Making contact with observations
Votsis, Ioannis (2010) Making contact with observations. In: EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer Netherlands, pp. 267-277.
Abstract
Jim Bogen and James Woodward’s ‘Saving the Phenomena’, published only 20 years ago, has become a modern classic. Their centrepiece idea is a distinction between data and phenomena. Data are typically the kind of things that are publicly observable or measurable like “bubble chamber photographs, patterns of discharge in electronic particle detectors and records of reaction times and error rates in various psychological experiments” (p. 306). Phenomena are “relatively stable and general features of the world which are potential objects of explanation and prediction by general theory” and are typically unobservable (Woodward 1989, p. 393). Examples of the latter category include “weak neutral currents, the decay of the proton, and chunking and recency effects in human memory” (Bogen and Woodward 1988, p. 306). Theories, in Bogen and Woodward’s view, are utilised to systematically explain and predict phenomena, not data (pp. 305–306). The relationship between theories and data is rather indirect. Data count as evidence for phenomena and the latter in turn count as evidence for theories. This view has been further elaborated in subsequent papers (Bogen and Woodward 1992, 2005; Woodward 1989) and is becoming increasingly influential (e.g., Basu 2003; Psillos 2004; Mauricio Su´arez 2005). In this paper I argue contrary to Bogen and Woodward that data serve as evidence for theories, not only for phenomena. Bogen and Woodward seem to forget the old Duhemian dictum that ‘theories cannot be tested in isolation’. That is, they seem to forget that theories require the help of auxiliary hypotheses to make contact with data. When augmented with suitable auxiliaries, theories do entail, predict and potentially explain the data. I say ‘potentially explain the data’ because my focus in this paper is only on the inferential and predictive relations between theories, phenomena and data. To demonstrate my claim I examine four cases from physics, chemistry and astronomy: (i) a controversy between Lavoisier and Priestley, (ii) the calculation of lead’s melting point, (iii) the prediction of the Poisson spot, and (iv) the discovery of Neptune. The first of these is discussed in Basu (op. cit.) and the second in Bogen and Woodward (1988). The last two have not yet been discussed in the context of Bogen and Woodward’s work but they are widely discussed in confirmation theory as paradigmatic examples of novel predictions. The choice of cases reflects my desire to assess Bogen and Woodward’s view (1) under the best light by considering one of their principal examples as well as a meticulously discussed example from one of their devotees and (2) under the most stringent confirmation criteria by considering two exemplary cases of novel prediction.
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