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**PART III**

**Issues and challenges in historical  
theory**

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## POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

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This chapter examines the relationship between history and political ideologies. Doing so requires discussion of two highly complex and multi-stranded concepts. As this very set of volumes bears excellent witness, the concept of history and what it implies as an area of study is far from simple. Thus, at minimum, thinking about history as a discipline invites discussion of whether the historian is trying to recapture the past – or produce a *post hoc* narrative about it; whether its study relies more on a continuous (linguistic) tradition or on a particular mode of thought to prosecute it successfully; how it relates to cognate disciplines (such as literature, sociology, philosophy, and political science); and the degree to which its study has taken a particularly new turn in modernity. But the study of political ideologies is no less complex, and if anything, has invited even more dispute amongst scholars. For some political philosophers, notably many recent Anglo-American theorists, political ideologies can only ever be regarded as deeply unsatisfactory, at best offering clues as to the true nature of political concepts, but hopelessly weighed down by emotive, value-laden, imprecise vocabulary.<sup>1</sup> By contrast, post-modern theorists such as Slavoj Žižek regard political ideologies as indispensable means for political actors to understand the world, arguing that the search for precise conceptual clarity behind such ideologies is a hopeless quest, which ignores the vital role that ideologies play in bringing a limited order to a deeply contingent and uncertain world.<sup>2</sup> In view of such deep disagreements, I will first attempt to define the nature of political ideologies before proceeding to see how different versions of political ideology relate to history.

How then should we define political ideologies? First, it is worth saying explicitly that political ideologies are *modern* phenomena. It is true that there are some scholars who seek to locate the origins of ideologies in the early modern period. Thus, just to take Britain as an example, one can find scholars who try to associate the birth of liberalism with the work of Hobbes and Locke in the 17th century, the advent of socialism with the ideas of radical groups (like the Levellers) in the civil war, and the origins of conservatism in the ideas associated with the Restoration of Charles II in 1660 – namely in the divine right of kings and the importance of the established church.<sup>3</sup> But in the main analysts of ideologies have overwhelmingly agreed that political ideologies appeared as a response to the triple pressures of the Enlightenment, industrialization, and urbanization, and the French Revolution in the 18th century, concurring

with Reinhart Koselleck's conceptualization of the period from roughly 1750–1850 as a crucial *Sattelzeit* or “bridging period.”<sup>4</sup> Further in support of this position, analysts of ideologies often note that this was the very time the term “ideology” was coined – specifically by the French theorist Antoine Destutt de Tracy, who sought to conceptualize human ideas on a scientific footing in his *Eléments d'Idéologie*, written between 1801 and 1815.<sup>5</sup>

After this, however, serious divisions between analysts of ideologies appear. Historically, one of the most powerful traditions of interpreting ideologies has been to view them as various forms of distortion. The most influential version of this thesis was that of Marx and Engels, who, in a series of works from the *1844 Paris Manuscripts* to *The German Ideology* to *The Communist Manifesto*, explained the appearance of ideologies as more or less systematic forms of such distortion, obscuring the underlying socio-economic realities that genuinely explained the nature of modern capitalism. In particular, the appearance of liberal ideology – with its stress on individualism and formal economic and political rights – helped to cover up the true nature of bourgeois society, with its systematic alienation and exploitation, that ultimately had its origins in the fundamentally unequal division of the means of production that modern capitalism had inevitably brought.<sup>6</sup> However, whilst fundamentally misleading as an analysis of modern society, Marx and Engels believed such an ideology was not *trivially* false, but rather useful and valuable since the form it took provided important clues as to the exact *nature* of the pathological socio-economic relations underlying modern capitalism. By paying close attention to the form that bourgeois ideology took, in other words, Marx and Engels argued, the analyst of modern society could gain vital information about how to overcome the fundamental socio-economic problems that had ultimately produced such an ideology – and so, finally, to emancipate societies, to free them.<sup>7</sup> (Such a vision has proved durable and has been reworked in various ways within the Marxist tradition – so that in the work of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci the exposure of bourgeois ideology requires the development of a socialist alternative, while for Louis Althusser socialist ideology might even have a permanent role in a communist society, provided that capitalist class structures had genuinely been overcome.<sup>8</sup> But there have also been more liberal and conservative variants of the suspicion of “ideology” as a concept. Thus, in the work of Giovanni Sartori, the post-war Italian scholar, for example, ideologies are unfavourably contrasted with pragmatic belief systems on the basis that only the latter is genuinely revisable in the light of experience – with pragmatic liberalism being favourably contrasted with communist and socialist ideologies.<sup>9</sup> And in the work of the conservative political philosopher Michael Oakeshott, ideologies are represented as inferior versions of practical political experience – at best aids or “cribs” for the politically inexperienced, but inevitably too inflexible, too abstract, too rationalist, to offer a proper substitute for the resources of a living political tradition.<sup>10</sup>

However, although still influential, this suspicion of ideology has been increasingly challenged by analysts who take a more positive view of the concept. By far the most important and sophisticated of these theorists is Michael Freeden, whose *Ideologies and Political Theory* (1996) and subsequent publications have revolutionized the study of political ideologies, and it is his view that I will seek to adopt here. Freeden strongly opposes counterposing “ideology” to “emancipation,” as the Marxist tradition does, or regarding ideologies as inferior to “pragmatism” or “tradition,” as Sartori and Oakeshott do. Instead, Freeden argues that ideologies should not be conceptualized in a pejorative manner but rather as important symbolic and cognitive maps through which individuals and groups order their political experiences and which clarify as much as they distort. According to him, they have three main features. First, political ideologies are not crudely organized around one particular single concept but rather are composed of *multiple* concepts, organized in a complex and sophisticated structure. To be

precise, major political ideologies are formed of three types of concepts – “core” concepts which are essential to a particular ideology, together with “adjacent” and “peripheral” concepts, which are increasingly less important to its coherence.<sup>11</sup> Thus, for example, “equality” and “community” will almost always be core parts of socialist ideology, whereas the conceptualization of society in terms of class has often been important (but less crucial), while the aim of increasing economic efficiency is a peripheral aim found only in certain types of socialist thought. Second, following on from this, political ideologies “decontest” complex political concepts such as “liberty,” “equality,” and “rationality,” according to Freedén. By this, he means that political ideologies help to resolve deep differences between political philosophers about the meanings of concepts – so that (for example) the issue of whether equality means “equality of opportunity” or “equality of outcome” is made clear (or at least *clearer*) by its relationship to other concepts within the ideology.<sup>12</sup> Third, Freedén argues, the complex internal structure of political ideologies makes it easier to understand why there are different versions of the same political ideology – so that, for example, some liberals believe in a far more absolute commitment to private property rights than others do.<sup>13</sup>

Freedén’s argument thus provides us with a stimulating way of investigating political ideologies that do not simply reduce them to being delusions, or at best, clues as to how political agents can emancipate themselves. But what implications does his analysis have for the relationship of political ideologies to history? Essentially, it has three. First, most basically, history represents an inescapable context within which political concepts and ideologies obtain their meanings. Whatever the continuities within a particular theory of liberalism, for example, a context where a high proportion of individual citizens own their own homes is likely to have implications for the kind of property rights liberals regard as most crucial to personal freedom.<sup>14</sup> Second, as the distinguished intellectual historian Quentin Skinner (amongst others), has argued, political concepts themselves always inevitably carry the accretions and associations of past usage in a way that makes it hard to analyze them without historical analysis.<sup>15</sup> Just taking “democracy” as an example – this concept bears the imprint of conceptions of British “representative democracy” (with its stress on traditional continuity and the rule of law), a radical tradition that links it to a suspicion of political power and very frequent elections, and ideas of “direct democracy” associated with Switzerland, and more recently with referendums in various Western democracies. So however much the formulation of an ideology may help elucidate such terms by setting them in a more fixed and coherent conceptual structure, this does not negate the importance of exploring the historical development of such contested terms. Third, political ideologies themselves have to conceptualize historical change in some form or other.<sup>16</sup> Such conceptualizations may vary in scope from those that are relatively ad hoc, almost seeking to deny that historical change is a problem, to grand meta-narratives of historical development – such as those provided in the 19th century by Hegel, Marx, and Durkheim. Moreover, of course, as we will explore below, political ideologies will necessarily differ in the way that they conceptualize historical change – with some being much keener to embrace the concept of progress than others, for example. But all political ideologies are necessarily committed to having some kind of theory of historical change, at the very least because without one, there is no possibility of maintaining its coherence as a compelling normative position over time, and more positively because a theory of historical change may well help to clarify the relationship of other key concepts within the ideology. Just to give one example: Marx’s meta-narrative of historical change has important implications for how he conceptualizes equality and freedom, not least for the normative ends he believes socialists should aim at. Thus “history” turns out to be not just an inescapable context and framework within which political ideologies

operate but also a concept that ideologists necessarily have to define in order for their positions to be coherent at all.

## The major ideologies: Liberalism, conservatism, and socialism

### *Liberalism*

How, then, do the major political ideologies of liberalism, conservatism, and socialism seek to conceptualize history? To explore this, we obviously need a definition of the major ideologies. Taking liberalism first, defining such a complex political ideology comprehensively is, of course, a major challenge, not least because the central commitment of liberals to “freedom” necessarily invites further questioning as to the implications this has for other political concepts. To some extent, such queries can be answered analytically – since liberals have tended to elucidate their commitment to liberty by arguing for four other positions. First, they have tended to justify their commitment to individual liberty by arguing that all human agents possess more or less equal reasoning abilities, and as such, deserve equal freedom. (This is in contrast to thinkers of the ancient world, such as Aristotle, who distinguished between reasoning abilities of men, women, and slaves, and even some modern conservatives, who have stressed the greater reasoning abilities of the elite.) Second, in order to guarantee such freedom in a political sphere, liberals have usually argued in favour of the importance of representative government and the rule of law, together with a host of associated rights such as freedom of expression and association. Third, albeit sometimes with qualifications, liberals have tended to support the free market against “artificial” restraints by government and monopolies, partly for reasons of efficiency but also to uphold the economic freedom of individuals. And finally, liberals have usually maintained that upholding private property rights is vital to ensure that individual citizens can exercise their economic and political liberties in a meaningful manner – whether this be to maximize their pleasure or affect their self-realization.

However, such an analysis is incomplete – and indeed, it neatly exemplifies the necessity of understanding both the historical context for the development of liberalism and the different ways in which it has conceptualized change. Often, opponents of liberalism have charged the ideology with not taking history seriously, putting forward a purely abstract, rationalist, and unhistorical account of politics and human nature – and there has sometimes been *some* justification for this. Whatever the merits of Bentham’s utilitarianism, for example – and it is certainly much less crude than it is often characterized – or of John Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice*, neither has much to say about the concept of history.<sup>17</sup> However, in general, liberals have not merely engaged with the concepts of history and change but instead have viewed them as integral to the very nature of liberalism. Essentially, they have put forward four different ways of conceptualizing history, which I will briefly consider in turn.

First, a very important initial inspiration for liberalism towards the end of the 18th century was the work of the Scottish Enlightenment, and most notably that of Adam Smith, which appeared at least partly in response to an increasingly commercial economy and the start of the industrial revolution. What Smith provided to liberals above all was an account of historical change that was optimistic and justified progress, by claiming that mankind had progressively developed through four economic stages: Namely from hunter-gatherer societies to nomadic ones organized around livestock, to a more settled society based upon arable farming, and finally to a commercial society with a set of contractual relationships with associated forms of symbolic property such as paper money and credit.<sup>18</sup> Crucially, Smith argued, these developments had had (on balance) positive effects on the behaviour of modern individuals, causing

them to become more polite and civilized – in marked contrast to earlier republican thinkers like Machiavelli and Andrew Fletcher, who had contended that greater prosperity and commercial activity would inevitably lead to great hedonism and indolence, corrupting political life by encouraging individuals to care more about their private enjoyments than the public good. As such, Smith presented liberals not only with reasons to celebrate modernity in general but also, more specifically, to argue for private liberty and the free market – on the basis that these are supportive of the public good, rather than corrupting of it – and these arguments proved influential amongst 19th century liberal thinkers.<sup>19</sup> Thus, just one example was the early 19th century French thinker Benjamin Constant, who, while he lamented the loss of the “vividness” of the pleasures of ancient liberty, argued strongly that only a political system that respected the importance of private freedom was appropriate for modernity.<sup>20</sup>

Second, other 19th century liberals also put forward a progressive account of human history, but one that was more centrally based on a confidence in human reason. So for such liberals, there was a mutually supportive relationship between granting greater liberty to individuals, on the one hand, and social and political improvement, on the other, because they believed human reasoning abilities (at least in modern circumstances) were strong enough to guarantee this. Just to give two examples, a couple of thinkers who broadly upheld this view, despite their metaphysical differences, were J.S. Mill and G.W.F. Hegel.<sup>21</sup> Thus Mill, at least by the time he was writing “On Liberty” (1859), argued that there should be a strong presumption in favour of individuals having liberty of speech and action because the advantages of robustly testing opinions and being exposed to other styles of living (however eccentric) would improve society in general, as well as the character of individuals.<sup>22</sup> It is true that Mill was certainly concerned, like Alexis De Tocqueville, about the possibility that modern societies, particularly democracies, could become too uniform and herd-like if the view of the majority was allowed to reign unchecked, but he believed that with an appropriately proportional voting system (to represent different *interests* in society, rather than just crude majorities) universal education, and greater say given to the more educated, such problems could be avoided.<sup>23</sup> Equally Hegel, although he sought to anchor personal freedom much more firmly within a modern state structure than Mill had done, reconciling the individual wishes of particular citizens with the objective ethical structure of an ideal state, also sought to justify increasing individual liberty with reference to a progressive account of history. Thus for Hegel, what allowed for the possibility of genuine freedom in modernity was the progressive dialectical development that had occurred historically from the ancient Greek polis to the modern (Prussian) state, so that individuals finally had a genuine opportunity to “realize” themselves, which they had not had before.<sup>24</sup> This was partly the consequence of the gradual development of a genuine individual self-consciousness, which had not existed in the ancient world, through the impact of Protestant Christianity, but also of being able to act freely in *reality* – a development made possible by the advent of the modern state. For if the appearance of a free market and private property rights were crucial building blocks of such freedom according to Hegel, the role of the state in providing a structure genuinely capable of embodying and reconciling the different ethical and political beliefs of its citizens was also vitally important.<sup>25</sup> For Hegel, as for Mill, therefore, a confidence in advocating normative liberal values was intrinsically linked to a progressive account of history that stressed the cumulative development of human reason.

Third, later in the 19th century, other liberals also based their normative prescriptions in favour of individual liberty on a progressive account of history, but one that emphasized the importance of a range of *sociological changes* associated with modernity, rather than simply with more sophisticated commercial activity or an increasing ability of individuals to reason well. A key example of this kind of liberal thinker was the famous late 19th century French sociologist

Emile Durkheim. For Durkheim, although increased economic sophistication and the greater ability to use reason in modernity represented important justifications for advocating greater individual liberty, such phenomena constituted only *part* of a more fundamental historical process whereby primitive homogeneous societies were gradually transformed into sophisticated heterogeneous ones through the effects of an increasing division of labour under capitalism. This process, Durkheim argued, involved three interrelated developments. In the first place, Durkheim maintained, the division of labour caused by modern capitalism had the positive effect of increasing genuine social solidarity since the much wider range of occupations that individuals were undertaking due to the division of labour led to a greater level of functional interdependence. Because individuals tended to have more specific and discrete functions in modernity, Durkheim argued, they tended to have a more genuine reason to cooperate with one another than in earlier phases of human development – when individuals tended to have fewer specified functions and were bound together purely for self-protection and military conquest.<sup>26</sup> (This contrasted with the position of many late 19th century sociologists, such as Ferdinand Tonnies, who argued that the greater heterogeneity and commercial sophistication of modern societies were only won at the cost of a decline in genuine social solidarity, as self-interest tended to dominate social relationships, at least in the public sphere.<sup>27</sup>) Secondly, following on from this, Durkheim argued, what guaranteed the importance of individual freedom in modernity was precisely the fact that this normative value was genuinely shared in modern societies – rather than being justified on the unsatisfactory basis of the maximization of self-interest. For, as put it himself: “Rhere is nothing less constant that interest. Today, it unites me to you; tomorrow, it will make me your enemy.”<sup>28</sup> Lastly, in view of this modern commitment to individualism and co-operative social solidarity, Durkheim argued, the nature of legal systems tended to change in parallel – so that rather than being fixated on vengeance and punishment, they became much more precisely organized, privileging reason over emotion, restitution over revenge, hence upholding the “rule of law.”<sup>29</sup> For Durkheim, then, and the liberal thinkers who followed him, what fundamentally justified the commitment to upholding individual freedom and other liberal values in modernity was a progressive account of history based upon the increase of social co-operation, ultimately explained by the increasing division of labour caused by industrialization.

Finally, since the beginning of the 20th century, but particularly since the Second World War, a fourth group of liberals has justified a commitment to upholding individual liberty, the rule of law, and other liberal values rather differently. Eschewing an entirely progressive account of history, such liberals have instead argued that the effects of modernity are ambivalent. On the one hand, modernity has offered genuinely greater possibilities for individual freedom, partly because of the increased division of labour (as Durkheim had argued) and partly because of the reduction of traditional constraints – such as those associated with aristocratic elites and with religious norms and institutions. But on the other, such opportunities to gain greater liberty have been won only at the cost of a reduced experience of community and the agonizing realization that moral norms could conflict at a fundamental level with one another without any easy means of resolution. An early and highly influential example of this kind of liberal was the pre-eminent early 20th century sociologist Max Weber – though his insistence on the irreconcilable pluralism of moral goods was echoed by a number of influential mid-20th century liberals, including the British philosopher Isaiah Berlin and the French sociologist Raymond Aron.<sup>30</sup> For Weber, it was fundamentally the impact of modern capitalism – or, more precisely, the psychological mindset strongly associated with it, known as the “Protestant ethic” – that had encouraged the idea that reason should be conceptualized instrumentally so that the paradigmatic rational calculation was one where there was both a clear “end” and clear “means” for



individuals to achieve it.<sup>31</sup> As such, this mindset encouraged the view that reason was unable to judge between different moral *values* and furthermore tended to downplay the importance of community since communal values and institutions were less capable of being rationally justified. (Indeed, Weber believed, the danger was that instead of such a conception of reason would encourage *bureaucracy* rather than community, as the form of social organization best able to maximize instrumental efficiency, and in such circumstances, the importance of individual liberty and the rule of law had to be fought for strongly, rather than assumed.<sup>32</sup> For Weber and other such liberals, then, although history again provided a means for legitimating liberal values, as it had for the other liberal thinkers we have discussed, the account of history provided was far more ambivalent, rejecting the much more full-throated commitment to progress provided by the others.

### *Conservatism*

Turning to conservatism, we encounter a political ideology that has proved particularly difficult to define. In contrast to liberalism, where at least it is fairly uncontroversial to identify liberty as being essential to all versions of the ideology, in conservatism's case, the search for one such core concept has proved elusive. Thus, analysts have often variously suggested that the key to conservatism is its commitment to inequality or free-market capitalism or to traditional hierarchies (rather than the "artificial" modern state). But in all of these cases, it is easy to cite exceptions where thinkers generally regarded as central to the conservative tradition do not uphold these values – or at least only with significant qualifications. Thus, many American conservatives, even in the 19th century, such as the influential advocate of free markets W.G. Sumner, took the idea of formal political equality as sacrosanct, however much they rejected any conception of egalitarian social justice – while there certainly have been conservatives like T.S. Eliot who have been critical as well as appreciative of the effects of the free market and modern conservative thinkers (like Roger Scruton) who have sought to stress the importance of the authority of the modern state, in addition to more traditional institutions.<sup>33</sup> This has led other commentators on conservatism to claim that trying to identify *any* core concept at its heart is a mistake. So for example, Samuel Huntington has claimed that the essence of conservatism is simply to uphold the status quo, "to justify any established social order (...) against any challenge to it nature or being," while others (often from within the conservative tradition itself, like the 20th century British conservative Ian Gilmour) have sought to argue that conservatism should be conceptualized as *disposition* rather than an ideology, intent on defending the evolutionary development of a country's tradition against artificial impositions from the state or elsewhere.<sup>34</sup> But these denials that conservatism has any real core are also highly dubious. For the implication of Huntington's definition is that monolithic totalitarian states such as the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s should be labelled as conservative, which seems deeply counterintuitive, while the assertion that conservatism should be identified with a disposition to follow the "genuine" tradition of a state or country is also highly problematic. For since in almost any given situation, a choice has to be made as to *which* aspects of a tradition should be followed, trying to identify conservatism with the "natural" course of it raises more questions than it solves.

How then should conservatism be defined? Essentially, it has two core concepts that define it and two subsidiary considerations that flow from these. These two core concepts are significantly different from those of more progressive ideologies. First, conservatives stress the importance of controlling or managing change, which at the very least favours caution in altering the status quo over radical change, so that they tend to favour "present laughter to

utopian bliss,” in Oakeshott’s resonant phrase.<sup>35</sup> Second, conservatives almost always contend that the social order is underpinned by “extra-human” forces, independent of human control so that they view social and political institutions as being shaped and constrained by such phenomena as “God,” “biology,” and “the natural order,” depending on the era in question. Rather than viewing social and political institutions as being primarily created by conscious individual effort, in other words, as liberals tend to argue, conservatives maintain that the survival of vital social and political institutions is reliant on respecting such quasi-natural forces.<sup>36</sup>

From these core concepts, conservatives flesh out their ideology in two related ways. In the first place, in pursuit of their goal of trying to control and manage change cautiously, conservatives develop their more substantive political concepts (such as “liberty” or “security”) in self-conscious opposition to those of progressive ideologies. This helps to explain the otherwise bewildering diversity of conservative ideological positions since conservatives formulate their concepts in opposition to whichever “threat” to the current social and political order they deem most threatening. (Thus, in mid-19th century Britain, Victorian conservatives sought to combat liberal demands for equal rights, particularly to vote, by stressing the importance of a pre-existing aristocratic order to ensure social and political stability – while by the early 20th, they were instead stressing the virtues of universal private property rights against incipient demands for socialist redistribution.<sup>37</sup> In the second place, on a related point, it should be stressed that conservatives have often formulated their rival political concepts quite antagonistically, wilfully, or otherwise misunderstanding the core concepts of their progressive opponents. Thus, for example, many post-war conservatives, confronted with the core socialist demands for greater equality and sense of community, often chose to conceptualize such aims as being identical to the *adjacent* socialist demand for greater nationalization, with the result that conservatives appeared to be stressing the importance of privatization and decentralization as core concepts. But in fact, the conservatives were actually continuing to uphold their true core concepts of managing change and an “extra-human” order.<sup>38</sup>

What role does history play in conservative political ideology? To some extent, we have already hinted at the answer to this question by identifying a desire to control and manage change as a core component of conservatism. But of course, this raises further questions about precisely what such a commitment entails – and in particular the degree to which it implies continuing to appeal to past norms and practices. Broadly speaking, conservatives have conceptualized history in two different ways. First, more forward-looking conservatives have conceptualized the role of history as a continuous tradition, restraining present and future conduct, but in such a way so as to allow cautious innovation and development, building on the experience and inherited wisdom of the past. To give an example of this kind of conservative this we will examine the famous late 18th century thinker Edmund Burke.

Thus, if we examine Burke’s work, we discover a conservative who was far from being a reactionary or an advocate for an unchanging status quo. Writing at a time of considerable political and social change in the late 18th century, he not only supported the complaints of the British settlers of the thirteen colonies in North America but also, with qualifications, the increase in commercial activity that was occurring in this period. (Indeed, Burke argued that “moneyed” activity, entrepreneurial activity, was not just tolerable, but *necessary* since it is “enterprising” and innovative – as opposed to traditional landed agricultural activity, which was “sluggish, inert and timid.”<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, crucial to understanding Burke’s argument is that such cautious commitments to innovation were underpinned by a deeply conservative conception of history, which is revealed in the way in which he conceptualized tradition. This is apparent if we consider the way in which tradition was defined in his thought in sharp contrast

to reason, which is limited to making decisions about particular problems or events on an individual basis – and as such is apt to leave people “hesitating in the moment of decision, sceptical, puzzled and unresolved.”<sup>40</sup> By contrast, Burke argued, tradition provided a repository of gradually accumulated wisdom from previous generations, a set of customs and institutions that have gradually developed, naturally and organically, in a way that continues to offer us a vital guide to future action and which cannot be replicated by the conscious application of individual abstract reason. (As Burke himself put it, appealing to tradition in this way is beneficial because it “furnishes a sure principle of conservation, and a sure principle of transmission; without at all excluding a principle of improvement.”<sup>41</sup> And good examples of these, Burke contended, are the common law, which develops through the gradual accumulation of precedents from particular cases, the state itself, which derives its legitimacy from the historic wisdom it has been bequeathed by previous generations, and the established church, which helped politicians and subjects alike to have a proper awe and respect for the state.<sup>42</sup> In short, therefore, while Burke certainly advocated the possibility, indeed the necessity, of continuing social and political improvement, this was explicitly constrained by the importance of tradition – in other words, by a cautious and evolutionary conception of history.

Second, in contrast to Burke, other conservative theorists have rejected the idea that history can be conceptualized in such an evolutionary fashion, arguing instead that negotiating the course of events successfully produces more fundamental challenges. They have done so for two distinct if related, reasons. In the first place, some conservatives have argued that certain historical events are so adverse or catastrophic that they require more radical reactions than those envisaged by Burke, either seeking to reverse their effects entirely or at least partially to minimize their effects. Classic examples of these “problems” include industrialization, the Enlightenment, and the French revolution, and to give an example of such a theorist, let us consider the early 19th century Savoyard writer, Joseph de Maistre.

For Maistre, the event that shaped his thought above all was the French Revolution and the bloodshed that had flowed from it – it was a cataclysm that represented a fundamental breakdown of traditional norms. Rather than being a temporary challenge, in other words, which could be negotiated without too much difficulty, for Maistre, what the French Revolution exposed were the deep-seated problems caused by the Reformation. This had had three main negative effects. Firstly, by stressing the overwhelming importance of a believer’s individual conscience, it had radically undermined the authority of tradition, the church, and established Catholic religious truths.<sup>43</sup> Secondly, because of the scepticism of traditional knowledge it had stimulated, Maistre argued, the Reformation had directly caused the Enlightenment belief that only empirical scientific investigation provided certain knowledge of the world – hence rendering God largely inaccessible to human understanding.<sup>44</sup> And finally, by popularizing the idea that mankind should be conceptualized as a set of individuals, divorced from God, Maistre maintained, the Enlightenment had opened the way to the individualism of Rousseau’s political theory, which sought to base political legitimacy on each citizen’s consent, and ultimately the hubris underlying the revolution – namely that mankind could remake the political system purely through human will and design. As such, Maistre argued that the solution to this crisis had to be radical – reasserting the power of the Catholic Church and re-establishing the French monarchy with genuine majesty and sacred power.<sup>45</sup> If he conceded that a full return to the *ancien regime* was not possible, and even that the revolution had been necessary, to combat the evils of mankind and to purify the church, nevertheless Maistre argued that the reassertion of Catholic power and tradition was essential. Attempting to assimilate the horrors of the revolution into an evolutionary tradition was not enough.

If some conservatives rejected an evolutionary conception of history because they felt that a particularly adverse development had occurred, a second group was even more radical. For them, it was not just a particular event that was the problem, but rather the whole of modernity and the way in which it had developed. One particular cause of concern for a number of such conservatives was the decline of religious belief – which, they variously believed, was in danger of undermining secular authority, the possibility of a healthy culture, or indeed morality itself. However, arguably the most radical of all such conservatives was the mid-20th century German-American émigré philosopher Leo Strauss since he lamented not just the decline of religion, but a whole array of other developments in modernity as well, and as such, we will briefly examine how he conceptualized the nature of that historical decline.

Thus, turning to Strauss's work, we encounter a thinker who maintained that the problems associated with contemporary societies were very deep-seated. Critical of modern Western societies for being technocratic and morally neutral, Strauss explained such developments not by referring to the advent of mass democracies or even to the decline of religion, but rather to a much longer historical process whereby the standards of classical natural right had been undermined in modernity – hence leaving us with no objective measure of right and wrong. This, Strauss maintained, had occurred in three stages, which he delineated in particular in *Natural Right and History* (1953), but also elsewhere.

First, Strauss argued, Machiavelli and Hobbes had fundamentally lowered the standards of moral conduct in the 16th and 17th centuries. According to Strauss, Machiavelli had stressed the importance of following objectives that could be attained in the real world, rather than aiming for the very best state, as Plato had done, while Hobbes exacerbated this, privileging the importance of self-preservation above a genuine standard of good.<sup>46</sup> Second, the situation was made worse by the second stage of modernity, which was initiated by Rousseau. Rousseau attempted to return to classical standards, to the world of the ancient Greek polis, by advocating loyalty to the city-state through the mechanism of the “General Will,” but instead of solving the problem, he just intensified it. For if in the thought of Hobbes and Locke there was still the possibility of an appeal to a higher law, in Rousseau's thought (Strauss argued) this was ruled out – instead, the “General Will” becomes the highest moral law; the highest moral values of mankind thus become subject to human will and hence (by extension) to historical vicissitudes. This conclusion was underlined by the work of Hegel, who claimed that history itself constituted a process by which human values were optimized.<sup>47</sup> Finally, the last stage of this process was inaugurated by Nietzsche, who confronted the fact that history did not provide any real evidence of human progress and, as such, that values were simply the creation of human will or power.<sup>48</sup> As such, Strauss argued, the only solution was to try and re-establish a universally valid hierarchy of moral ends, a process that would require the right kind of (transformative) education to rectify the failures of modern liberalism.<sup>49</sup> But given how deep-seated the problems caused by historical decline are, according to him, the prospects for success were small.

### **Socialism**

Turning to socialism, defining this ideology has also presented difficult challenges for analysts since, just like liberalism and conservatism, it has taken a large number of different forms. Thus, scholars and politicians alike, for example, have trenchantly debated whether socialism is best identified as a political movement for greater equality, an economic argument for planning or nationalization, or a prescription for violent revolution. And furthermore, despite the general acceptance that socialism, like the other major political ideologies, is a modern phenomenon, appearing only after the French Revolution and the industrialization of the 18th and 19th

centuries, there has still been considerable debate about when *precisely* socialism was first codified into a fully-fledged doctrine. Nevertheless, notwithstanding these disagreements, arguably, it is possible to identify the five core elements of socialism, which are as follows.

First, socialists have maintained that group membership is very important to the nature of human beings, stressing the importance of individuals being part of a community or society in general – or even that individual abilities and capacities are actually *constituted* by such social relationships. As Marx put it, for example, “society does not consist of individuals; it expresses the sum of connections and relationships in which individuals find themselves.”<sup>50</sup> Second, socialists have stressed the importance of men achieving genuine happiness or human flourishing, rejecting the idea that formal conceptions of individual liberty or upholding the norms of tradition are sufficient for this. Instead, all socialists have believed that individuals should, at the very least, be protected from economic exploitation, and often, more maximally, that they should be provided with the resources to develop their abilities and capacities fully. (As one writer put it in the late 19th century, the great benefit of socialism was that it would “render (...) all the material and economic factors underlying human life, subservient to the well-being of man in a way hitherto unattained.”<sup>51</sup>)

Third, in order to achieve such human flourishing, socialists have argued, it is vital to appreciate that humans are naturally productive – in a sense, they are genuinely *creative*, not simply intrinsically inclined to try to improve their material circumstances. For some, such as the 19th century British socialist William Morris, this explicitly implied that labouring activities themselves should become aesthetic; for others, such as the earlier 19th century Scottish socialist Robert Owen, it was enough that they be non-exploitative and communal.<sup>52</sup> But in all cases, the creative nature of labour has been affirmed to some extent. Fourthly, all socialists have upheld the importance of equality. It is true that equality is a complex and contested concept, and socialists have differed – sometimes vituperatively – over the degree to which equality of outcome is a crucial value, over the degree to which equality is possible without a revolution and the extent to which active democratic participation is necessary to secure it, just to give a few examples. But in all cases, socialists have been united in the belief that purely formal civil and political equality is insufficient to secure genuinely equal rights for everyone in society and have therefore recommended more substantive definitions of the concept.

What is socialism’s fifth core concept? This is, in fact, history, or rather a particular conception of it, which, as in the case of liberalism and conservatism, helps to explain how socialists conceptualize change over time. It is true that one can find types of socialists who do not explicitly refer to history as part of their position, preferring to make arguments for equality (or other core socialist goals) on an analytical basis. Thus David Miller, just to give one example, advocated a kind of socialism in the 1980s and 1990s which emphasized the importance of community and citizenship, whilst espousing a qualified acceptance of markets (if not full-blooded capitalism).<sup>53</sup> Even in this case, however, it is unclear that his position really makes sense without the knowledge that it represents an attempt to reformulate socialism in a context where neo-liberal economics in theory and practice had become hegemonic in Britain and the United States – so that a particular view of history remains highly important, even if it is unstated. And in almost all major articulations of socialist ideology, the importance of a progressive view of history, whereby there is at least the possibility of achieving a genuinely emancipated society, rationally organized and allowing the possibility for universal self-development, is a crucial component. Broadly speaking, there have been three versions of this account of history.

First, one of the most powerful accounts of historical change available to socialists was the one formulated by Marx in collaboration with Friedrich Engels in the 1840s and 1850s, in such

works as the *German Ideology*, the *Communist Manifesto*, and the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*. As is well known, Marx's earlier work was importantly influenced by Hegel, and his account of history in these works retained three aspects of Hegel's account. Firstly, like Hegel, Marx espoused a view of history that is progressive and universal – a meta-narrative that claims to explain the whole of history as a set of inevitable developments culminating in the whole of mankind gaining their freedom. Secondly, like Hegel, Marx envisaged history as being a dialectical process, in other words, driven forward by contradictions between the nature of socio-political reality and how it was being conceptualized. Finally, Marx maintained that a crucial precondition for ultimate emancipation was a genuine apprehension of the nature of modern society and its problems – in other words, that a real consciousness of it was attained.

However, there were also three important differences with Hegel, which underlined the socialist nature of Marx's account. In the first place, most fundamentally, Marx stressed the concrete nature of historical change, contrasting this with what he saw as Hegel's excessive concern with the evolution of individual consciousness.<sup>54</sup> Taking inspiration from Adam Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment, Marx argued instead that historical change was fundamentally caused by alterations in economic organization but, unlike the latter, denied that the transition to capitalism had had broadly positive effects. Rather he maintained that capitalism, with its ruthless tendency to maximize production, had exacerbated social tensions, ultimately polarizing people into becoming members of either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. The former owned capital and hence continued to have a stake in the capitalist system; the latter constituted the industrial workforce and had no means of survival other than selling their labour.<sup>55</sup> Secondly, following on from this, Marx maintained that the proletariat were in a unique position to appreciate the failings of capitalism, precisely because they owned no property, and hence had the potential to understand the exploitative nature of capitalism in a way no other class did.<sup>56</sup> (This was in stark contrast to Hegel, for whom individual private property represented the very foundation of individual freedom.) Through a gradual process of political education, being thrust together in factories, and eventually forming trade unions that looked beyond mere wage negotiations, Marx argued, the proletariat could come to a genuine apprehension of the nature of capitalism.<sup>57</sup> Finally, Marx argued, having achieved such a self-conscious apprehension of capitalism, the proletariat were in a position to understand why only a revolution would enable the whole of society to become emancipated – to ensure that all individuals had the goods necessary for their self-development. This is because capitalism was not only *unstable*, Marx maintained, encouraging overproduction due to the ceaseless demand for profits, but also *wasteful*, failing to distribute goods effectively to cater to the genuine needs of individuals. Once the proletariat had understood this, Marx believed, they were in the correct position to ensure appropriate historical change.

Marx's explanation of historical change in these texts was a powerful one, which has remained influential in various guises amongst socialists since it was written. Nevertheless, even in the 19th century, it ran into the obvious problem that Marx's confidence about the instability of capitalism, and the revolutionary potential of the proletariat, seemed to have been disproved by events. Because several promising revolutionary situations, from 1848 onwards, had failed to produce a Marxist revolution, in other words, why continue to believe such a theory? One response to this conundrum was to emphasize the importance of impersonal economic forces in causing revolutions rather than revolutionary self-consciousness. To some extent, this was the solution that Marx himself propagated in his later works, notably in *Capital* – where he emphasized that the structural instability of capitalism would inevitably cause a revolution, even though the immiseration of the proletariat made it much harder for them to achieve revolutionary consciousness than he had believed in his earlier works. And this position was reinforced

by the work of Marx's collaborator Friedrich Engels. For whilst Engels' theoretical position was more complex and ambiguous than has often been described, there is no doubt that Engels' embrace of social Darwinism opened the way to a much more mechanistic and determinist interpretation of history by subsequent Marxists.<sup>58</sup>

Our second group of socialists, however, found such explanations crude and unsatisfying. Instead of resorting to determinism to explain why revolutions had not appeared as predicted in the 19th century, they sort to reformulate Marx's arguments more fundamentally, arguing that revolutions were not necessary to achieve a just society at all. Instead, they maintained, it was quite possible to devise methods to achieve socialism by gradual reforms, arguing for an evolutionary account of progressive historical change. Such socialists have generally been labelled "revisionists," and there have been a number of prominent examples of them, including the first Labour Prime Minister in Britain, Ramsay MacDonald, and the prominent mid-20th century socialist intellectual Anthony Crosland, whose *The Future of Socialism* (1956) was highly influential. But here, let us briefly examine the arguments of Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932), who was the first socialist intellectual seriously to challenge Marxian orthodoxy, and whose *The Preconditions of Socialism* caused a storm when it was published in 1899.

Bernstein essentially justified his evolutionary conception of socialism with four arguments. First, in contrast to Marx's claim that capitalism was inevitably destined to collapse, Bernstein argued that it was reforming itself, distinguishing between ownership and control, and supporting the continuation of small and medium-sized firms rather than eliminating them. The net result was not merely continuing economic growth but also a wider ownership of capital, rather than its concentration.<sup>59</sup> Second, following on from this, Bernstein argued, the size of the middle-class was not diminishing but growing as white-collar employment increased, and, crucially, it was as likely to be a progressive force as a regressive one.<sup>60</sup> Third, therefore, Bernstein argued, one could hope for more from the immediate establishing of democracy than Marx had believed, since the electorate would be amenable to supporting progressive measures, and the state had the potential to be more of an honest broker than merely a protector of the interests of capital.<sup>61</sup> As Bernstein put it in a revealing comment, summarizing his approach to socialism: "There can be more socialism in a good factory law than in the nationalisation of a whole group of factories. I have for (...) 'the final goal of socialism' (...) little (...) interest. The goal (...) is nothing to me, the movement is everything."<sup>62</sup> Finally, in harmony with his other tenets, Bernstein sought to justify his approach to history empirically, claiming that anything Marx and Engels had achieved had been in spite of their interest in a Hegelian dialectical approach to it. It is true that Bernstein appealed to a conception of social Darwinism to justify his position, but this amounted to little more than the claim that more developed societies were more harmonious than primitive ones; at the bottom, he put forward an empirical account of historical change, primarily based upon his own sociological observations.<sup>63</sup>

The final approach to historical change that socialists have advocated is one that seeks to come to terms with the current powerful trend towards globalization. The advent of an economy which is more highly developed and interconnected than ever before has confronted socialists with new challenges – and in such circumstances, thinkers on the Left have been forced to redefine or at least re-orientate their goals, and therefore their conceptualization of history. As an example, let us consider Anthony Giddens, the sociologist and political theorist, whose books *Beyond Left and Right* (1994) and *The Third Way* (1998) have often been credited with helping to provide the New Labour governments of 1997–2010 in Britain with a political program. Giddens argues that the economic aspects of globalization have made it much harder for national governments to achieve a traditional socialist redistribution of resources. This is partly because the power of national governments to control their economies has been significantly reduced by the advent of

largely unregulated exchange rates, unrestricted capital flows, and powerful multinational companies.<sup>64</sup> But perhaps even more fundamentally, Giddens argues, socialists have been faced with the reality that post-industrial Western societies have become much more plural and individualistic than in the earlier period of classic mass democracy, and that therefore finding clear criteria for just redistribution are much harder.<sup>65</sup> As such, he argues, one cannot simply expect the central state to provide all the answers, but instead have to find other means to embrace the more positive elements of globalization – namely that it tends to incline citizens to become more cosmopolitan, to embrace the importance of human rights and green values, and to rethink the role of the nuclear family, prioritizing the rights of women and sexual freedoms to a much greater degree. In particular, Giddens argues, the state needs help from businessmen and charities to ensure citizens realize their aspirations since the latter are likely to be more flexible in meeting the needs of particular citizens; the state can at best play an enabling role.<sup>66</sup> And a critical part of this reorientation, Giddens argues, is to re-conceptualize history, admitting that the social democratic state of the 1950s and 1960s was not the universal answer to the problems of welfare and justice that some earlier socialists had believed. Rather it was a very particular construction that was premised on a number of social norms – not least a relatively homogeneous electorate and male breadwinners – that no longer exists. Redefining socialist ends inevitably means rethinking history, in other words.<sup>67</sup>

### Conclusion

This chapter has argued that, far from being a marginal or additional consideration when analyzing ideologies, the conceptualization of history is a vital component of liberalism, conservatism, and socialism alike. All of these ideologies necessarily exist in particular historical contexts, use concepts that are deeply affected by their historical accretions, and have to find ways to cope with historical change. In the case of liberalism, we concluded that there have essentially been four ways of conceptualizing history, three of which sought to explain why progress was possible, and one that had a more ambivalent view of modernity, but nevertheless claimed that the pluralism modernity brought represented a strong justification for individual liberty. By contrast, conservatives have sought to manage change, some contending this can be done on a cautious, evolutionary basis, while others have argued that it is necessary to return to an earlier point or even criticize the tradition as a whole. Finally, socialists were presented by a powerful conceptualization of history by Marx in the 19th century, but this conceptualization has required revision as some of his predictions failed to materialize, and globalization has taken place in a way he did not envisage. What is undeniable, therefore, is that a powerful conceptualization of history remains vitally important for the health of political ideologies. But in what ways ideologies will now re-conceptualize history and tradition in the new era of the 21st century, no doubt time will tell.

### Notes

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- 2 S. Žižek, ed., *Mapping Ideology* (London: Verso, 1994), 10–15.
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- 4 R. Koselleck, *Futures Past*, trans. K. Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
- 5 D. de Tracy, *Éléments D'Ideologie*, 5 vols. (Paris: Courcier, 1815).



- 6 K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, ed. A.J.P. Taylor (London: Penguin, 1967), 98–9.
- 7 Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, 50 vols. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), V, 59–61.
- 8 A. Gramsci, *Selection from the Prison Notebooks*, eds. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 332–334; L. Althusser, *For Marx*, trans. B. Brewster (London: Verso, 1969), 232–234.
- 9 G. Sartori, “Politics, Ideology and Belief Systems,” *American Political Science Review* 69, no. 2 (1969): 398–411, at 400–403.
- 10 M. Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and other essays*, ed. T. Fuller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991), 8–9, 28–32, 48–54.
- 11 M. Freedon, *Ideologies and Political Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 77–80.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 76.
- 13 *Ibid.*, 84–88.
- 14 *Ibid.*, 98.
- 15 Q. Skinner, “Language and Political Change,” in *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, eds. T. Ball, J. Farr, and R.L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 6–23, at 22.
- 16 Freedon, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 98–99.
- 17 Bentham’s epistemological position, which was based upon the idea that individuals were largely the product of their own experiences, left little room for arguing that the understanding derived from history was important. Furthermore, Bentham was contemptuous of the idea that the ancients had much to teach us, on the basis that such men and women actually had less experience. As he put it: the “wisdom of the ancestors (...) as their talents could only be developed in proportion to the state of knowledge at the period in which they lived (...) [is] the wisdom of the cradle.” J. Bentham, *Handbook of Political Fallacies*, ed. C. Brinton (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), 44–45. It should also be mentioned that Rawls, to some extent, became more interested in history in later work, writing a set of lectures on the history of moral philosophy. See J. Rawls, *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*, ed. B. Herman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
- 18 A. Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, eds. R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner, 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1976), V. i.a.
- 19 It is important to note that Smith did make this argument with important qualifications. He certainly did not agree with earlier thinkers like Bernard Mandeville that public benefits were solely the result of private vices. But he nevertheless thought that self-interest was a crucial factor in stimulating economic growth, and hence ultimately, moral progress. See Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, I. ii. 2.
- 20 B. Constant, “De La Liberté chez Les Modernes,” in *De La Liberté Chez Les Modernes: Ecrits Politiques*, ed. M. Gauchet (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 1980), 189; J. Jennings, *Revolution and the Republic: A History of Political Thought in France since the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 161–167.
- 21 There is, of course, a real debate amongst scholars as to whether Hegel is a liberal or a conservative. Sceptics of his liberal credentials might well point to his cautious approach to representation, for example – one of his last pieces of writing objected to the 1831 Reform Bill in Britain (which was hardly the most radical proposal in the first place). But the stress on individual freedom and its realization in the state, and Hegel’s strong conviction that the course of history was progressive and powered by reason, arguably give good grounds for believing him to be a liberal.
- 22 J.S. Mill, *On Liberty and other essays*, ed. J. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 78–79. This argument came with the important proviso that only sufficiently “civilized” societies could benefit from such a commitment to individualism – notoriously Mill believed that India and China were not ready for such a commitment to liberty.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 375–376.
- 24 G.W.F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 216–223 (§ 341–360).
- 25 *Ibid.*, 130–131, 155, 160–161 (§ 201, 257, 260).
- 26 E. Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society*, trans. G. Simpson (New York: Free Press, 1964), 129.
- 27 F. Tonnies, *Community and Civil Society*, ed. J. Harris, trans. J. Harris and M. Hollis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- 28 Durkheim, *The Division of Labour*, 129.
- 29 *Ibid.*, 75, 138.
- 30 J.W. Muller, “Fear and Freedom: On ‘Cold War Liberalism,’” *European Journal of Political Theory* 7, no. 1 (2008): 45–64.

- 31 M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. T. Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner, 1958), 76; A. Giddens, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 152–153.
- 32 Weber, *Economy and Society*, eds. and trans. G. Roth and C. Wittich, 3 vols. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), I, 217–226; Weber, *Political Writings*, eds. and trans. P. Lassman and R. Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 222.
- 33 W.G. Sumner, *Social Darwinism: Selected Essays*, ed. S. Persons (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963); T.S. Eliot, *The Idea of a Christian Society* (London: Faber, 1939); R. Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
- 34 S. Huntington, “Conservatism as an Ideology,” *American Political Science Review* 51, no. 2 (1957): 454–473, at 455; I. Gilmour, *Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism* (London: Hutchinson, 1977), 121; 132–133.
- 35 Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics*, 408.
- 36 Freedden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 334–335.
- 37 *Ibid.*, 335–340.
- 38 *Ibid.*, 343–347.
- 39 E. Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 140.
- 40 Burke, *The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke*, 8 vols. (Bohn Library Edition. London: George Bell and Sons, 1889), III, 81.
- 41 Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution*, 120.
- 42 *Ibid.*, 118, 192, 189.
- 43 R. Lebrun, *Throne and Altar: The Political and Religious Thought of Joseph de Maistre* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1965), 138.
- 44 J. de Maistre, *An Examination of the Philosophy of Bacon*, ed. and trans. R. Lebrun (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1998), 14.
- 45 Maistre, *Du Pape* (Antwerp, 1820), 213.
- 46 L. Strauss, *Political Philosophy: Six Essays*, ed. H. Gilden (Indianapolis: Pegasus Books, 1975), 40–41, 49; Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953), 166–202.
- 47 Strauss, *Political Philosophy*, 51–56.
- 48 *Ibid.*, 94–97.
- 49 Strauss, *Liberalism Ancient and Modern* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), 64.
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- 51 T. Kirkup, *A History of Socialism* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1906), 4.
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- 55 Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, 82–85, 91.
- 56 *Ibid.*, 92.
- 57 *Ibid.*, 89–93.
- 58 D. McLellan, *Marxism after Marx* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 9–16.
- 59 E. Bernstein, *Evolutionary Socialism*, trans. E. C. Harvey (New York: Schocken Books, 1961), 48.
- 60 *Ibid.*, 50.
- 61 *Ibid.*, 142, 147.
- 62 McLellan, *Marxism*, 32.
- 63 *Ibid.*, 34–36.
- 64 A. Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right* (Cambridge: Polity, 74–77).
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- 66 *Ibid.*, 111–118.
- 67 Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right*, 51–77.

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