Attitudes towards Islamic Inheritance: Religious or Patriarchal Preferences?

Dina Rabie* Nora El-Bialy†

May, 2025

Abstract

The Islamic inheritance law puts women at a distributive disadvantage leading to gender inequality in wealth accumulation. Religiosity and patriarchy are often blamed for the persistence of gender inequality in Muslim-majority countries. Employing an online vignette experiment, we examine whether religious and pro-male preferences reinforce gender inequality in inheritance in Egypt. We find that religious individuals prefer to abide by the inheritance law and its distributive inequality. We also find that individuals with pro-male cultural beliefs prefer to avoid the inheritance law only selectively to protect the male distributive advantage. Put together, we find that both religiosity and pro-male cultural beliefs are impediments to achieving gender equality in inheritance in Egypt.

Keywords: religiosity, pro-male culture, Islamic inheritance, vignette experiment

JEL Classification: C99 - D19 - K36

*Northeastern University London. Corresponding author: d.rabie@northeastern.edu

†Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg

Acknowledgements: The authors are grateful to Stefan Voigt and the participants in the Institute of Law and Economics (ILE)'s Jour Fixe on their valuable feedback on an earlier version of this article. This paper was initiated and written in the framework of the DAAD Programs: Subject-Related Partnerships with Institutions of Higher Education in Developing Countries and the Ta'ziz Science Cooperations between the University of Hamburg and the British University in Egypt.

1 Introduction

Egypt ranks 135^{th} out of 146 countries with respect to gender equality according to the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index (The World Economic Forum, 2024). Egypt is a (Sunni) Muslim-majority country where, according to its constitution, "principles of Shari'a [Islamic law] are a major source of legislation" (Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2014, art. 2). The supremacy of Shari'a in the Egyptian constitution influence a host of economic, political, and social phenomena in the country, including gender inequality (Gouda and Potrafke, 2016; Gouda and Gutmann, 2021; Gouda and Hanafy, 2022). Furthermore, Egypt, along with Saudi Arabia and Iran, has one of the least gender-equal family laws worldwide pertaining to the strong influence of Shari'a in family legislation (Htun and Weldon, 2011; Rahman, 2012). For example, according to Islamic inheritance, a woman's inheritance is generally half of the share of a man at the same kinship degree from the deceased.

This paper examines whether religiosity and/or patriarchal cultural norms can explain individual attitudes towards gender inequality in Islamic inheritance law. We use an online vignette experiment in Egypt in order to elicit the preferences for abiding by the (default) Islamic inheritance law versus the willingness to accept a deviation from the law to achieve gender equality in inheritance. This research question is motivated by recent empirical evidence from two lines of literature. The first line of literature relies on cross-country studies of gender inequality. According to this literature, gender inequality is found to be higher in countries with higher average religiosity among the population with religious affiliation (Schnabel, 2016), and lower in countries with higher share of those without religious affiliation within the population in general (Schnabel, 2016; Klingorová and Havlíček, 2015), or among the male population in particular (Moon et al., 2022). This literature also documents higher discrimination against women in Muslim-majority countries (Bishin and Cherif, 2017; Donno and Russett, 2004; Fish, 2002). Unequal gender norms in these countries have been explained by the prevalence of specific, conservative, interpretations of the Qur'an (Donno and Russett, 2004; Klingorová and Havlíček, 2015), and by patriarchal institutions and culture (Rahman, 2025; Ahmad et al., 2021; Bishin and Cherif, 2017). The second line of literature that motivates our research question employs observational individual-level data to study attitudes towards the Islamic inheritance law. This literature documents societal backlashes against attempts to achieve

gender equality in inheritance in Muslim-majority countries such as Bangladesh (Khan et al., 2016), and Pakistan (Ahmad et al., 2012), and among the Muslim populations in Kenya (Harari, 2019) and India (Roy, 2015; Bhalotra et al., 2020).

We contribute to both lines of literature in two ways. First, our paper lies at the intersection of the two lines of literature by examining how religiosity and patriarchal norms may explain attitudes towards gender disparity in Islamic inheritance. Second, and more importantly, our paper is among the first studies to employ a vignette experiment in a Muslim-majority country to elicit preferences towards gender inequality in inheritance. This goes beyond both the cross-country studies and the observational individual-level studies, because it allows us to disentangle the effect of religiosity versus patriarchal norms via varying the hypothetical scenarios shown in the vignettes. In this regard, our paper is closely related to Engel et al. (2021) who examine women's inheritance rights in Pakistan by employing inheritance-related vignettes. However, Egypt differs from Pakistan with respect to women's inheritance. Whereas women in Egypt inherit half of men's shares, women in Pakistan do not *de facto* inherit at all. Therefore, conducting an experiment in Egypt offers novel perspectives on the question. [1]

Egypt passed a legal reform in 1946 with respect to inheritance by legalizing will writing. [2] Specifically, article 37 of the Egyptian Testament Law No. 71 of 1946 states that legal heirs (and others) can be given up to one-third of the inheritance by the commandment of a will without other heirs' consent. A will that implies devoting more than one-third of the inheritance can only be implemented if approved by all legal heirs. The introduction of wills could have restored the unequal shares in inheritance by devoting a share of inheritable assets to women when they compete with men over inheritance. However, to the best of our knowledge, will writing remains a rare phenomenon in Egypt. [3] Instead, parents without sons often gift assets to their daughters – when the parents are still alive – in order to overcome the transfer of wealth to secondary heirs upon their death, as dictated by Islamic inheritance law. [4]

We employ an online vignette experiment to elicit individual preferences towards the

1. We discuss this point further in the next section.
2. Will writing is permissible in Shari'a.
3. To overcome the lack of literature or quantitative data on the use of wills in Egypt, we consulted a group of legal practitioners who advised on the scarcity of will writing in Egypt.
4. Primary heirs are the children, spouse and parents of the deceased. If the deceased has no son, secondary heirs (e.g., deceased's siblings, nephews, nieces, ..) share the inheritance with the daughters.

departure from the Islamic inheritance law via child gifting to achieve gender equality in inheritance. We design hypothetical situations where a Household Head (HH) is allocating his endowments to his offspring to avoid the application of the inheritance law. We vary the gender composition of the progeny [5] in the hypothetical situations between only females or a female and a male child, and we ask participants whether they agree or disagree with the HH's decision. Our empirical analysis is based on comparing participants' responses in the female-only and the male-female vignettes. Participants who reject the HH's allocation decision regardless of the gender composition of the progeny are defined to be always law abiders. However, participants' who accept the HH's allocation decision in the female-only case but reject it in the female-male case are said to be pro-male selective law avoiders. We hypothesize that religiosity induces an always law-abiding preference but patriarchal beliefs form a preference for pro-male selective law avoidance.

Our findings support our hypotheses. In line with the first hypothesis, we find that religiosity strongly and positively correlate with non-selective abidance by the Islamic law, but not with pro-male selective avoidance of the law. In line with the second hypothesis, we find that patriarchal beliefs are positively correlated with pro-male selective law avoidance, but not with non-selective law abidance. Put together, our findings suggest that both religiosity and patriarchy act as impediments to gender equality in inheritance in Egypt. Our findings on religiosity and compliance with the gender unequal Islamic inheritance law are in line with the results of the cross-country studies that religiosity is positively correlated with higher gender inequality in Muslim-majority countries (e.g., Schnabel, 2016; Klingorová and Havlíček, 2015). Our finding on patriarchal beliefs and the pro-male preferences in inheritance align with the findings of the individual-level studies on the attitudes towards gender inequality (e.g., Engel et al., 2021; Bishin and Cherif, 2017).

2 Related Literature and Hypotheses

Pro-male biases in family expenditures and intergenerational transfers of wealth are documented in the literature (Burgess and Zhuang, 2002; Quisumbing et al., 2004; Basu

5. We mean by progeny the offspring of the household head.

and de Jong, 2010). This is often blamed on the level of religiosity and/or patriarchal culture within a given society (Bishin and Cherif, 2017; Charrad, 2011; Donno and Russett, 2004; Fish, 2002). While Bishin and Cherif (2017) argue that patriarchal culture better explains individual attitudes towards gender equality in Muslim-majority countries than religiosity, empirically disentangling the effect of religiosity from patriarchal culture remains challenging. This is because cultural norms may be derived from religion (Klingorová and Havlíček, 2015). That is, religious rules develop into cultural norms and individuals may follow these rules, not because they believe in them, but rather to signal their compliance with the norms in their society (Zasu, 2007).

Recent empirical literature examined the effects of pro-women legal reforms of inheritance laws, generally finding a societal pro-male backlash. For example, Harari (2019) documented an increase in compensatory behavior by Muslim parents to their sons following a legal reform in Kenya that supported gender equal inheritance rights. A similar legal reform in India also resulted in an increase in son gifting (Roy, 2015) and son preference in fertility choices (Bhalotra et al., 2020). However, we cannot arguably disentangle religiosity from pro-male cultural norms in cases such as Kenya and India, where the legal reforms *deviated* from the Islamic inheritance law (i.e., from unequal to equal shares in inheritance). By contrast, an intervention that is better suited to disentangle religiosity from pro-male culture is the case of Pakistan (Engel et al., 2021). The legal system in Pakistan originally deprived women of inheritance rights altogether. However, this was changed following a series of legal reforms which introduced women's inheritance rights in accordance with the Islamic law (i.e., from none to unequal inheritance shares to women). Although the Pakistani legal reforms conformed with the Islamic law, Engel et al. (2021) documented the failure of the reforms to introduce women's *de facto* inheritance rights.[6] It is therefore the patriarchal culture, rather than religiosity, that explains the societal resistance to the Islamic-law-abiding reforms in Pakistan.

Guided by the empirical evidence discussed above, we design a vignette experiment to disentangle the effects of religiosity and patriarchal beliefs on attitudes towards women's inheritance, i.e., the acceptance of the Islamic inheritance law and its distributive disadvantage to women versus the willingness to deviate from the religious law to achieve gender equality. We examine the two following hypotheses:

6. See Acemoglu and Jackson (2017) and Gutmann and Voigt (2018) on norms and resistance to legal reforms.

H1: The higher the religiosity, the higher the likelihood of (non-selective) compliance with the Islamic inheritance law.

H2: The stronger the patriarchal beliefs, the higher the likelihood of pro-male selective compliance with the Islamic Inheritance law.

According to the first hypothesis, we expect individuals with higher religiosity to have a preference for the universal compliance with the law, regardless of the gender composition of primary heirs. According to the second hypothesis, we expect individuals with stronger patriarchal beliefs to prefer complying with the law only if primary heirs include a son to protect the male distributive advantage, but to prefer avoiding the law if primary heirs are all daughters. Next, we discuss our experimental design and analysis to test for our hypotheses.

3 Experiment and Empirics

3.1 Experiment Design

We employ an online vignette experiment to elicit individual attitudes towards gender equality in inheritance.[7] We employ a within-subjects design where all participants respond to all vignettes. The vignettes refer to a household head (HH) who is making decisions related to transfers of endowments to his offspring. The transfers of endowments are meant to represent the intergenerational transfers that would otherwise take place via the inheritance law when the HH dies. We vary the gender composition of the HH's progeny between female-only and mixed gender. In both variations, the participants read hypothetical situations in which the HH makes allocation decisions to his children and the participants are asked whether they agree or disagree with the HH's decision.

We employ two sets of vignettes; set A and set B to elicit individual attitudes towards the Islamic inheritance law. In set A, we compare participants' responses to a vignette where a sonless HH decides to allocate all his endowments to his daughters to responses in a similar vignette where the HH decides to allocate all of his endowments equally between his daughter and son. Set A's vignettes are given below and are meant to resemble a situation where the HH avoids the application of the inheritance law altogether by making

7. The experiment was not pre-registered.

the allocation decisions during his lifetime. We call this the *law avoidance* treatment.

Set A Scenario One:

> Doctor Magdy has 3 daughters and no sons. To secure his daughters' future after his death, he decided to bequeath (gift) all his endowments to his daughters during his lifetime. Do you agree with Doctor Magdy's decision? [Yes/No]

Set A Scenario Two:

> Mister Islam has a son and a daughter, stemming from his beliefs on the importance of gender equality, he decided to equally bequeath (gift) his endowments among them during his lifetime. Do you agree with Mister Islam's decision? [Yes/No]

Set B of the vignettes follows the same setup, but the hypothetical situations allow for partial application of the inheritance law upon the HH's death. We call this the *law internalization* treatment, and we present the vignettes below.

Set B Scenario One:

> Engineer Mostafa has 3 daughters and no sons. To secure his daughters' future after his death, he decided to bequeath (gift) most of his endowments to his daughters during his lifetime. However, he kept a small monetary amount in his bank account to be distributed among the Shari'a-eligible heirs according to the law. Do you agree with Engineer Mostafa's decision? [Yes/No]

Set B Scenario Two:

> Doctor Abdelrahman has a son and a daughter, stemming from his beliefs on the importance of gender equality, he decided to bequeath (gift) his daughter less than a third of his endowments during his lifetime. This was to ensure equality between the girl and her brother in inheritance following his death. Do you agree with Doctor Abdelrahman's decision? [Yes/No]

Between both sets, scenario one represents commonly observed practices in Egypt among families with only daughters to exclude secondary heirs and keep the household wealth within the primary heirs (i.e., offspring and spouse).[8] The law internalization

8. In Islam, if the deceased has no son, his/her brothers and sisters .. etc. share the inheritance with

treatment (set B) allows for the primary heirs to keep most of the wealth, while still enabling the exercise of the Islamic inheritance law.[9] Scenario two in both sets can be thought of as a nudge towards gender equality as being explicitly mentioned in both scenarios.

We employ a 2x2 setup to disentangle individual preferences and we identify four preference profiles; reject-reject, accept-accept, accept-reject, and reject-accept. If a participant answers "no" to both vignettes (reject-reject), the participant would always be law abiding by rejecting the circumvention of the inheritance law. In contrast, if a participant accepts both scenarios (accept-accept), the participant would be demonstrating a preference for always law avoidance regardless of the gender composition of the HH's progeny. However, if a participant accepts the avoidance of the law in the absence of a son but not in his presence (accept-reject), the participant would be demonstrating a pro-male selective law avoidance preference. Conversely, if a participant rejects law avoidance in the absence of the son but accepts it in his presence (reject-accept), the participant would be demonstrating a pro-female law avoidance preference. This 2x2 setup allows us to elicit if individuals have selective choices based on gender. Specifically, accepting the circumvention of the inheritance law (whether fully or partially) when the progeny is only-female but rejecting it when it is mixed-gender provides support that individuals have pro-male bias. An opposite situation (reject-accept) would represent a pro-female bias. However, we expect to find higher pro-male than pro-female biases.

All participants viewed all vignettes in the same order which alternated sets A and B, meaning that participants viewed scenarios one in sets A and B (i.e., A1 followed by B1) then scenarios two in both sets (i.e., A2 followed by B2). All participants viewed only one vignette per screen. Participants additionally responded to a questionnaire on socio-economic demographics, their religious practices, and their self-reported views on their level of religiosity (religious beliefs). Participants viewed only one question per screen, just as they had with the vignettes. We present the questionnaire and the vignettes in Appendix A.

We collected our data through the Experimental and Behavioural Economics Laboratory (EBEL) in Cairo, Egypt.[10] EBEL first recruited a random sample of non-student

the deceased's children. The spouse's share remains fixed (e.g., 1/6).

9. Research in this area is very limited. Therefore, we rely on the authors' observations of the Egyptian society and the advice we received from a group of legal practitioners.

10. EBEL is a research laboratory at The British University in Egypt.

subjects, then used the exponential non-discriminative snowball sampling to reach out to a more diverse sample of adults by asking the initial sample to share the link among family and friends. We opted for this recruitment strategy as we were interested in a non-student sample at an age where the question of inheritance is relevant to them.

The vignettes were not incentivized but participants who completed the online experiment and the questionnaire had the option to enter a raffle to win a prize of 1,000 Egyptian Pounds for participation. Participants identities remain anonymous.

3.2 Data

3.2.1 The Sample

A sample of 245 adults (94% Muslims) completed the online experiment and questionnaire.[11] We drop non-Muslims (14 participants) due to the irrelevance of the research question to them, and we present our Muslim sample characteristics below.

We present the summary statistics for participants' characteristics in Table 1. Female participants represent 41% of the sample. Participants' age ranges from 21 to 64 years old with the mean age in the sample being 35. The majority of participants (90%) are well-educated holding a bachelor degree or above (denoted by *high_education)*. More than half of the sample (68%) live in an urban governorate (denoted by *urban_gov_liv)* and 34% self-report having above average income level (denoted by *abvavg_income)*.

We explain the preferences profiles, religiosity, and pro-male cultural beliefs variables in what follows.

3.2.2 Attitudes towards the Inheritance Law

Employing the vignettes, we examine participants' attitudes towards the allocation decision by the HH to circumvent the inheritance law. Recall that there is full circumvention in the law avoidance treatment and partial in the law internalization treatment. Figure 1 presents participants' preferences in both treatments. We find that 51% of our sample have a reject-reject preference, as described above, regardless of the gender composition of the progeny in the law avoidance treatment (panel a). This means that half of our sample prefers the full abidance by the inheritance law. For the law internalization

11. A total of 285 participants started the study but 40 did not complete it.

Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Socioeconomic Characteristics					
female	231	0.41	0.49	0	1
age	231	34.67	8.25	21	64
high_education	231	0.90	0.30	0	1
urban_gov_liv	231	0.68	0.47	0	1
abvavg_income	231	0.34	0.47	0	1
Preference Profiles					
Set A					
reject-reject	231	0.51	0.50	0	1
accept-reject	231	0.20	0.40	0	1
reject-accept	231	0.07	0.25	0	1
accept-accept	231	0.22	0.42	0	1
Set B					
reject-reject	231	0.37	0.48	0	1
accept-reject	231	0.33	0.47	0	1
reject-accept	231	0.08	0.27	0	1
accept-accept	231	0.22	0.42	0	1
Religiosity					
non_conserv	224	0.83	0.38	0	1
relig_index	231	3.03	1.22	0	5
Pro-male Cultural Beliefs					
pro_male_ cul1	231	2.00	1.26	0	6
pro_male_ cul2	231	0.82	0.92	0	4

treatment (panel b) this percentage is significantly lower (37%, t-test p-value < 0.01). This suggests that participants feel more at ease with the partial rather than with the full avoidance of the inheritance law.

We also find that a sizeable number of participants accept law avoidance in the absence of a son but reject it when a son is present (i.e., accept-reject, or pro-male selective law avoiding). Furthermore, the percentage of pro-male selective law avoiders in the law internalization treatment is significantly higher than that in the law avoidance treatment (33% vs. 20%, t-test p-value < 0.01). We investigate this finding further in the empirical analysis section.

The preference for pro-female selective law avoidance (i.e., reject-accept) is demonstrated by only 7% and 8% of participants in the law avoidance and law internalization treatments, respectively. Finally, a quarter of the sample always avoid the law in both treatments. These last two groups, who accept law avoidance in the presence of a son,



Figure 1 – Attitudes towards HH's Allocations of Endowment

exhibit a gender egalitarian attitude towards inheritance norms. [12]

3.2.3 Religious Beliefs

The majority of (Muslim) participants (83%) self-report holding non-conservative religious beliefs. Yet, when asked about their religious practices, the respondents score a mean of 3 out of 5 on a religiosity index created by the authors. [13] We base this religiosity index on five equally-weighted criteria: a) pro-women's-veiling (82% of the respondents agree), b) against cross-gender handshake (31%), c) pro-polygyny (a man marrying several wives) (42%), d) does not drink alcohol (97%), and e) does not accompany someone who drinks alcohol (51%). Those values were propagated by the Islamic revival in Egypt since the 1970s and as such they present the populist views of religion among the masses. [14] Responses to individual questions forming the index show higher variation in views on cross-gender handshake, polygyny, and accompanying an alcohol consumer than views on women's veil and own consumption of alcohol. The correlation coefficient between the self-reported and the authors' constructed religiosity measures (denoted by *non_conserv*

12. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.
13. The higher the score on the index, the higher the measured religiosity.
14. Binzel and Carvalho (2017) provide a discussion on the changes in the Egyptian society following the Islamic revival in the late 20^{th} and early 21^{st} centuries.

and *relig_index, respectively)* is -0.11. [15]

3.2.4 Pro-male Cultural Beliefs

We elicit patriarchal or pro-male cultural beliefs using two alternative measures. First, we ask participants about their views on whether parents *must* buy an apartment for each of their sons versus their daughters. [16] We construct a variable that takes the value of one if the respondent's view to this question is stronger when the child is male than when the child is a female, and we find that 48% of the respondents are pro-male. As a follow-up, we ask the participants if the children *must* receive a compensation in cases of under-provision (of the apartment) by the parents, and we find that 21% are pro-male in the sample. [17] We use these two alternative measures (hereafter labelled *pro_male_cul1* and *pro_male_cul2*, respectively) as a proxy for patriarchal or pro-male cultural beliefs.

Table 2 shows the pair-wise correlations between the religiosity and pro-male cultural beliefs measures. As stated before, the religiosity index is negatively weakly correlated with self-reported religiosity. Our main measure of patriarchal beliefs is not correlated with self-reported religiosity, but positively weakly correlated with the constructed religiosity index. The two patriarchal beliefs measures are positively moderately correlated with one another.

Table 2 – Religiosity and Patriarchy Correlation Matrix

	non_conserv	relig_index	pro_male_ cul1	pro_male_ cul2
non_conserv	1.00			
relig_index	-0.11	1.00		
pro_male_cul1	-0.03	0.15	1.00	
pro_male_cul2	0.01	0.01	0.51	1.00

3.3 Empirical Analysis and Results

In what follows, we examine whether religious and/or pro-male cultural beliefs are correlated with individual responses in the vignettes. We begin our analysis by examining the correlates of exhibiting always law-abiding preferences. As shown in the previous

15. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.
16. This is a strong social norm in Egypt where parents buy/gift each of their male children an accommodation to prepare for their future marriages.
17. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1

section, the preference for law abidance is the most prevalent in the law avoidance and law internalization treatments, and it involves no alternation to the inheritance shares. We then examine the correlates of exhibiting pro-male selective avoidance of the inheritance law. This is the second most prevalent preference in both treatments and the focus of this paper. We also provide the analysis for pro-female selective avoidance of the law and always law avoiding preferences in Appendix B.

3.3.1 Non-Selective Rejection of Household Allocation Decision

We start our analysis by investigating the characteristics of individuals who demonstrate a preference for always law abiding (reject-reject) in both treatments. Recall that a reject-reject preference profile means that the respondent rejects any alteration or avoidance to the application of the inheritance law regardless of the gender composition of the progeny in the vignettes. Our outcome is thus a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the individual has a reject-reject preference in a given treatment and zero otherwise. Following our first hypothesis, we expect a positive relationship between this outcome variable and the individual's religiosity.

We present the results for the law avoidance treatment in Table 3. Self-reported non-conservative religious beliefs, while having the expected sign, are statistically insignificant (columns 1 & 2). However, we find a strong positive relationship between the constructed religious index and the rejection of the HH's allocation decision (columns 3 & 4) as expected. This means that individuals who are stricter in their religious observance are more likely to completely abide by the inheritance law. Further, pro-male cultural beliefs are not found to be correlated with the preference for inheritance law abidance in the law avoidance treatment (columns 5 to 8 in Table 3). This finding supports our first hypothesis on the positive correlation between religiosity and the Islamic law abidance.

We repeat the above analysis for the law internalization treatment and we present the results in Table 4. Recall that in this treatment, the hypothetical vignettes allow for partial avoidance of the inheritance law. A reject-reject preference, as measured by our outcome variable, means that the participant prefers full abidance by the inheritance law. We find that religiosity is positively and significantly correlated with law abidance in this treatment (columns 1 to 4). Unlike in the law avoidance treatment, the self-reported non-conservative religious views variable is statistically significant at the 5% level, meaning

Table 3 – Non-selective Rejection of the HH Allocation Decision: Case of Law Avoidance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
non_conserv	-0.072	-0.060						
	(0.088)	(0.082)						
relig_index			0.132***	0.100***				
			(0.023)	(0.026)				
pro_male_cul1					0.091	0.022		
					(0.066)	(0.065)		
pro_male_cul2							0.085	0.084
							(0.081)	(0.078)
female		-0.251***		-0.205***		-0.235***		-0.236***
		(0.069)		(0.067)		(0.069)		(0.068)
age		0.004		0.002		0.002		0.003
		(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.004)
high_education		-0.070		-0.041		-0.075		-0.086
		(0.111)		(0.114)		(0.111)		(0.110)
abvavg_income		-0.153**		-0.118*		-0.158**		-0.162**
		(0.070)		(0.067)		(0.069)		(0.069)
urban_gov_liv		-0.055		-0.011		-0.053		-0.048
		(0.075)		(0.074)		(0.075)		(0.075)
Constant	0.564***	0.681***	0.107	0.286	0.462***	0.666***	0.489***	0.656***
	(0.080)	(0.195)	(0.074)	(0.186)	(0.046)	(0.181)	(0.037)	(0.177)
N	224	224	231	231	231	231	231	231
Adjusted R^2	-0.001	0.102	0.098	0.143	0.004	0.091	0.000	0.095

Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable is binary and takes the value of one for a reject-reject preference profile, zero otherwise. The reference groups for the control variables are male, less than a bachelor's degree, average or below average income, and living in a non-urban governorate. The age is a continuous variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p-value < 0.10 ** p-value < 0.05 *** p-value < 0.010.

that individuals who think of themselves as non-conservative, with respect to religion, are less likely to abide by the inheritance law when given the opportunity to abide by it partially rather than fully. Furthermore, we find that individuals who score highly on our religious practices index are significantly more likely to abide by the inheritance law. It is worth noting that the religiosity index coefficient is comparable across both treatments, in terms of magnitude and significance, again lending strong support to our first hypothesis that religious individuals are more likely to abide by the Islamic inheritance law.

Pro-male cultural beliefs, as reported in columns 5-8 of Table 4 are either insignificant or significant only at the 10% level which means that pro-male cultural beliefs have a negative but weak correlation with law abidance in the law internalization treatment. This suggests that those with pro-male cultural beliefs are less likely to reject the partial avoidance of law.

Table 4 – Non-selective Rejection of the HH Allocation Decision: Case of Law Internalization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
non_conserv	-0.183**	-0.176**						
	(0.088)	(0.087)						
relig_index			0.123***	0.108***				
			(0.022)	(0.024)				
pro_male_cul1					-0.021	-0.077		
					(0.064)	(0.065)		
pro_male_cul2							-0.141*	-0.137*
							(0.073)	(0.076)
female		-0.220***		-0.164**		-0.211***		-0.204***
		(0.065)		(0.064)		(0.067)		(0.066)
age		0.007*		0.006*		0.006		0.006
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)
high_education		-0.040		-0.009		-0.068		-0.041
		(0.126)		(0.126)		(0.124)		(0.126)
abvavg_income		-0.089		-0.065		-0.112*		-0.104
		(0.065)		(0.063)		(0.066)		(0.065)
urban_gov_liv		0.013		0.058		0.008		0.001
		(0.076)		(0.072)		(0.076)		(0.076)
Constant	0.513***	0.424**	-0.006	-0.111	0.378***	0.373*	0.397***	0.358*
	(0.080)	(0.200)	(0.065)	(0.190)	(0.045)	(0.193)	(0.036)	(0.191)
N	224	224	231	231	231	231	231	231
Adjusted R^2	0.016	0.081	0.092	0.120	-0.004	0.060	0.010	0.067

Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable is binary and takes the value of one for a reject-reject preference profile, zero otherwise. The reference groups for the control variables are male, less than a bachelor's degree, average or below average income, and living in a non-urban governorate. The age is a continuous variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p-value < 0.10 ** p-value < 0.05 *** p-value < 0.010.

Female participants are found to significantly support law avoidance in both treatments demonstrating a preference for opposing the distributive disadvantage they face in inheritance. Furthermore, we find that individuals with above average income level are less likely to abide by the inheritance law.

In appendix B we present the analysis for the always law-avoiding (accept-accept) preference profile in Tables B1 and B2 for the law avoidance and law internalization treatments, respectively. We obtain similar results to Tables 3 and 4.

In the following section we examine how religiosity and pro-male cultural beliefs may affect preferences for pro-male selective law avoidance/abidance.

3.3.2 Pro-male Selective Rejection of Household Allocation Decision

In the previous section, we show that when individuals have gender bias, it is more likely for this bias to be pro-male than pro-female (revisit Figure 1). We hypothesize that this pro-male bias is driven by a patriarchal culture. In what follows, we thus examine if pro-male cultural beliefs are correlated with pro-male preferences in inheritance. Here, we are interested in the accept-reject preference profile. Recall that the accept-reject preference is when a participant accepts law avoidance when the progeny in the hypothetical vignettes is only female, but prefers law abidance (i.e., rejects law avoidance) when the progeny includes a son. To this end, we create a dummy variable that is equal to one for an accept-reject preference in a given treatment, zero otherwise.

Table 5 – Pro-male Selective Rejection of the HH Allocation Decision: Case of Law Avoidance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
non_conserv	0.088	0.069						
	(0.062)	(0.064)						
relig_index			-0.011	-0.009				
			(0.022)	(0.024)				
pro_male_cul1					0.038	0.047		
					(0.053)	(0.055)		
pro_male_cul2							-0.068	-0.079
							(0.060)	(0.063)
female		-0.051		-0.063		-0.053		-0.062
		(0.059)		(0.060)		(0.058)		(0.057)
age		-0.004		-0.004		-0.004		-0.004
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)
high_education		0.118		0.132*		0.146*		0.141*
		(0.077)		(0.077)		(0.076)		(0.076)
abvavg_income		0.004		-0.005		0.001		0.002
		(0.059)		(0.058)		(0.057)		(0.057)
urban_gov_liv		0.015		0.002		0.008		0.001
		(0.065)		(0.064)		(0.064)		(0.064)
Constant	0.128**	0.184	0.236***	0.268*	0.185***	0.196	0.217***	0.255**
	(0.054)	(0.130)	(0.074)	(0.146)	(0.036)	(0.123)	(0.031)	(0.129)
N	224	224	231	231	231	231	231	231
Adjusted R^2	0.002	-0.003	-0.003	-0.006	-0.002	-0.004	0.000	-0.001

Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable is binary and takes the value of one for an accept-reject preference profile, zero otherwise. The reference groups for the control variables are male, less than a bachelor's degree, average or below average income, and living in a non-urban governorate. The age is a continuous variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p-value < 0.10 ** p-value < 0.05 *** p-value < 0.010.

Following our second hypothesis, we expect to find a positive correlation between

pro-male selective law abidance and pro-male cultural beliefs. We present our regression results for the law avoidance treatment in Table 5 and for the law internalization treatment in Table 6. We find that pro-male cultural beliefs are positively correlated with a pro-male selective abidance of the inheritance law, as predicted by the second hypothesis, in the law internalization treatment but not in the law avoidance treatment. This could be because pro-male cultural beliefs are in action only when participants have the option to partially abide by the law. This partial abidance can be appealing to participants for several reasons including, but not limited to, moral concerns over allowing for partial application of the law, or satisfying secondary heirs by allowing them some share of the inheritance. On the other hand, we find that religiosity, whether self-reported or constructed, is not correlated with pro-male selective law avoidance.

Table 6 – Pro-male Selective Rejection of the HH Allocation Decision: Case of Law Internalization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
non_conserv	0.033	0.015						
	(0.082)	(0.084)						
relig_index			-0.014	-0.001				
			(0.025)	(0.025)				
pro_male_cul1					0.107*	0.139**		
					(0.062)	(0.064)		
pro_male_cul2							0.255***	0.249***
							(0.080)	(0.081)
female		0.036		0.040		0.060		0.046
		(0.069)		(0.068)		(0.066)		(0.065)
age		-0.006*		-0.006*		-0.007*		-0.006
		(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)
high_education		0.087		0.092		0.123		0.075
		(0.106)		(0.105)		(0.106)		(0.111)
abvavg_income		0.028		0.026		0.031		0.018
		(0.071)		(0.068)		(0.067)		(0.066)
urban_gov_liv		0.034		0.017		0.022		0.035
		(0.075)		(0.074)		(0.073)		(0.071)
Constant	0.308***	0.420**	0.370***	0.437**	0.277***	0.331**	0.277***	0.357**
	(0.074)	(0.174)	(0.082)	(0.174)	(0.041)	(0.155)	(0.033)	(0.161)
N	224	224	231	231	231	231	231	231
Adjusted R^2	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	0.009	0.018	0.043	0.043

Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable is binary and takes the value of one for an accept-reject preference profile, zero otherwise. The reference groups for the control variables are male, less than a bachelor's degree, average or below average income, and living in a non-urban governorate. The age is a continuous variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p-value < 0.10 ** p-value < 0.05 *** p-value < 0.010.

We present the analysis for the pro-female selective law avoidance (reject-accept) in appendix B, Tables B3 and B4. We find that the pro-male cultural beliefs have mostly negative coefficients, in line with the second hypothesis. However the coefficients are not statistically significant, presumably because of the small number of participants who exhibit pro-female preferences.

3.3.3 Robustness Checks

Our empirical analysis is based on estimating a separate linear probability model (LPM) for each of the four possible preference profiles (reject-reject, accept-reject, reject-accept, accept-accept), using OLS. The advantage of this specification is its ease of interpretation. An alternative model specification is to employ a multinomial logistic (MNL) regression where the outcome is a categorical variable that indicates each of the four preference profiles.

We present the summary results for the MNL estimation for the explanatory variables of interest in Tables B5 and B6 in the appendix for the law avoidance and law internalization treatments, respectively. In these regressions, the reject-reject profile is the base category. We show both the coefficients of the MNL regressions, which reflect the relative odds of choosing a given profile versus the reject-reject profile, as well as the marginal effects of the regressors of interest on the probability of each category. In our interpretation we focus on the marginal effects because these are closer in interpretation to the OLS coefficients of the LPM in the main tables.

We find that the MNL results confirm the LPM results that we discussed in the previous sections. Namely, we find that religious individuals are less likely to avoid the application of the inheritance law. This result supports our first hypothesis on the positive correlation between religiosity and law abidance. We further find that pro-male cultural beliefs are positively correlated with pro-male selective avoidance in the law internalization, but not in the law avoidance treatment, which is also in line with our OLS findings and in support of our second hypothesis on the positive correlation between having pro-male cultural beliefs and the resistance to losing the pro-male advantage in inheritance.

4 Discussion

To summarize, our results are mostly consistent with our two hypotheses. Consistent with the first hypothesis, we find that religiosity is positively correlated with the abidance by the Islamic inheritance law in both the law avoidance and the law internalization treatments. Pro-male cultural beliefs are not significantly correlated with the always law-abiding preference profile. Conversely, in line with the second hypothesis, we find that pro-male cultural beliefs are positively correlated with pro-male selective avoidance of the inheritance law. However, religiosity is not significantly correlated with this preference profile.

Despite this, it may be plausible to think that our results could be driven by a preference for primary heirs. Recall that under the Islamic inheritance law, secondary heirs (e.g., deceased's brothers and sisters) receive a share of inheritance if the deceased had no sons, but receive nothing if the deceased had at least one son. So, the acceptance of law avoidance may be driven by a preference for primary heirs (children) over secondary heirs. However, we argue that our findings cannot be solely explained by a preference for primary heirs. While law avoidance in the first scenario (female-only) may be indeed driven by a preference for primary heirs, law abidance in the second scenario (the presence of a son) cannot be explained by a preference for primary heirs, since secondary heirs do not inherit in this case, but rather by a pro-male preference.

We show in Tables B7 and B8 in the appendix the correlates of the relative odds of choosing an accept-reject profile versus an accept-accept profile, within the restricted sample of respondents who choose an accept-reject or accept-accept profile. Notice that in this restricted sample, all respondents hold a preference for primary heirs, as they all accept the avoidance of the inheritance law in the first scenario (female-only progeny). They only differ in their attitude towards women as captured in the second scenario (female-male progeny), where the risk of passing inheritance to secondary heirs is not present. We find that in this restricted sample, our patriarchy measures are strongly positively correlated with the probability of choosing an accept-reject profile in the case of law internalization, which is similar to our main results for the full sample.

Furthermore, in the law internalization treatment, it may be plausible that our participants think that inheritance is risky due to its deferred nature and may find it unfair for the daughter to receive a secured portion of the wealth while the son does not. To test for

this possibility, we include a vignette where the transfers to the daughter is managed via a will. [18] We again test for the pro-male selective law avoidance in the law internalization treatment using this alternative vignette and we present the results in appendix Table B9. We find that the pro-male cultural beliefs are positively and strongly correlated with the pro-male selective attitude. Moreover, the pro-male cultural beliefs coefficients' magnitude and significance are comparable in Table 6 and Table B9 lending confidence to our interpretation on the patriarchal culture and pro-male preference.

Finally, the law internalization treatment may include a religious primer; the reference to the Shari'a-eligible heirs in the first scenario, and the reference to the one third inheritance share in the second scenario. We do not expect this potential religious priming to bias our results since the potential prime is introduced in both scenarios.

5 Conclusion

Egypt's rank on the Global Gender Gap index demonstrates persistent gender inequality. While promoting gender equality is important for development, the roots of inequality in Egypt have not been directly addressed. In this paper, we present the case of inequality in inheritance between men and women of equal kinship level as dictated by Islamic law and legislated in the Egyptian family law. We examined if religiosity and pro-male cultural beliefs represent obstacles to achieving gender equality in inheritance.

We employ an online vignette experiment to elicit individual attitudes towards the inheritance law in Egypt. The vignettes present situations where a household head (HH) decides to allocate their endowments to either achieve gender equality in inheritance between a son and a daughter, or to protect their daughters in the absence of a son. In both situations, the HH intervenes with the inheritance law. We further investigate the cases where the HH completely avoids the application of the law, and when the HH internalizes the law allowing for partial avoidance/application. We correlate the elicited attitudes towards inheritance with individual religiosity and pro-male cultural beliefs.

We find that religiosity is positively correlated with a higher likelihood of abiding with the Islamic inheritance law. This is true for the complete law avoidance and the law internalization cases. In contrast, we find that pro-male cultural beliefs are correlated

18. Specifically, we replace scenario 2 in set B with a similar one where the means of the transfer is will writing. We refer to this new scenario along with scenario 1 in set B as set C.

with the application of the law in the presence of a son but not in his absence. This relationship is stronger in the law internalization than the law avoidance cases. Our results show that the religious values promoted by the Islamic revival in Egypt as well as the pro-male cultural beliefs represent obstacles for any legal reform allowing for gender equality in inheritance. Such pro-male values may result in weak legal enforcement of any potential reform or potentially even blocking such a reform altogether.

This paper opens new and exciting areas of research on religion, culture, and gender. While we employ the inheritance law, future research may employ other examples such as the asymmetric polygamy rights in Islam but not in other monotheistic religions or the implications of polygamy in cross-country settings (such as Muslim migrants in Western countries).

References

Acemoglu, D., & Jackson, M. O. (2017). Social norms and the enforcement of laws. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 15(2), 245-295.

Ahmad, E., Bibi, A., & Mahmood, T. (2012). Attitudes towards women's rights to inheritance in District Lakki Marwat, Pakistan. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 197-217.

Basu, D., & de Jong, R. (2010). Son preference and gender inequality. *Demography*, 47, 521-536.

Bhalotra, S., Brulé, R., & Roy, S. (2020). Women's inheritance rights reform and the preference for sons in India. *Journal of Development Economics*, 146, 102275.

Binzel, C., & Carvalho, J. P. (2017). Education, social mobility and religious movements: The Islamic revival in Egypt. *The Economic Journal*, 127(607), 2553-2580.

Bishin, B. G., & Cherif, F. M. (2017). Women, property rights, and Islam. *Comparative Politics*, 49(4), 501-520.

Burgess, R., & Zhuang, J. (2002). Modernization and son preference in People's Republic of China. *Asian Development Bank*, working paper no. 20.

Charrad, M. M. (2011). Gender in the Middle East: Islam, state, agency. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 37(1), 417-437.

Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2014. Retrieved April 20, 2025, from https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf

Donno, D., & Russett, B. (2004). Islam, authoritarianism, and female empowerment: What are the linkages?. *World Politics*, 56(4), 582-607.

Engel, C., Heine, K., & Naseer, S. (2021). Religion and Tradition in Conflict. Experimentally Testing the Power of Social Norms to Invalidate Religious Law. Experimentally Testing the Power of Social Norms to Invalidate Religious Law (May 28, 2021). *MPI Collective Goods Discussion Paper*, (2021/13).

Fish, M. S. (2002). Islam and authoritarianism. *World Politics*, 55(1), 4-37.

Gouda, M., & Gutmann, J. (2021). Islamic constitutions and religious minorities. *Public Choice*, 186(3), 243–265.

Gouda, M., & Hanafy, S. (2022). Islamic constitutions and democracy. *Political Research Quarterly*, 75(4), 994-1005.

Gouda, M., & Potrafke, N. (2016). Gender equality in Muslim-majority countries. *Eco-*

nomic Systems, 40(4), 683-698

Gutmann, J., & Voigt, S. (2018). The rule of law and Islam. In *Handbook on the Rule of Law* (pp. 345-356). Edward Elgar Publishing.

Harari, M. (2019). Women's inheritance rights and bargaining power: Evidence from Kenya. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 68(1), 189-238.

Htun, M., & Weldon, S. L. (2011). State power, religion, and women's rights: A comparative analysis of family law. *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 18(1), 145-165.

Khan, I., Abdullah, M. F., Rahman, N. N. A., Nor, M. R. B. M., & Yusoff, M. Y. Z. B. M. (2016). The right of women in property sharing in Bangladesh: Can the islamic inheritance system eliminate discrimination?. *SpringerPlus*, 5, 1-8.

Klingorová, K., & Havlíček, T. (2015). Religion and gender inequality: The status of women in the societies of world religions. *Moravian Geographical Reports*, 23(2), 2-11.

Moon, J. W., Tratner, A. E., & McDonald, M. M. (2022). Men are less religious in more gender-equal countries. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 289(1968), 20212474.

Quisumbing, A. R., Estudillo, J. P., & Otsuka, K. (2004). Land and schooling: Transferring wealth across generations. International Food Policy Research Institute.

Rahman, F. Z. (2025). Islamic doctrine and women's economic rights: implications of an ambiguous relationship for state policy in the Muslim world. *Politics and Religion*, 18(1), 50-73.

Rahman, F. Z. (2012). Gender equality in Muslim-majority states and Shari'a family law: is there a link?. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 47(3), 347-362.

Roy, S. (2015). Empowering women? Inheritance rights, female education and dowry payments in India. *Journal of Development Economics*, 114, 233-251.

Schnabel, L. (2016). Religion and gender equality worldwide: A country-level analysis. *Social Indicators Research*, 129, 893-907.

The World Economic Forum (2024). Global Gender Gap 2024: Insight Report.

Zasu, Y. (2007). Sanctions by social norms and the law: Substitutes or complements?. *The Journal of Legal Studies*, 36(2), 379-396.

Appendix A: Experiment and Questionnaire*

*Translated from Arabic. Each question/vignette was shown on a separate screen.

The first section of the questionnaire aims to know some simple information about the participant in the study. We would like to remind you that we cannot identify the participant's identity and that the information received from you are used only to conduct scientific research.

What is your gender?

— Female

— Male

What is your age?

In which governorate do you currently live?

What is the highest academic degree you have obtained?

In Egyptian standards, what is your economic status?

— Below average

— Average

— Above average

This section of the study aims to know your opinion on some life matters. We would like to remind you that the aim of the study is scientific research and there is no link between the participant's answers and their identity.

Below is a set of statements. Please choose a number from 1 to 5 to express your extent of agreement with the statement so that:

1 means that you strongly agree

2 means that you agree

3 means that you neither agree nor disagree

4 means that you disagree

5 means that you strongly disagree

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

— Parents must buy an apartment for each male son for him to have it upon marriage.
— Parents must buy an apartment for each female daughter for her to have it upon marriage.
— If parents did not buy an apartment for their male son, he must be financially compensated.
— If parents did not buy an apartment for their female daughter, she must be financially compensated.

Doctor Magdy has 3 daughters and no sons. To secure his daughters' future after his death, he decided to bequeath all his endowments to his daughters during his lifetime. Do you agree with Doctor Magdy's decision?

— Yes
— No

Engineer Mostafa has 3 daughters and no sons. To secure his daughters' future after his death, he decided to bequeath most of his endowments to his daughters during his lifetime. However, he kept a small monetary amount in his bank account to be distributed among the Shar'ia-eligible heirs according to the law. Do you agree with Engineer Mostafa's decision?

— Yes
— No

Mister Islam has a son and a daughter, stemming from his beliefs on the importance of gender equality, he decided to equally distribute his endowments among them during his lifetime. Do you agree with Mister Islam's decision?

— Yes
— No

Doctor Abdelrahman has a son and a daughter, stemming from his beliefs on the importance of gender equality, he decided to bequeath his daughter less than a third of his endowments by writing a will. This was to ensure equality between the girl and her brother in inheritance following his death. Do you agree with Doctor Abdelrahman's decision?

Doctor Abdelrahman has a son and a daughter, stemming from his beliefs on the im-

portance of gender equality, he decided to bequeath (gift) his daughter less than a third of his endowments during his lifetime. This was to ensure equality between the girl and her brother in inheritance following his death. Do you agree with Doctor Abdelrahman's decision?

— Yes

— No

Do you think that the hijab for a Muslim women is an obligation?

— Yes

— No

— I do not know

What do you think of shaking hands between a man with a woman?

— I find no problem in it

— I find it undesirable

— I find it forbidden according to the Islamic Shari'a

What do you think of polygyny?

— I welcome polygyny whenever the man wants

— I welcome polygyny in cases of necessity

— I welcome polygyny with conditions

— I do not welcome polygyny

— I totally reject polygyny

How do you consider yourself in terms of religiosity?

— Conservative

— Moderate

— Irreligious

Do you drink alcohol?

— Yes

— No

— Sometimes

Do you accompany someone who drinks alcohol?

— Always

— Sometimes

— Occasionally

— Never

Which religion do you follow?

— Islam

— Christianity

— Other

Appendix B: Additional Tables

Table B1: Non-selective Acceptance of the HH Allocation Decision: Case of Law Avoidance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
non_conserv	-0.040	-0.048						
	(0.077)	(0.072)						
relig_index			-0.128***	-0.103***				
			(0.021)	(0.020)				
pro_male_cul1					-0.082	-0.026		
					(0.054)	(0.053)		
pro_male_cul2							0.017	0.022
							(0.069)	(0.065)
female		0.231***		0.194***		0.224***		0.229***
		(0.059)		(0.055)		(0.059)		(0.058)
age		-0.003		-0.002		-0.002		-0.002
		(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.004)
high_education		-0.019		-0.067		-0.033		-0.029
		(0.084)		(0.083)		(0.083)		(0.083)
abvavg_income		0.152**		0.116*		0.158**		0.158**
		(0.065)		(0.059)		(0.064)		(0.064)
urban_gov_liv		0.048		0.009		0.053		0.056
		(0.059)		(0.055)		(0.056)		(0.057)
Constant	0.256***	0.212	0.609***	0.531***	0.261***	0.142	0.217***	0.116
	(0.070)	(0.167)	(0.079)	(0.148)	(0.040)	(0.155)	(0.031)	(0.150)
N	224	224	231	231	231	231	231	231
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	0.118	0.137	0.198	0.005	0.117	-0.004	0.116

Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable is binary and takes the value of one for an accept-accept preference profile, zero otherwise. The reference groups for the control variables are male, less than a bachelor's degree, average or below average income, and living in a non-urban governorate. The age is a continuous variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p-value < 0.10 ** p-value < 0.05 *** p-value < 0.010.

Table B2: Non-selective Acceptance of the HH Allocation Decision: Case of Law Internalization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
non_conserv	0.146**	0.169***						
	(0.058)	(0.064)						
relig_index			-0.090***	-0.084***				
			(0.023)	(0.023)				
pro_male_cul1					-0.099*	-0.068		
					(0.054)	(0.054)		
pro_male_cul2							-0.090	-0.083
							(0.061)	(0.060)
female		0.218***		0.171***		0.189***		0.196***
		(0.060)		(0.058)		(0.059)		(0.059)
age		0.002		0.001		0.001		0.001
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)
high_education		0.003		-0.022		-0.005		0.016
		(0.098)		(0.096)		(0.097)		(0.097)
abvavg_income		-0.016		-0.040		-0.008		-0.003
		(0.061)		(0.059)		(0.061)		(0.061)
urban_gov_liv		-0.012		-0.034		-0.000		-0.003
		(0.062)		(0.058)		(0.060)		(0.060)
Constant	0.103**	-0.054	0.494***	0.426**	0.269***	0.146	0.239***	0.121
	(0.049)	(0.164)	(0.080)	(0.165)	(0.041)	(0.147)	(0.032)	(0.147)
N	224	224	231	231	231	231	231	231
Adjusted R^2	0.013	0.055	0.066	0.084	0.010	0.036	0.003	0.036

Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable is binary and takes the value of one for an accept-accept preference profile, zero otherwise. The reference groups for the control variables are male, less than a bachelor's degree, average or below average income, and living in a non-urban governorate. The age is a continuous variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p-value < 0.10 ** p-value < 0.05 *** p-value < 0.010.

Table B3: Pro-female Selective Rejection of the HH Allocation Decision: Case of Law Avoidance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
non_conserv	0.024	0.038						
	(0.040)	(0.039)						
relig_index			0.007	0.013				
			(0.013)	(0.015)				
pro_male_cul1					-0.048	-0.044		
					(0.033)	(0.031)		
pro_male_cul2							-0.034	-0.027
							(0.035)	(0.035)
female		0.072*		0.074*		0.063*		0.069*
		(0.038)		(0.038)		(0.037)		(0.037)
age		0.003		0.003		0.003		0.003
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
high_education		-0.028		-0.024		-0.038		-0.027
		(0.061)		(0.061)		(0.061)		(0.061)
abvavg_income		-0.003		0.007		-0.000		0.002
		(0.038)		(0.040)		(0.038)		(0.038)
urban_gov_liv		-0.008		-0.001		-0.008		-0.008
		(0.037)		(0.036)		(0.036)		(0.036)
Constant	0.051	-0.078	0.048	-0.085	0.092***	-0.003	0.076***	-0.027
	(0.035)	(0.108)	(0.041)	(0.103)	(0.027)	(0.087)	(0.020)	(0.092)
N	224	224	231	231	231	231	231	231
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	0.002	-0.003	0.002	0.005	0.006	-0.002	0.001

Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable is binary and takes the value of one for a reject-accept preference profile, zero otherwise. The reference groups for the control variables are male, less than a bachelor's degree, average or below average income, and living in a non-urban governorate. The age is a continuous variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p-value < 0.10 ** p-value < 0.05 *** p-value < 0.010.

Table B4: Pro-female Selective Rejection of the HH Allocation Decision: Case of Law Internalization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
non_conserv	0.004	-0.007						
	(0.047)	(0.044)						
relig_index			-0.019	-0.023				
			(0.019)	(0.020)				
pro_male_cul1					0.014	0.006		
					(0.036)	(0.035)		
pro_male_cul2							-0.023	-0.030
							(0.041)	(0.041)
female		-0.034		-0.046		-0.038		-0.039
		(0.038)		(0.041)		(0.038)		(0.038)
age		-0.002		-0.001		-0.001		-0.001
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
high_education		-0.050		-0.061		-0.050		-0.050
		(0.075)		(0.077)		(0.075)		(0.078)
abvavg_income		0.077*		0.079*		0.088**		0.089**
		(0.043)		(0.043)		(0.043)		(0.043)
urban_gov_liv		-0.036		-0.041		-0.030		-0.033
		(0.042)		(0.040)		(0.041)		(0.040)
Constant	0.077*	0.210*	0.141**	0.247*	0.076***	0.150	0.087***	0.163
	(0.043)	(0.118)	(0.062)	(0.147)	(0.024)	(0.116)	(0.021)	(0.113)
N	224	224	231	231	231	231	231	231
Adjusted R^2	-0.004	0.001	0.003	0.012	-0.004	0.003	-0.003	0.005

Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable is binary and takes the value of one for a reject-accept preference profile, zero otherwise. The reference groups for the control variables are male, less than a bachelor's degree, average or below average income, and living in a non-urban governorate. The age is a continuous variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p-value < 0.10 ** p-value < 0.05 *** p-value < 0.010.

Table B5: Multinomial Logit Analysis: The Case of Law Avoidance

Panel A

	Reject-Reject	Accept-Reject	Reject-Accept	Accept-Accept
non_conserv		0.57	0.82	-0.12
		(0.54)	(0.82)	(0.48)
Controls	Yes			
Observations	224			
Marginal Effects	-0.07	0.08	0.05	-0.06
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.07)

Panel B

	Reject-Reject	Accept-Reject	Reject-Accept	Accept-Accept
relig_index		-0.30*	-0.10	-0.88***
		(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.19)
Controls	Yes			
Observations	231			
Marginal Effects	0.10***	-0.01	0.01	-0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)

Panel C

	Reject-Reject	Accept-Reject	Reject-Accept	Accept-Accept
pro_male_cul1		0.18	-0.81	-0.21
		(0.36)	(0.58)	(0.38)
Controls	Yes			
Observations	231			
Marginal Effects	0.03	0.05	-0.05	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)

Panel D

	Reject-Reject	Accept-Reject	Reject-Accept	Accept-Accept
pro_male_cul2		-0.57	-0.65	-0.10
		(0.48)	(0.83)	(0.46)
Controls	Yes			
Observations	231			
Marginal Effects	0.09	-0.08	-0.03	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)

The dependent variable is categorical and ranges from 1 to 4 representing the four possible preferences profile. Each panel represents a separate multinomial regression with the explanatory variable of interest and controls. Controls are: gender, age, high education, above-average income, and living in an urban governorate dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Table B6: Multinomial Logit Analysis: The Case of Law Internalization

Panel A

	Reject-Reject	Accept-Reject	Reject-Accept	Accept-Accept
non_conserv		0.58	0.38	1.57**
		(0.44)	(0.67)	(0.66)
Controls	Yes			
Observations	224			
Marginal Effects	-0.18**	-0.01	-0.01	0.20**
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.09)

Panel B

	Reject-Reject	Accept-Reject	Reject-Accept	Accept-Accept
relig_index		-0.37***	-0.67**	-0.81***
		(0.14)	(0.30)	(0.19)
Controls	Yes			
Observations	231			
Marginal Effects	0.11***	0.00	-0.02	-0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)

Panel C

	Reject-Reject	Accept-Reject	Reject-Accept	Accept-Accept
pro_male_cul1		0.66*	0.36	-0.09
		(0.35)	(0.53)	(0.40)
Controls	Yes			
Observations	231			
Marginal Effects	-0.08	0.14**	0.01	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)

Panel D

	Reject-Reject	Accept-Reject	Reject-Accept	Accept-Accept
pro_male_cul2		1.11***	0.09	0.04
		(0.42)	(0.73)	(0.54)
Controls	Yes			
Observations	231			
Marginal Effects	0.09	-0.08	-0.03	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)

The dependent variable is categorical and ranges from 1 to 4 representing the four possible preferences profile. Each panel represents a separate multinomial regression with the explanatory variable of interest and controls. Controls are: gender, age, high education, above-average income, and living in an urban governorate dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Table B7: Pro-male Selective Rejection of Allocation: Case of Law Avoidance
(Restricted Sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
non_conserv	0.167	0.126						
	(0.135)	(0.147)						
relig_index			0.125***	0.125***				
			(0.036)	(0.043)				
pro_male_cul1					0.140	0.094		
					(0.101)	(0.100)		
pro_male_cul2							-0.111	-0.093
							(0.129)	(0.129)
Constant	0.333***	0.545	0.160	0.065	0.415***	0.616*	0.500***	0.726**
	(0.123)	(0.350)	(0.105)	(0.393)	(0.068)	(0.347)	(0.056)	(0.334)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	95	95	98	98	98	98	98	98
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.095	0.089	0.176	0.009	0.109	-0.003	0.106

Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable equals 1 if accept-reject, zero if accept-accept. The reference groups for the control variables are male, less than a bachelor degree, average or below average income, and living in a non-urban governorate. The age is a continuous variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p-value < 0.10 ** p-value < 0.05 *** p-value < 0.010.

Table B8: Pro-male Selective Rejection of Allocation: Case of Law Internalization
(Restricted Sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
non_conserv	-0.172	-0.165						
	(0.119)	(0.120)						
relig_index			0.091***	0.105***				
			(0.034)	(0.037)				
pro_male_cul1					0.186**	0.154*		
					(0.086)	(0.093)		
pro_male_cul2							0.244***	0.213**
							(0.090)	(0.095)
Constant	0.750***	0.980***	0.347***	0.332	0.508***	0.677**	0.537***	0.781***
	(0.109)	(0.296)	(0.103)	(0.335)	(0.063)	(0.282)	(0.052)	(0.273)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	125	125	127	127	127	127	127	127
Adjusted R^2	0.006	0.010	0.042	0.049	0.028	0.018	0.039	0.030

Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable equals 1 if accept-reject, zero if accept-accept. The reference groups for the control variables are male, less than a bachelor degree, average or below average income, and living in a non-urban governorate. The age is a continuous variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p-value < 0.10 ** p-value < 0.05 *** p-value < 0.010.

Table B9: Pro-male Selective Rejection of the HH Allocation Decision: Case of Law Internalization (An Alternative Measure)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
non_conserv	0.013	0.001						
	(0.084)	(0.086)						
relig_index			-0.037	-0.025				
			(0.025)	(0.026)				
pro_male_cul1					0.072	0.107*		
					(0.062)	(0.064)		
pro_male_cul2							0.217***	0.218***
							(0.081)	(0.082)
female		0.056		0.054		0.078		0.068
		(0.069)		(0.067)		(0.066)		(0.065)
age		-0.004		-0.005		-0.005		-0.004
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)
high_education		0.081		0.076		0.109		0.070
		(0.106)		(0.105)		(0.106)		(0.106)
abvavg_income		0.006		-0.007		0.007		-0.004
		(0.071)		(0.068)		(0.068)		(0.067)
urban_gov_liv		0.068		0.039		0.054		0.066
		(0.075)		(0.074)		(0.073)		(0.070)
Constant	0.333***	0.351*	0.450***	0.456**	0.303***	0.278*	0.293***	0.290*
	(0.076)	(0.181)	(0.085)	(0.180)	(0.042)	(0.161)	(0.034)	(0.161)
N	224	224	231	231	231	231	231	231
Adjusted R^2	-0.004	-0.004	0.005	-0.001	0.002	0.008	0.030	0.030

Linear Probability Model. Dependent variable is binary and takes the value of one for an accept-reject preference profile (in set C), zero otherwise. The reference groups for the control variables are male, less than a bachelor's degree, average or below average income, and living in a non-urban governorate. The age is a continuous variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p-value < 0.10 ** p-value < 0.05 *** p-value < 0.010.