally, the Palestinian territories, (which has competed in the past four Olympic Games) is also a member of the OIC, but Kosovo, which was supported in its independence movement by the OIC, is not yet a member state.

| Country | Total Population | Muslim % | Religion and state | Type of government |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | 27,601,038 | 100% | Islamic state | Absolute monarchy |
| Maldives | 350,000 | 100% | State religion | Presidential republic |
| Mauritania | 3,124,000 | 99.99% | Islamic state | Military junta |
| Somalia | 9,558,666 | 99.9% | State religion | Coalition government |
| Turkey | 71,517,100 | 99.8% | Secular | Parliamentary democracy |
| Algeria | 33,769,669 | 99% | State religion | Presidential republic |
| Afghanistan | 32,738,376 | 99% | Islamic state | Presidential republic |
| Morocco | 33,723,418 | 99% | State religion | Constitutional monarchy |
| Yemen | 23,013,376 | 99% | Islamic state | Presidential republic |
| Iran | 70,495,782 | 98% | Islamic state | Presidential republic |
| Tunisia | 10,383,577 | 98% | State religion | Presidential republic |
| Comoros | 798,000 | 98% | State religion | Federal republic |
| Pakistan | 172,800,000 | 97% | Islamic state | Semi-presidential republic |
| Iraq | 28,221,181 | 97% | State religion | Parliamentary democracy |
| Tajikistan | 7,215,700 | 97% | Secular | Presidential republic |
| Libya | 6,173,579 | 97% | State religion | Jamahiriya Revolution |
| Jordan | 5,568,565 | 95% | state religion | Constitutional monarchy |
| Senegal | 11,658,000 | 94% | Secular | Semi-presidential republic |
| Djibouti | 496,374 | 94% | Secular | Semi-presidential republic |
| Azerbaijan | 8,676,000 | 93.4% | Secular | Presidential republic |
| Oman | 2,577,000 | 93% | State religion | Absolute monarchy |
| Egypt | 77,100,000 | 90% | State religion | Semi-presidential republic |
| Syria | 19,405,000 | 90% | None | Authoritarian republic |
| Niger | 13,272,679 | 90% | Secular | Parliamentary democracy |
| Mali | 11,995,402 | 90% | Secular | Semi-presidential republic |
| The Gambia | 1,700,000 | 90% | Secular | Presidential republic |
| Bangladesh | 162,221,000 | 89% | State Religion | Parliamentary democracy |
| Turkmenistan | 5,110,023 | 89% | Secular | Parliamentary republic |
| Uzbekistan | 27,372,000 | 88% | Secular | Presidential republic |
| Indonesia | 228,582,000 | 86.1% | None | Presidential republic |
| Guinea | 10,211,437 | 85% | Secular | Military junta |
| Kuwait | 3,399,637 | 85% | State religion | Constitutional monarchy |
| Bahrain | 1,046,814 | 81% | State religion | Constitutional monarchy |
| Albania | 3,170,048 | 79.9% | None | Parliamentary republic |
| Qatar | 744,029 | 77.5% | State religion | Absolute monarchy |
| United Arab Emirates | 5,432,746 | 76% | State religion | Federal constitutional monarchy |
| Kyrgyzstan | 5,356,869 | 75% | Secular | Semi-presidential republic |
| Sudan | 39,379,358 | 70% | None | Authoritarian republic |
| Brunei | 381,371 | 67% | State religion | Absolute monarchy |
| Malaysia | 27,730,000 | 60.4% | State religion | Parliamentary democracy and Elective Monarchy |
| Sierra Leone | 6,294,774 | 60% | None | Presidential republic |
| Lebanon | 4,196,453 | 60% | None | Parliamentary democracy |
| Kazakhstan | 15,217,711 | 57% | Secular | Presidential republic |
| Chad | 5,041,690 | 54% | Secular | Presidential republic |
| Nigeria | 154,279,000 | 50% | None | Presidential Federal Republic |
| Burkina Faso | 13,228,000 | 50% | Secular | Semi-presidential republic |

**Table 2.** List of majority Muslim countries (ranked by Muslim population as percentage of total population) that are member states of the OIC.

*Olympic host city bid successes since 1960 and OIC shortlist*

To examine the possibility of a city from the Muslim world hosting the Olympic Games, I have first examined past history of the modern Olympics, and have researched host cities and criteria by which selection chances are amplified. Thus, by applying key factors for becoming a host city for the Olympic Games to the OIC list of Muslim member countries, nations which are unsuitable can be eliminated from their list. Sufficient development to fund the necessary infrastructural requirements that the Olympic Games demand is first and foremost.

According to the most recent selection process, that for the 2016 games, eventually awarded to Rio de Janeiro, the IOC apply 11 technical criteria to select an Olympic host city, namely, government support; infrastructure; sporting venues; planned Olympic village; environmental conditions and impact; accommodation; transport plan; safety and security; past events experience; finance; and overall project and legacy (International Olympic Committee, 2009). In terms of the process of selection, host cities wishing to bid, prepare their bids typically a minimum of three years prior to the IOC decision. The decision itself is approximately seven years prior to the games. Thus, a decade or more is committed by a host city in preparing a bid, being award the games, and actually hosting the event (Hasan, 1999).

| Country | Host City | Olympic Year | GDP (PPP) per capita (US$) | GDP (millions of US$) |
|---------|-----------|--------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| Italy | Rome | 1960 | 38,996 | 2,313,893 |
| Japan | Tokyo | 1964 | 38,457 | 4,910,692 |
| Mexico | Mexico City | 1968 | 10,200 | 1,088,128 |
| Germany | Munich | 1972 | 44,729 | 3,673,105 |
| Canada | Montreal | 1976 | 45,085 | 1,499,551 |
| USSR/ Russia | Moscow | 1980 | 11,807 | 1,676,586 |
| USA | Los Angeles, Atlanta | 1984, 1996 | 47,440 | 14,441,425 |
| South Korea | Seoul | 1988 | 19,136 | 929,124 |
| Spain | Barcelona | 1992 | 35,117 | 1,601,964 |
| Australia | Sydney | 2000 | 46,824 | 1,013,461 |
| Greece | Athens | 2004 | 32,105 | 357,548 |
| China | Beijing | 2008 | 3,259 | 4,327,448 |
| Great Britain | London | 2012 | 43,734 | 2,680,000 |
| Brazil | Rio de Janeiro | 2016 | 8,295 | 1,572,839 |

**Table 3.** List of countries to have hosted the Summer Olympics with corresponding host cities, GDP (nominal) per capita and GDP (nominal) based on IMF and World Bank 2008 statistics.

Table 3 shows fiscal statistics for host nations of the Summer Olympics from 1960. Though these are all 2008 statistics, they provide a reasonable benchmark of national development and indicate the general level of economic stability (Mules, 2005). Consequently, under-developed and developing nations below historic success thresholds can be eliminated from the OIC list as unsuitable to host the games, as it can be reasonably assumed that financial guarantees demanded by the IOC would not be forthcoming. Based on this, and using the lowest approximate value from previous games, nations with per capita GDP below 3,000 US$ (similar to China who hosted the 2008 games in Beijing) and GDP below 350,000 Million US$ (similar to Greece (Nixon, 2005) who hosted the 2004 games in Athens), results in 21 member nations from the OIC being removed.

Furthermore, other OIC member nations have been removed due to a variety of other reasons. Iraq has been removed as, due to recent wars, security and poor infrastructure, it will likely take decades to reach standards required. Saudi Arabia is also not shortlisted, as religious conservatism will impede hosting public events with the participation of women and broader media issues would be too restrictive; Syria and Iran both have longstanding political tensions with Israel and USA, particularly on the issues of Palestine, Lebanon, Hezbollah, nuclear proliferation and disputed territories such as the Golan Heights, which will likely negate IOC confidence for the foreseeable future. However, Iran, with a solid history of participation in the Olympics and strong historical and cultural significance, remains in the list for further analysis. Bahrain and Maldives are inadequate in size (665 and 300 sq km respectively) to host the games. Though Bahrain has successfully hosted a Formula 1 motor sport race annually since 2004, this global event is a single event with comparatively limited impact. The Maldives, which is topographically the lowest country on the planet, consequently suffers from environmental issues, most widely publicised being the catastrophic Tsunami in 2004. Maldives is thus not a viable host option, though fiscally more stable than others already rejected from the OIC list. The majority of this nation of atolls will likely disappear over the course of this century and the current priority of the government of the Maldives is to actively seek the purchase of land elsewhere, in order to relocate the nation's inhabitants. I have also excluded nations who have no substantive Olympic record, in that they have never won a single medal at the Olympics. These additional nations are Albania, Brunei, Oman, Jordan, Turkmenistan and Libya.

Analysing and deconstructing the technical criteria for selecting a host city by the IOC, listed earlier, can now be done in the context of the remaining Muslim countries and their likely bidding cities. Factors which indicate possible success in bidding include whether or not a potential host city has a past history of bidding, though it is reassuring to some Muslim hosts that have not bid previously, that five out of the last six cities to have hosted the Olympic Games won on their first bid attempt. Other factors are the cultural and historical significance of the host city and/or country; political stability; social stability including religious freedom, racial equality, human rights, equality of women and non-discrimination; security risk based on recent history; the existence of sporting, transportation and hospitality infrastructure upon which a bid can be built; a history of hosting other mega-events, either regional or global and the outcome of them. The final factor included in the list is provision of a public fiscal guarantee. Due to rising costs of hosting the games, coupled with interest at an international level, the IOC cannot, more than ever, risk failure in the delivery of an Olympic Games. Consequently, the committee decided that governments must act as financial guarantor when a city bids to host the Olympics (Lenskyj, 2004:370). These factors are not exhaustive, but provide indicators as to the likelihood of success by a Muslim nation to bid for one of its cities to host the games in the near future. Applying all the measures and eliminations described, an analysis of the remaining 14 member nations of the OIC based on the criteria outlined is given in Table 4.

| Country (bidding city) | Continent | Past bid as host (city) | Olympic history | History and Traditions | Political stability | Security (historical) | Existing infrastructure | Major sporting events held | GDP (PPP) per capita (US$) | GDP (millions of US$) | Potential host |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Algeria (Algiers) | Africa | - | 11 games 14 medals | Rich in tradition pre and post Islam, Ottoman and French rule, UNESCO World Heritage sites | Improving since cancelled elections of 1991 led to a decade of unrest | Unrest of 1990s resulted in many athletes resettling in France | Strong economy, low fiscal deficit and good energy sector revenues Fair air, road and rail network, limited but growing hospitality and tourism sector | Mediterranean Games (1975) | 6,538 | 159,669 | Though IOC expressed wish for African nation for 2020, Algeria still recovering from political and social unrest of 1990s so bid in near future is unrealistic |
| Azerbaijan (Baku) | Eurasia | 2016 (Baku) | 4 games 16 medals | Rich in folklore, music, art, architecture and sport | First Muslim world secular democracy 1918 Women's hijab banned in public buildings | Stable since independence from USSR | Sound business infrastructure according to World Bank, economic growth, good transportation and penetration of telecoms | Limited scale - e.g. Chess tournaments (Baku 2008 FIDE Grand Prix) | 7,656 | 46,378 | Though politically, economically and geographically sound, needs to develop infrastructure and portfolio of sporting venues and events |
| Egypt (Cairo) | Africa | - | 19 games 24 medals | Very rich and diverse history 3rd and 4th dynasties date to around 3000 BC when pyramids were built, Tutankhamen ruled from 1336 BC for nine years, Assyrians (671 BC), Persia (525 BC), Alexander the Great (332 BC), Islam (642), Cairo founded (969), Ottomans (1517), Napoleon (1798), Egyptology from around 1820 | Independent since 1953, semi-democratic presidential system, Hosni Mubarak served last five terms with Muslim Brotherhood his main opponents Peasant activism and emergency law (since 1967) also persist | Recent history of terrorist shootings and bombings of tourists around Egypt Most deadly were 62 tourists shot and killed at Luxor (1997) and 88 killed in bombings in Sharm el-Sheikh (2005) | Developing infrastructure, well developed media, growth in telecoms (Etisalat and Orascom) Development marred by corruption Transportation infrastructure is dated though functional, Cairo well equipped for tourism, mega-event hosting needs development | No significant event hosted since the inaugural Mediterranean Games of 1951 in Alexandria | 5,491 | 162,617 | Cairo currently reviewing its potential to host major sporting events |
| Indonesia (Jakarta) | Asia | - | 13 games 25 medals | Diverse influences of indigenous and foreign settlers Religion covers Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Confucianism Religious and ethnic fusion shapes much of the cultural tradition Chinese and Indian tradition is also strong, e.g. in cuisine | Annexation of East Timor in (1978) and human rights abuses alleged following independence (1999) was condemned internationally Political reform followed 1998 revolution and the resignation of Suharto Founding member of ASEAN | Jemaah Islamiyah Islamist group (al-Qaeda affiliated) have targeted tourist destinations and western interests across Indonesia: Jakarta Stock Exchange (2000) 15 dead; Christmas Eve Bombings (2000) 18 dead; Bali (2002) 202 dead; Marriott Hotel (2003) 12 dead; Australian embassy (2004) 9 dead; Bali (2005) 20 dead; Jakarta (2009) 7 dead | Sound tourist and transportation infrastructure Olympic scale development required in areas, such as stadia, but this could form part of a bid | Asian Games 1962, South East Asian Games 1979, 1987, 1997 Asian Judo Championships (1981) | 3,725 | 511,765 | Regional al-Qaeda supported terrorism remains a major obstacle for Indonesia (Schwarz, 2000) |
| Iran (Tehran) | Asia | Considered bid for 1984 but withdrew | 14 games 48 medals | Dates to 4000 BC, a former empire and superpower in the form of Persia, Islamic conquest in the 7th century, a Shi'a majority nation since the 16th century, ruled by a Shah from this time until the Islamic revolution of 1979 Iran is best known culturally for its film industry, literature, architecture and cuisine | Issues on nuclear proliferation, Israel persist Uprising following 2009 presidential elections | Accusations of sponsorship of international and regional terrorism against Ahmedinejad regime from Israel and western nations Sunni militant groups carry out terrorist attacks within Iran, e.g. Zahedan bombing (2007) which killed 18 | Believed Iran withdrew from 1984 bid due to recognition of level of infrastructure expenditure required | Asian Games 1974; West Asian Games (1997, 2010) | 10,624 | 335,233 | In the current climate, a Tehran games would likely result in a return to boycotts (such as in 1980 and 1984) from western nations, which the IOC would certainly wish to avoid |
| Kazakhstan (Almaty) | Asia | Almaty bid for 2014 Winter Olympics | 4 games 39 medals | Post-Soviet culture developing, with influences from Islam and neighbouring nation of China and Russia | Stable though political rights, religious freedom, independence of the judiciary and civil liberties of inhabitants is criticised | No attacks to date, though Kazak's recent westward leanings is raising the level of perceived threat | Major energy producer Fair transportation and telecoms infrastructure Landlocked nation in highly strategic location-Silk Road and O&G pipelines Kazak government investing over $700 Mn into development for ASIAD 2011 | Almaty will host the Asian Winter Games 2011 Asian Judo Championships (2004) | 11,086 | 135,601 | With a good summer climate, Kazakhstan could build on its Winter Olympics bid and ASIAD 2011 winter success and consider a bid for a Summer Olympics |
| Kuwait (Kuwait City) | Asia | - | 11 games 1 medal | Greek, Ottoman and British have ruled region through history Kuwait founded in 1705 by Bani Utbah Independence in 1961 Follows well-documented Gulf Arab tradition (Kennedy, 2004) | Stable constitutional monarchy since 1961 with political parties representative of religious sects within the country | No major incidents since first Gulf War and, in recent years, terrorist plots have been allegedly thwarted against US military interests in Kuwait | Affluent Gulf nation, high standard of development marred by first Persian Gulf war in 1990/1 Olympic Infrastructural development must take high temperatures and humidity into account | West Asian Games (2002) Football tournaments: Gulf Cup of Nations regional (1974, 1990, 2003); Arab Nations Cup (1964, 2002); Asian Cup (1980) Asian Judo Championships (1984, 2007) | 39,305 | 158,089 | Good potential |
| Lebanon (Beirut) | Asia | - | 15 games 4 medals | Ottoman rule Independence from French and British rule since 1941 | Though election of Saad Hariri in Nov 2009 officially brings an end to a lengthy period of time with effectively two governments followed by a power vacuum, political tension remains high | A litany of hijacking, terrorism, war and assassinations in recent history | Arab-Israeli tensions have affected Lebanon since the 1967 war, civil war 1975-1990, Israel control of southern Lebanon 1978, Israeli attacks follow and buffer zone set up in 1983 | No significant event hosted since the Mediterranean Games of 1959 | 11,270 | 27,918 | Political instability, Arab-Israeli tension, borders with Syria and Israel, economic impact of civil war and social strife, means Lebanon is not equipped for a major event in the foreseeable future |

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| Country (City) | Region | | Games/Medals | History | Political | Security | Economy/Infrastructure | Sporting events | | | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | Tensions continue to today with Israeli invasion July 2006 | | | | | |
| Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur) | Asia | - | 11 games 4 medals | Islamic rule and Portuguese, Dutch and British colonialism have defined Malaysia until independence (1957) Multi-ethnic and multi-religious society | Mahathir Mohammed's 22 years as Prime Minister (1981-2003) saw a decline in democratic values Economic decline and subsequent crime and ethnic tensions in recent years | Malaysian Jemaah Islamiyah members believed to be involved in Indonesian attacks No attacks on Malaysian soil in recent years, though warnings persist from western nations (Goh, 1994) | Vibrant tourist sector and transportation infrastructure is good, backed by sustainable economic growth Largest stadium by capacity in the Muslim world | Formula 1 Grand Prix; South East Asian Games (1977, 1989, 2001) Commonwealth Games (1998) | 13,315 | 207,116 | Good potential |
| Morocco (Rabat) | Africa | - | 12 games 21 medals | Berber, Roman, Islamic rule, French and Spanish protectorate, independence 1956 | Stable constitutional monarchy | Casablanca has seen suicide bombings in 2003 (33 killed) and 2007 (1 killed in 3 separate incidents) Madrid bombings of 2004 which killed 191 linked to same terror group | Popular tourist destination with good related infrastructure | Mediterranean Games (1983 in Casablanca) | 4,076 | 88,879 | Expected to bid for 2020, IOC expressed wish for African nation for 2020 Security remains a problem |
| Qatar (Doha) | Asia | 2016 (Doha) | 7 games 2 medals | Ruled by Ottomans, Safavid Iran, Bahrain and Oman, British protectorate post First World War, independence in 1971 | Stable absolute monarchy, with comparatively liberal society within a Gulf context | Underlying threat, one suicide attack in 2005 killed one expatriate resident | Excellent transportation and hospitality infrastructure including easy international passage Sporting infrastructure limited with only one 50,000+ seater stadium | Asian Games 2006; West Asian Games (2005) | 80,870 | 102,302 | Strong candidate with history of bidding, stable liberal society, strong economy and excellent infrastructure Considering to bid for 2020 (Doha) Climate is the only major issue |
| Tunisia (Tunis) | Africa | - | 12 games 7 medals | Roman, Islamic/Ottoman and French rule, independence 1956 | Presidential democracy with state law banning Islamic political parties Secularism is protected vigorously, women for example are not allowed to wear the hijab in public buildings Media/Internet is censored, public criticism of authoritarian regime restricted | Al-Qaeda sponsored suicide bombing of synagogue (2002) killed 21, including 14 German tourists | Economically sound, highly self-sufficient, with strong growth especially during 1990s, good urban development, real estate boom and effective poverty reduction measures taken Good transportation system Football-loving nation with three 50,000+ seater stadia | Mediterranean Games (1967, 2001) | 7,473 | 40,348 | Potential future candidate |
| Turkey (Istanbul) | Eurasia | 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 games (Istanbul) | 20 games 82 medals | Trukey is on the Anatolian Peninsula, Perisan Empire, fell to Alexander the Great in 334 BC, later Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire from Constantine I (324 CE) Byzantine fell in 1453 to Ottoman Empire (led by Mehmed II) which spread across the known world, only falling in 1920 in the Treaty of Sevres after World War I Turkish War of Independence followed led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ataturk) who later established the Republic of Turkey and became its first president Today, Turkey is secular | Parliamentary democracy with close ties to the West, member of NATO with military bases, bidding for EU membership Invaded Cyprus in 1974, remains disputed territory with Greek Cypriot nation Strongly secular, women's hijab banned in public buildings | Terrorist attacks and bombings (1999, 2003, 2004 and 2008, 94 civilian deaths) | Economically strong, high growth in recent years and diversified industry Good transportation with new high speed rail network Largest auto racing venue in the Muslim world | Formula 1 Grand Prix; Mediterranean Games (1971 in Izmir) | 12,888 | 729,983 | Expected to bid for 2020 Strongest bidding and participation history of Olympics from the Muslim world Terrorism remains a major obstacle for Turkey to be awarded the Olympics Resolution of Cyprus issue and EU membership will strengthen Turkey in the medium term |
| United Arab Emirates (Dubai) | Asia | - | 7 games 1 medal | Formerly known as the Trucial States through agreement with the British in the 19th century Independent federation established in 1971 Highly dependent on expatriate workforce which accounts for over 70% of the nation's population UAE is historically charitable, supporting relief efforts after natural disasters, support for Palestine and African development projects in all estimated at around $40 Bn in foreign aid and soft loans since 1971 | Operates as a federation of seven emirates under a constitutional monarchy Highly tolerant, liberal and religiously inclusive society by Gulf standards, particularly compared to neighbours Iran and Saudi Arabia Human rights, particularly of low paid expatriate workers from poorer developing nations remains an issue of international criticism, though measures have been taken in recent years | UAE has cooperated strongly with the west since the 1991 Gulf War Financial dealings of al-Qaeda in the UAE to fund 9/11 hijackers brought criticism of money laundering, which the UAE has clamped down on | IMF classifies UAE as a high income developing economy, with fourth largest oil reserves in the world UAE and Dubai in particular are ambitious Largest infrastructure expenditure in the Gulf region in recent years Significant expenditure on transport infrastructure, 20th busy airport in the world, Dubai Metro recently opened, boasts the tallest building, tallest hotel in the world, huge offshore real estate projects Growth tempered by global recession in 2008/9 | Formula 1 Grand Prix (Abu Dhabi) The International Cricket Council moved from Lord's Cricket ground to Dubai in 2005 | 37,293 | 262,150 | Expected to bid for 2020 (Dubai) Ambitious development of 'DubaiLand' and Dubai Sport City as well as continued infrastructure development in real estate, travel and tourism markets makes Dubai a strong competitor for Olympic success Dubai, as with other Gulf bidding cities, has a very hot and humid climate in the summer months which is a concern for the Olympics, though the UAE plans to counteract this with temperature controlled venues as far as possible and perhaps, hosting the games later in the year |

**Table 4.** Selection of potential host nations (cities) for the Olympic Games from majority Muslim countries (ranked by total population) based on key measures.

Former bidding cities from the Muslim world are limited. Notably, Istanbul with four bids has had the greatest number of unsuccessful bids in Olympic history. It is possible that the unsuccessful bids of Baku and Doha for the 2016 Olympic Games may have been intended purely for exposure and the establishment of a bidding history before embarking on serious attempts in the future, rather than a serious expectation of award. However, Istanbul and Doha once again, together with Dubai and Rabat, are all developing bids for the 2020 games, a decision on which is expected in 2013. The IOC has indicated a desire for an African host city in that year and, should they add the nations of the Arabian Peninsula, the stakes could not be higher.

From the analysis detailed in Table 3, ten cities have a favourable chance of success in the next six bidding contests to host the Olympic Games (though others may emerge in time). These are the three Persian Gulf (Asian) cities of Doha, Kuwait City and Dubai; the three African cities of Cairo, Rabat and Tunis; the two (further) Asian cities of Almaty and Kuala Lumpur and the two Eurasian cities of Baku and Istanbul.

Among these ten cities, five are the strongest candidates. Istanbul potentially is the most promising host nation for the Olympics. Its major drawbacks are terrorism, the geo-politics of a divided Cyprus and, to comparatively lesser degrees, infrastructure and finance (Nielson, 1992). The strength of Turkey's participation in earlier Olympic Games, coupled with Istanbul's long bidding history, means the IOC may wish to prioritise Turkey and wait for them to alleviate their problems and obtain EU membership before awarding them the first games in the Muslim world. If, however, the IOC is not inclined to wait, a Persian Gulf city is the next likely recipient in the Muslim world, based on this analysis, of hosting the games. Doha, which bid to host the 2016 games, failed, in part, due to it wishing to host the event in late October (Doha 2016 Olympic Bid Committee, 2008), as opposed to the traditional summer months, as its summertime temperatures can soar to up to 50 degrees Celsius. Though the bidding committee for Doha emphasised that hosting the games later in the year is not without precedent, with Melbourne (1956), Tokyo (1964) and Mexico City (1968) all hosting their games between October and December, these games pre-date the times when television rights and global audiences became of paramount importance. It is, along with Dubai, likely to bid for the 2020 games, with an

assurance for holding the games during the more traditional summer months, with promises of temperature-controlled venues. Both cities, being very similar in terms of climate, are more than capable of delivering such venues due to their economic wealth as well as experience in infrastructure development, but the recent emphasis on greener games may hamper such bids. Events, such as the marathon, a signature event at the Olympics, would also remain adversely affected by high summer temperatures and high humidity. Finally, Kuala Lumpur and Cairo show potential. Kuala Lumpur is currently not targeting hosting the games, with the Olympic Council of Malaysia making no reference to competing to host the games in their last three annual general meetings (Olympic Council of Malaysia, 2009). Cairo is still in the infancy of developing a bid.

Today, as through the history of the modern Olympics, the economic and political value of hosting a global mega-event is viewed very optimistically. Whether or not the reality is positive or not is a source of debate. However, from the politics in Berlin in 1936, Moscow in 1980 and Beijing in 2008 to the economics of profitability and tourism in Los Angeles in 1984 and Sydney in 2000, to city recognition and infrastructural improvements that signified Barcelona in 1992; there is ample evidence of the long-term value of the games if one looks for it. This research can act as catalyst for member nations of the OIC to recognise that from a comparable viewpoint, it is potentially in their long term geo-political and socio-economic interests for a member nation to host the Olympics. This evaluation sets out factors upon which the member nations of the OIC may contemplate developing an approach for securing an Olympic Games in the Muslim world, and developing an agenda for its legacy of engagement with the rest of the world. From the viewpoint of the broader international community, engagement with the Muslim world could not be more necessary or timely than at present, and sport has historically been demonstrated as an effective tool in achieving similar goals.

## FIFA World Cup football

In terms of mega-sporting events that take place globally, only the FIFA World Cup is remotely comparable to the Olympics in terms of scale and worldwide appeal, though this is a single sport event, which eases infrastructural as well as other issues. Here, the likelihood of a Muslim host

in the near future is growing; though identifying a likely candidate nation is probably more difficult than for the Olympics. FIFA has historically rotated this event, which also takes place every four years like the Olympics, between Europe and the Americas, due to the enormity of participation in the sport being historically from those two continents. This is changing, however, with South Africa due to be the first African nation to host the event in 2010 and Japan and South Korea already having been given the opportunity to jointly host the tournament in 2002, becoming the first Asian World Cup football hosts. FIFA have also announced that it is formally abandoning its Euro-American rotation from 2018. This news does open the door for Muslim nations to bid to host future World Cup tournaments. In terms of Muslim nation participation in the contest, only Turkey has recorded any level of success historically, having won fourth place in 2002. Being a nation likely to join the European Union in the future, Turkey potentially is a promising host nation for both the FIFA World Cup tournament as well as the Olympics. Its major drawbacks are primarily terrorism, the geo-politics of a divided Cyprus and, to comparatively lesser degrees, infrastructure and finance (Nielson, 1992).

With recent choices of host nations, FIFA have also sent a message that having a long international tradition of football in a country is diminishing as a point of relevance when it comes to being a host of the World Cup Finals. Of the five most recent tournaments (including 2010), three have been awarded to non-traditional football playing nations. Host nations USA in 1994 are largely seen as having been awarded the tournament to allow football, the most popular sport on earth, to penetrate the most affluent untapped market in the world. Nevertheless, the expected marketing opportunities and revenues from developing the game in the USA after the tournament were not forthcoming, as the nation's interest in sport was found to be largely saturated by American football, basketball, baseball and hockey. South Korea/Japan (2002) and South Africa (2010) are both further attempts at penetrating broader international markets for football, with the level of interest in the sport in both Asia and Africa extremely high. In most Muslim nations too, football is the most popular sport. Thus, with FIFA's cancellation of the rotation system for selecting host nations for the tournament and their evident and articulated desire to penetrate broader markets, it seems the potential for a future Muslim host nation for the FIFA World Cup is growing. The only issue, like the Olympics, is identifying suitable candidates.

## Muslim women and sport

Though Islam teaches equality in physical as well as spiritual development of both men and women, cultural influences remain dominant in preventing women from fully contributing in sport. To analyse gender issues in sport thoroughly would require an extensive independent work beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, published statistics on the participation of Muslim women in sport across Muslim nations have illustrated that their involvement in sport is both varied from one country to the next and is dependent on whether the women live in relatively freer urban settings of are from rural areas. Other important factors include the degree of 'Westernisation' of society, in other words, greater liberalisation and commitment to secular ideals, as well as the penetration of nationalist and socialist ideology. Another important issue is teaching of physical education in schools for girls. Generally, this is officially compulsory in schools. In practice, due to traditional Islamic values that require segregation of the sexes is often neglected where such segregation is difficult to organise. For the most part, women become qualified as teachers or healthcare professionals in Muslim countries, rather than for participation in sport at a world-class level. According to Sfeir (1985), however, change is taking place, albeit at a very slow pace.

## Chapter summary

This chapter discussed the role of drivers of liberalism and extremism within the context of the fundamentalist continuum and, by analysing the globalisation of sport in detail has sought to understand the implications of its role in promoting a liberal agenda in the Muslim world. To further this analysis, rather than examine drivers (causes) of liberalism/extremism, it is useful to investigate their impact within nations (effects). As such, the following chapter looks at two nations as case studies; the first is of Muslims living as a minority (Britain) and the second is Muslims living as a majority (United Arab Emirates). Both are examined in relation to the fundamentalism continuum to determine what movements within the continuum on an individual, collective and national level.

# CHAPTER 4: NATIONAL CASE STUDIES

## Introduction

In order to understand the fundamentalism continuum in terms of its relevance to Muslims in a given nation and to understand what changes have been occurring on the continuum in recent years from individual, collective and national perspectives, this chapter conducts case studies on two sample countries; one in a Muslim minority country, the other in a Muslim majority country. The countries have been carefully selected as both their Muslim societies have undergone significant transformations in recent years, which need analysis and understanding. Thus, the first case explores Muslims living as a minority in Britain under a secular, democratic constitution. The second examines Muslims living as a majority under an Islamic constitution in the United Arab Emirates. The findings demonstrate the breadth and diversity of views, practices and socio-cultural norms existent within the two countries, postulated as representative of a great spectrum of views and practice across Muslims around the world.

## Case study on British Muslims

### Demography

In the 2001 census, the total population of the United Kingdom was close to 60M people, making the nation the third largest in Europe behind Germany and France. The United Kingdom in the twenty first century is multicultural and has diverse religious communities. Christians form the largest religious group, making up approximately 43% of the population. Muslims, who constitute about 2.7% of the population, account for 1.6M people and are therefore the second largest religious group. However, the combined figures for those stating they have no religion and those choosing not to state their religion on the census accounts for 23% of the population. Other religious groups include Hindus (1%), Sikhs (0.6%), Jews (0.5%) and Buddhists (0.3%).

## British Muslim identity

The significant identity issues facing British-born Muslims, the interrelationships between British identity, culture and religious devotion amongst British men of South Asian origin, with a particular focus on those of Indian and Pakistani origin, are examined in this case study. A review of extant literature revealed that a coherent and unifying force has not emerged which defines British Islam and that sectarian divisions and cultural allegiances have, and continue to be, the defining characteristic of British Muslims. Furthermore, loyalty to ones motherland continues to play a strong part in identifying first generation British-born Muslims. In order to test these views further, a survey of British Muslim men of Indo-Pak origin was undertaken, with a view to understanding the perspective, opinion and biases of this segment of British society, in a contemporary context. The findings of the survey revealed a deep commitment and conviction to Islam, a sense of loyalty to Muslim countries and preferential views in their favour where political views come into conflict with British values, a want for unity amongst Muslims from different cultural and religious groups in Britain, disdain and mistrust of those responsible for the portrayal of Muslim minorities living in Britain including the media and a want for the abandonment of South Asian cultural practices which continue to influence a desired traditional Islamic message.

The study of identity in its broad context deals with religion, ethnicity, custom and class. It has undergone significant transformation in recent decades, largely due to a shift in paradigm, from considering identity in "fixed and settled terms" to its contemporary understanding as being "malleable and constantly shaped by the changing context" (Ansari, 2004: 6).

In the context of Muslims living in Britain, it is agreed that the social and religious challenges to this community are extremely broad and difficult to navigate successfully. Marriage and the role of women (Abbas, 2003; Archer, 2002), the origin and education of Imams (Werbner, 1996), the role of religious leaders (El Fadl, 1994), the dichotomy between tradition and religion (Hasan, 1994; Bilgrami, 1992), fundamentalist terrorism and Islamophobia (Rehman, 2004), education (Carroll and Hollinshead, 1993), employment, Islamic schools (Hewer, 2001), the hijab, sectarian division (Bharucha, 2003; Hasan, 1994), allegiance to the motherland over loyalty to Britain (Lewis, 2002; Geaves, 1999), interfaith dialogue (Westerlund, 2003), global politics

(Akhavi, 2003; Leonard, 2002), the Rushdie affair (Al-Azm, 1991; Piscatori, 1990), 9-11 (Fetzer and Soper, 2003), 7-7 (Rehman, 2004), Islamic revivalism (Thomson, 1937) and priorities facing the Muslim Ummah (Al-Qardawi, 2000; Denny, 1994), are all part and parcel of the obstacles and discourse amongst Muslims living in Britain.

Identity in a religious context amongst minorities can be envisaged in three ways; as an ascribed identity; as a chosen identity; and as a declared identity. It is not fixed, but rather 'evolves', such that identity theory tries to relate the individual perception of one's own identity into the construct of a broader social context (Peek, 2005: 215) and understand change over a span of time. Esposito (2005: 205) described this evolution from social, political and religious perspectives in the context of assimilation, acculturation, integration and multiculturalism. In addition, modernisation theory purports that religious identity allows for the distinction between traditional and modern societies, where, in traditional societies, religion is a cohesive force and its value system is unquestioned as a consequence of its sacredness (Weissbrod, 1983: 188). The identity of Muslims living in Britain has certainly evolved; though it is debatable to what extent this evolution could be dubbed as modernisation (Abbas, 2005). The presence of Muslims in Britain can be traced back three hundred years, to a time when the centrality of Islam in governance of Muslim lands was giving way to its private practice becoming its dominant feature. This is relevant, as individual and small group identity amongst Muslims as a minority living in Britain is the greatest challenge facing this demographic (Calder, 2009).

Prior to the First World War, settlers to Britain were seamen employed by the merchant navy. They were mainly settled in east London, Liverpool and Woking in Surrey, where the first purpose-built place of worship for Muslims in Britain, the Shah Jahan Mosque, was built in 1889 (Salamat, 2008). These were predominantly from the Indian subcontinent through activities of the East India Company.

Later, Yemeni citizens began arriving to Britain as merchants, in large part due to the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Today, their offspring are predominantly still located in areas such as Cardiff and Hull (Lewis, 2002: 11) and, after spreading inland, forming social groups in Sheffield and Birmingham (Geaves, 1999: 357). The Yemenis are thus regarded as the first

Muslim group to achieve social cohesion and stability within Britain as a consequence of religious organisation (Halliday, 1992).

Well-known to those interested in the history of Islam in Britain are a few noteworthy native English converts to Islam. Amongst them was W.H.Quillam who became Muslim in 1887. He was proactive in the propagation of Islam in England, publishing the Crescent, a weekly digest on issues pertaining to Islam (Lewis, 2002: 11). In more recent decades, the presence of Muslims in Britain bore no real significance until the census of 1951, at which time it was reported that 5,000 Muslims lived in Britain, mostly of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin (Nielson, 1992). Over the next four decades, the combined population of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis grew, through initial migration followed by procreation, to 640,000, with 47% of the Muslim population being born in Britain by 1991 (Anwar, 1993). The earlier migration was based purely on economic considerations, though the migrants themselves were not necessarily the poorest from there motherland, but rather from regions that had a tradition of travel and migration. Examples of these are Gujarat in India, with a highly literate and business oriented population and the Northwest Frontier in Pakistan, which were prosperous and fertile lands. Bangladeshis, with their longer traditional ties with Britain through the merchant navy, are mostly made up of Sylhetis, famous as restaurant workers, today reportedly managing in excess of 3,000 restaurants around Britain (Lewis, 2002: 16-17; Adams, 1987). The Muslim population overall in Britain was 1,591,000 in the census of 2001, with 787,285 being of Pakistani origin - the largest ethnic minority Muslim population (Office for National Statistics, 2009). The migration and settlement of South Asian Muslims occurred in four phases – 1) Pioneers - unmarried men or men migrating without families; 2) 'Chain Migration' - pooling of resources to purchase houses in which both a large number of males shared accommodation and as a means to invite more male workers, prominent prior to the Commonwealth Immigration Act, 1962; 3) Immigration of families - often due to rumours or fear of men taking British spouses; and 4) British-born Muslims – with 1.2% of the people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin being British-born, according to the census of 1961. Phases 3 and 4 thus began from the early part of the 1960s and accelerated in particular after the Immigration Act of 1971 which stipulated that the entire family would have to migrate, rather than the piecemeal arrival of young men alone (Lewis, 2002: 18).

The question of religion did not appear explicitly on the census until 2001. Although it was added as a voluntary declaration, 92% of participants selected to affirm their religion. Most striking about the demography of Muslims was that they demonstrated very low levels of education and high levels of 'poverty indicators' (living in shared or terraced accommodation, living in accommodation without central heating systems), when compared to the national average. Muslims are also the youngest faith group, with over 50% being under the age of 25 (Hussein, 2004). This combination of high levels of disadvantage from the perspective of education, amenities and employment coupled with consequentially higher levels of poverty compared to other faith groups has an evident impact both on the development of a firm British identity and, more worryingly, openness to radicalisation. Muslims of Bangladeshi and Pakistani descent tend to be younger and live in larger households than the national average, with double the national number of under-16 year olds and circa 5 persons per household compared to the national average of 2.43. The largest populations amongst persons of Bangladeshi and Pakistani origin are found in urban areas, particularly in two major concentrations, Birmingham (8% of total city population) and Bradford (11% of total city population). Though the earlier indications were that economic migration was designed to facilitate remittances to families and was to culminate in the eventual voluntary repatriation of Muslims to their homelands, the rights of citizenship and securities which Western secular democracy provide, coupled with social services, free healthcare provision, quality education and other attractive benefits, the situation evolved, as it has in other parts of the developed world, that Muslims were here to stay. Heavy internal investment thus followed, with the conversion of houses into mosques, halāl butchers and restaurants, religious education infrastructure, schools and social centres, with remittances petering away into oblivion and ghettos resembling Pakistani and Bangladeshi microcosms emerging in cities and major conurbations (Hussain and Bagguley, 2005). Islam has consequently become the fastest growing religion in Britain as well as the second largest religion (Geaves, 1999: 360) with the census of 2001 for England and Wales showing that 72% of the population were Christian followed by 3% (1,546,626 people) of the population being Muslim (Office for National Statistics, 2009). This accounts for approximately 9% of the eighteen million Muslims throughout Europe (Esposito, 2005: 205).

Peek (2002: 218-219) outlines four reasons why religion has become an important basis for identity, within the context of American Muslims, which are equally pertinent to the discourse on British Muslims. Firstly, religious identity gains prominence as a reaction to alienation, particularly in circumstances where the individual has moved from being part of the dominant religion of a nation to being a representative of a minority religion. An example is a Pakistani Muslim immigrant to Britain. Secondly, for tangible, material benefits, where a stronger religious identity can facilitate community networking and economic opportunities. Thirdly, shared worship acts as a vehicle for unity amongst diverse groups. Finally, religious identity is seen as a means for the preservation of group cohesion.

The identity of Muslims living in Britain is being challenged and analysed rigorously, in large part due to public discourse concerning the threat Muslims may pose in the wake of global terrorist attacks and Middle East politics. As a backdrop to this, Muslims were already undergoing significant change over recent decades as they struggled to find an identity and a voice as a minority religion amongst minority ethnic communities living in the West, with beliefs and practices that often put them at odds with the receiving culture. This has given rise to the 'deprivationist' perspective as Lewis (2000: 23) describes it, whereby Muslim communities of Asian origin feel discriminated against to the point of racial exclusion, eventually leading to alienation and, occasionally, revolt, such as with the Burnley, Oldham and Bradford riots of summer 2001.

Others have argued that the deprivationist viewpoint does not hold true, but rather that race, religion and culture are mere excuses used by migrant communities to disguise a failure by themselves to integrate and assimilate with the dominant culture and norms. Often cited as proof of this are figures pertaining to educational standards. For example, in the late eighties, Bangladeshi youths were one sixth as likely to have taken and passed an A-level qualification when compared to the national average. Such figures give rise to the view that it is a fundamental failure of immigrant communities to recognise that their settlement in Britain is permanent and their integration is vital.

Though Muslims themselves often speak of a desire for unity across their communities with a view to following a cohesive way forward for establishing an identity which 'fits' their existence in Britain, the reality is that British Muslims have three distinctive choices along three distinctive paths. Geaves (1999) expounds the three choices; isolation, assimilation and integration, in his thesis which is based upon "three choices being presented to them (young Muslims) by the receiving culture." In addition to these three choices I have addressed their interplay with a level of loyalty to three available paths, ethnic culture, British culture and religious identity, where ethnic culture addresses internal conflict issues (within families and communities), British Culture addresses external conflict issues (with the dominant culture) and religious identity which addresses religious conflict issues (alignment with religious values), hence the three paths. The interplay between these three choices and three paths are visible not only at the national or community level, but are highly discernable within individual family units with different siblings being noticeable as archetypes for the available choices and paths. For example, a Muslim who dates or drinks alcohol, will be considered as integrated into British culture, and welcomed by the receiving culture, will most likely be isolated from his ethnic cultural group. Similarly, a Muslim who dresses in Arab / South Asian clothing may well be isolated from the receiving culture but be either assimilated or integrated into both ethnic culture and religious identity. In such a way, these intersections can allow any Muslim to categorise themselves in relation to the three choices. The reality is, of course, far from black and white as the example suggests. However, these boundaries can be considered as purely archetypal in an effort to understand the dialectic of the discourse.

## The fundamentalism continuum and British Muslims

Though the understanding of Muslims within and amongst British Muslim society has been well researched, the broader context requires further analysis in order to appreciate the fundamentalism continuum from a more far-reaching viewpoint. In this regard, two key issues stand out in the new millennium, those of 'Islamophobia' and the 'Prevent' programme.

Islamophobia is "an outlook or world-view involving an unfounded dread and dislike of Muslims, which results in practices of exclusion and discrimination." From this perspective,

Islam is viewed as unresponsive to change, with adherents to the faith, in Britain in particular, but elsewhere in the western hemisphere also, being perceived as lacking the will to integrate and existing separately in ghettos. Consequently, Islam is seen as having alien values from the standpoint of the dominant culture and little in common with other cultures. The interaction between cultures is therefore perceived as neither affected nor influential. There is an overriding sense of Islam as being misplaced, inferior, barbaric, irrational and primitive as well as being oppressive to women. However, people opposed to Islam have historically held these views. The most significant addition to these is the perception that followers of Islam are all terrorists or are strongly supportive of terrorism and these view are used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society, with such antagonism seen as accepted and normal (The Runnymede Trust, 1997).

Within this environment and in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and 7/7 London bombings, the British government began an anti-terrorism programme called 'Prevent', with the objective of stopping people, particularly young British Muslim men, becoming terrorists or violent extremists. On the surface, it can be analysed that, with consideration of the fundamentalism continuum, the objective was to prevent Muslims from moving to the right of the spectrum and, perhaps, encourage those on the centre-right, to move further to the left. Contrary to this aspiration, the programme has become beset with criticism, as it singles out one religious minority in a discriminatory fashion. The active encouragement of intelligence gathering has consequently become tantamount to spying with prejudice on innocent civilians, merely because they are Muslim. Funding of schemes through the Prevent programme have therefore been criticised and growing numbers of Muslim organisations have expressed disdain and declined funding. Though 53 Million GBP has been spent between 2007 and 2010 on over 1000 Prevent projects, the programme is not only alienating those it was designed to engage with, but may have the opposite desired effect of moving Muslims further to the right on the continuum.

## Case study on the United Arab Emirates

"Unique, one of its kind, extraordinary, the world's biggest, largest, tallest, most exclusive" - these are words journalists love to use when describing the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Some may find these descriptions exaggerated, sometimes even repetitive. But all criticism and perhaps

envy aside – from a very objective point of view, the UAE have had a visibly incredible development over a very short period of time. From a society of nomads and pearl divers, struggling to make a living in an extremely harsh climate, to the most modern and liberal country in the region with a prospering economy with double-digit growth rates, a world-class infrastructure and a politically stable and visionary environment, the UAE have come a very long way. But how has this development impacted Muslim thought from the view of the fundamentalism continuum? This case study explores the development of the UAE and analyses this question.

## Demography and society

The UAE is located at the southern tip of the Persian Gulf and has three neighbouring countries - Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Sultanate of Oman. It is governed by a federal system founded in 1971. The union is formed of seven states, or emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah, with Abu Dhabi city as its capital. These emirates are settled by a diversity of cultural groups.  In addition to UAE native citizens, there are various Arab groups as well as Iranians, Filipinos, Indians and large numbers of Europeans and Americans.  These are all known as expatriates or abbreviated at expats.

The population of the UAE in 2003 was estimated by the United Nations at 2,995,000. The discovery of crude oil and its commercial production in the UAE created a new economic situation that was reflected in the availability of substantial financial resources on one hand, and the investment of such resources by the government for development on the other. The country has emerged into the mainstream of modernism over the past 40 years, with an economy driven by oil and gas and more recently tourism. Inhabitants have been directly influenced by the rapid development witnessed by the country in recent years.

Whilst Abu Dhabi has focused on developing its extensive energy resources, holding over 90% of the UAE's oil reserves, the other emirates have sought other economic drivers, as their oil reserves are relatively limited.  Trade has become Dubai's staple, for example, with the emirate re-exporting over $US 10 Billion annually.  Successful strategies in Dubai are copied in the other emirates and the resulting increase in competition deepens the market and allows for the spread

of best practice. This process has been supported by the UAE's heavy investment in infrastructure, principally in Dubai, which relies heavily on construction and IT projects.

Dubai's vision for a knowledge-based economy is a strategy for developing the model for growth and development in the region. A knowledge-based economy, as defined by the World Bank, rests on 4 pillars, known as the 4 "I's" - "infrastructure", "incentives", "innovation" and "intelligence". All of these rely on successful IT project execution. Infrastructure, for example, relates to the information society infrastructure and the dissemination and processing of information and how effectively a society gives people access to affordable and effective information and communications. Here, IT project success is clearly of paramount importance. Incentives relate to the economic and institutional framework, providing a stable macro-economy, a competitive environment, a flexible labour market and adequate social protection. Innovation brings together research and business activities in commercial applications of science and technology, with emerging sectors such as pharmaceuticals, bio- and nano-technologies and wireless communication systems. Finally, intelligence refers to education systems, where citizens acquire, share and use knowledge.

The UAE has set its sights on joining the ranks of the world's leading knowledge-based economies with a comprehensive strategy to enhance knowledge-driven development, underpinned by IT project investment in a diverse range of businesses. Dubai aims to generate 25% of its GDP from knowledge-based businesses and industries and seeks to raise the role of Foreign Direct Investment in the country's economy to 4% of the GDP.

The area was originally known as the "Trucial States" after a series of contracts between local tribes and the United Kingdom, which aimed to pacify the region known as the Pirate Coast. From maintaining maritime truce, these contracts developed into giving Britain control over the foreign affairs of the local sheikhdoms, effectively limiting all commercial relations to the United Kingdom unless specifically approved. In return, the United Kingdom offered protection.

When in 1968 the British announced their intention to draw back from the Gulf region, it was Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, ruler of the emirate of Abu Dhabi who immediately began

consultations with his neighbours to form a union – a concept unique to the Arab world, but the only guarantee for economic and political independence from strong neighbours such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. During the 1960s, life in the emirates was a long way from being glamorous or even close to comfortable. The estimated population at the time of the foundation was 280,000. Although the region had always been a trading hub, the economy depended largely on pearl diving, fishery and date cultivation. The population was poor and life was exceptionally hard. A trip from Abu Dhabi to Al Ain, a mere 160 km (100 miles), would take seven days, as there were no paved roads until the early 1960s.

The main reason was that it was not until the 1950s that oil was discovered. It took a further decade to export oil – Abu Dhabi started its oil exports in 1962, Dubai followed in 1969 and Sharjah in 1974. It was the black gold that kick started the economic development, fuelled by price jumps during the first oil crisis in the early 1970s. And it was due to a fortunate and visionary leadership of the founding fathers of the UAE under the guidance of Sheikh Zayed that this new wealth was put to good use. Even before oil was found, the ruler of Abu Dhabi had spent his own money on developing the infrastructure and on bringing progress to his people. He was also the driving force behind the new constitution, which created a political system unlike any other in the Arab world, and the trust in this leadership is reflected in the fact that the ruler of Abu Dhabi is also the President of the UAE. The head of the second-largest emirate Dubai is traditionally the Vice-President and Prime Minister of the UAE. The rulers of the seven emirates, all absolute monarchs, are represented on federal level through the Supreme Council. As a consultative institution and quasi-parliament, the Federal National Council (FNC) reviews proposed legislation. In December 2006, elections were held for the first time, and while 20 members of the FNC are still appointed, the local population elects 20. 22.5% of FNC members are women (one elected, eight appointed).

With the deaths of two of the UAE's founding fathers, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan in 2004 and Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum in 2006, a new generation has entered the political scene. Sheikh Zayed's son Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan is now ruler of Abu Dhabi and President of the UAE, Sheikh Maktoum's brother Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al

Maktoum took over as ruler of Dubai and Vice-President and Prime Minister of the UAE. A cabinet reshuffle resulted in the creation of 20 ministries, of which women lead two.

UAE nationals and in fact also the expatriate population feel very much connected with their leaders. The old Majlis system of governance, which allows anyone to present his or her grievances to the ruler, is still very much a part of the political system. The ruling families enjoy the trust, admiration and support of their people, and by any standard their leadership is visionary. Dubai especially has become the embodiment of globalization. With enrichment of its services sector the UAE, with Dubai at the helm of its expedited development, has seen an intense boom in information and communication technology (ICT). Knowing well that the oil reserves on which the country's first boom was based on are soon to run out, the emirate has early on branched out its economy and diversified to tourism, logistics and services. By now, Dubai boasts a large number of different free zones, which allow foreign investors full ownership of their businesses. The Dubai International Financial Center aims to turn Dubai into the region's financial capital. Large-scale projects such as the Palm Islands, DubaiLand, Ski Dubai and Burj Dubai have put Dubai on the map. The UAE are home to the only two seven-star hotels in the world. Abu Dhabi is now planning the first emission-free city.

The construction boom in particular has attracted many foreigners, who today make up around 80% of the population. As neither parties nor trade unions are allowed, there is relatively little unrest even though a majority of foreigners are low-wage workers.

According to the latest Arab World Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, the UAE is the most competitive economy in the Arab World. Its strength lies in highly developed infrastructure and the stability of its institutions and political system. Still in need of development is the educational system, with "inadequately educated workforce" and "poor work ethic in national labour force" listed as two of the most problematic factors for doing business by the Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008. In May 2007, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum announced the establishment of an education fund worth 2 billion USD to help bridge the knowledge gap in the Middle East. Tackling difficulties head-on is what the Prime Minister of the UAE is known for. "Change or you will be changed" was his message to Arab leaders.

As in all Arabian Gulf countries, the constitution of the UAE is based on Islamic principles with the Sharia forming the basis of law and penal codes. The state religion of the UAE is thus Islam, though there is a growing presence of religious minorities due to economic migration into the country. Predominant amongst these are adherents to Christianity from Europe and the Far East and Hinduism from south Asia.

## The fundamentalism continuum and Muslims in the United Arab Emirates

It is clear from the case analysis of the UAE that the acquisition of great wealth through the oil industry has been followed by diversification of industries to provide sustainable growth and development. This wealth has concurrently been used to great effect to develop infrastructure, education and healthcare, to the extent that individuals are affluent and consequently hold, by western standards, unusually high regard for the state and their leadership. In terms of the fundamentalism continuum, the development of the country has resulted in a highly liberalised, tolerant and westward looking society in comparison to Persian Gulf norms.

## Chapter summary

In terms of British Muslims, this chapter finds that Geaves' (1999: 376) view that "Islam is becoming the dominant mark of identity for the Muslim population (in Britain) ... influenced by the worldwide resurgence of Islam" is supported to a great extent. However, it can also be said that Bilgrami's (1992: 1071) hypothesis also holds true, that "... there is no reason to doubt that Muslims, even devout Muslims, will and do take their commitment to Islam not only as one among other values, but also as something which is itself differentiated internally into a number of, in principle, negotiable detailed commitments." Thus, the evolution of a British-Islamic identity continues, albeit with its devotees approaching the challenges and choices in a non-uniform, fragmented fashion, with little sense of a cohesive strategy for which they are all proponents. This lack of cohesiveness is supported both by comments from participants of the survey and in the cited literature. As Ansari (2004: 2) states, "...British Muslims at the start of the twenty-first century are neither ethnically nor ideologically homogenous." In other words, they occupy scattered positions across the fundamentalism continuum. Though the survey is

limited, as it negates half the potential demographic, namely women, as well as Muslims originating from countries other than the Indian subcontinent, the exploratory nature of the survey has found a breadth of views to justify further future investigation.

As for the UAE, there is a sharp contrast when compared to British Muslim society in that citizens occupy more central positions on the continuum. This is, in part due to governance and in part due to affluence and development. The combination of governance by a federal monarchy, with Islam as the state religion and where dissent of the rulers would not be tolerated, coupled with affluence and a well-developed and comparatively advanced society, has resulted in citizens committed to their faith, aligned with state authority and liberal in their outlook, particularly in comparison to large areas of conservatism in the region. Debate and discourse, of the kind open to Muslims in Britain, is consequently absent from UAE society.

# CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS

## Conclusions

It is clear from the study that the events of September 11 2001 in the United States, followed by the events of July 7 2005 in London to a lesser degree, have acted as catalysts in terms of the Muslim spectrum of fundamentalism. The consequential shake-up of Muslim perception, both from an internal perspective amongst Muslims themselves and an external perspective from observers of Muslim attitudes, behaviours and beliefs, has led to a dynamic tension between, on the one hand, a movement for democratising and liberalising Muslim society in line with western values, and on the other, the vision of reviving an Islamic Caliphate based on traditional values inclusive of all Muslims and antagonistic to the west.

The resultant effect has thus been efforts on both parts to promote their agendas through the means available to them. These means, range from extreme violence at one end of the spectrum, to web-driven propaganda at the other, with a view to entering the hearts and minds of Muslims and forcing or encouraging them to shift along the continuum in the desired direction.

This work has thus explored the phenomena, through developing a model for the fundamentalism continuum and evaluating it from various perspectives. The research focussed on the importance of sport as a liberalising tool and went on to analyse two Muslim societies struggling or coming to term with their place in the modern world. The outcomes are very revealing and show that Muslims throughout the world, whether in majority Muslim countries, or minorities which are relatively new to their environment are facing pressures to act and respond with greater fluidity on the continuum on individual, social and national levels, compared to the previous century.

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