The evolution of sectarianism

Ille, Sebastian (2021) The evolution of sectarianism. Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation, 97. p. 105726. ISSN 10075704

Abstract

Human cooperation for reasons other than self-interest has long intrigued social scientists leading to a substantial literature in economics. Its complement – sectarianism – has not received closer attention in economics despite its significant impact. Based on a dynamic model, the paper shows that sectarianism can be understood as the outcome of a repeated bargaining process in which sectarian affiliation evolves into a pure coordination signal that attributes economic and political benefits. It demonstrates that such sectarian social contracts co-evolve with the sects’ degree of coerciveness and are self-reinforcing. Sectarian conflict may then not be a result of diverging religious ideologies but is shown to be caused by external manipulations of the signal (e.g. via identity politics), and internal political and economic grievances within a sect that spill over to the inter-sectarian level while adopting a sectarian appearance. Theoretical results are supported by empirical findings from the Middle East.

	Text 12-s2.0-S100757042100037X-main.pdf Restricted to Repository staff only until 2050. Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (1MB)
Preview	Text The Evolution of Sectarianism final.pdf - Accepted Version Available under License Creative Commons Attribution. Download (849kB)

Official URL:	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cnsns.2021.105726
Item Type:	Article
Disciplines:	Social Science > Economics
Depositing User:	Sebastian Ille
Date Deposited:	07 Aug 2023 10:49
Last Modified:	16 Jan 2024 10:34
URI:	https://nul.repository.guildhe.ac.uk/id/eprint/361

Actions (login required)

Edit Item