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Comparing difficult democratic legacies: institutional continuity and state formation in Spain and Mexico

Author:

Pablo Calderón Martínez

Lecturer in Spanish, School of Languages and Social Sciences, Aston University / Visiting Assistant Professor (Research) Division of International Studies, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE).

Contact:

e-mail: p.calderon-martinez@aston.ac.uk

Twitter: @pablocm

Room NW 908

Aston University

Aston Triangle

B4 7ET

Birmingham

Abstract: This article offers a comparative analysis of Spain and Mexico's institutional evolution to elucidate how history matters in very specific ways. The main argument is that Mexico and Spain shared certain similarities but also key differences in terms of institutional continuities and their attempts to consolidate a modern nation-state. Variances in these two evolutions help us explain the varying degrees of success of both transitions. Whilst Mexico's entrenched institutional arrangement was supported by a relatively continuous evolution of extractive institutions since independence, Spain's history was characterized by clearer institutional breaks. Furthermore, Mexico's earlier and stronger process of state consolidation under authoritarianism led to a strongly unified elite. Such elite unity made the transition process a long and protracted one, whilst Spain's weaker state unification allowed for a competition of different elite groups during its transition to democracy; which greatly explains many of the characteristics of Spain's transition model.

Keywords:

Mexican democratic history, Spanish democratic history, state-formation, extractive institutions, historical institutionalism

This paper will briefly set out a comparison of the institutional evolutions of Mexico and Spain. The idea is to offer a historical comparison of institutional continuities and state/national consolidation in both countries. This analysis will help us explain why, amongst other factors of course, the democratic challenges faced by both countries during their transitions were rather different. Whilst the fact that Spain's transition was achieved in record time – which in itself helped with its relative success (the literature on democratization has long suggested that pacted and expedient transitions are more successful than so called "protracted transitions")– can be explained by the relative weakness of the institutions that preceded the transition, Mexico's democratization process was a "protracted" transition that resembled a war of attrition partly because of the strength of a set of institutions that remained fairly unchanged for over a century. Similarly, whilst Spain's transition was framed in a context shaped by the threat of secessionism and of elite bargaining, which in turn explains many of its shortcomings (no less in its chaotic decentralization), the Mexican transition was in no way influenced by concerns about national identity or the cohesiveness of the state.[1]

The historical comparison developed in this paper focuses on two particularly relevant variables: an analysis of institutional continuities (economic as well as political) and the processes of state consolidation. Democratization scholars from a range of theoretical dispositions agree that the process of state consolidation is key to understanding democratic developments.[2] The process that leads to state consolidation will, more or less invariably, have a long-lasting effect on the distribution of power within that state. Similarly, certain interpretations of democratization support the argument that a historical analysis of institutional development is worthy, if nothing else, because previous experiences with democracy play a part in shaping a nation's view towards it.[3] In a more specific way, functional (political culture) approaches to democratization also claim that the significance of enduring cultural syndromes "stems from the way in which they drive other outcomes," [4] such as economic growth, democracy or both.[5] As such, the reinforcing nature of institutions (shaped

by path-dependence theories) implies that the duration of a particular institutional arrangement is in all likelihood directly linked to its durability, i.e. the longer an institution exists the harder it is to change it. For these reasons then, a comparative analysis of the nation/state-building process and of the institutional continuity in both countries (both of which had contrasting results after their third-wave democratizations) can help us better understand how both historical variables can shape democratization processes.

Early Institutional Development in a Latin American Context.

For the purpose of this paper, democracy will be understood as a specific institutional arrangement that enables a free competition for political power.[6] Hence, we need to understand how the access to resources that allows this competition has evolved through time. A recent and well-known model of such an institutional analysis is Acemoglu and Robinson's hypothesis on how the history of colonialism explains underdevelopment. Their argument that the imposition of certain institutions designed to "extract incomes and wealth from one subset of society to benefit a different subset" is what explains Mexico's (and Spain's) relative backwardness is certainly compelling. [7] Robert Pastor follows a similar line and proposes that together with geological considerations and the effect of human migration into the region, the experience of colonialism – complemented by the experience of nation building – constitute the 'genetic code' of the different countries of North America.[8]

The notion that Mexico's problems originated elsewhere, however, is not necessarily new. Dependency theory's view that Latin America's failure to develop has been "the consequence of the misdeeds of stronger, richer nations" shares not only the notion that the "other" (i.e. the more powerful colonizer) is to blame for the regions underdevelopment, it also shares many of the historical and structural limitations that Historical Institutionalism places on economic and political development. [9] *Dependentistas* believe in the structural limits to possible action imposed by the access to material resources and the degree of development of the forces of production, as well as (and this is where the originality of the argument laid) in the limitations that the link with hegemonic countries impose.[10] In turn, *dependetistas* argue that in the case of Latin America the structural limitations imposed by what is essentially the "undemocratic nature of economic growth" (characterized by "the unequal exchange" with developed nations in which the comprador bourgeoisie maintains this unequal relationship because of private gains), leads to authoritarian political systems.[11]

A precursor of such an unfair relationship between polities at different levels of development was the one experienced between the colonies and the metropolis. Spanish political economy during most of the colonial period was dominated by a simplistic view of mercantilism that saw the colonies as a source of material wealth (limited to specific sectors in Spain). Such wealth was not only the raw materials that were abundant in Mexico and other colonies but also the indigenous populations themselves. This is not necessarily to say that what took place was a wholesale transfer to Mexico of an institutional structure fashioned in Madrid and modelled on the "renaissance model of centrally controlled polity."[12] If anything, the extractive nature of the institutions established in the colonies was exacerbated by their success in centralizing authority, and the relative freedom of action early conquistadors enjoyed due to the weakness of Madrid's authority; it was a very Spanish model of development fashioned in the New World. Although both Mexico and Spain underwent some important social and economic transformations during the colonial rule, it would be safe to argue that, to an extent, the extractive nature of their mercantilist institutions remained more or less a constant throughout colonial times.

The basic rationale of colonialism would suggest that extractive institutions would have served the objectives of the colonial power a lot better than democratic or inclusive rule. Once these institutions were established the reinforcing nature of institutions would also suggest, however, that the extractive nature of the arrangement would remain unchanged for both sides. As the costs of changing these institutions would have been too high and the people with the possibility to do so lacked the right incentives to do so, mere institutional inertia ensured their survival. Whether or not the colonial legacy can explain Mexico's relative underdevelopment, and lack of truly democratic and inclusive institutions until today, remains highly contentious. Regardless, although Acemoglu and Robinson's theory (backed by Fukuyama's assertion that independence failed to break the colonial "mind-set" of the elites and the dominated masses) may not explain Mexico's "backwardness" up until the twenty-first century, it certainly does up until the twentieth. [13]

Mexican independence only achieved a change in the elites benefiting from the extraction of resources – from Iberian elites, to *criollo* elites.[14] Indeed, far from being a liberal revolution, it was the Napoleonic invasion of 1808 (which gave birth to the liberal notion of a Spanish state) what gave an incentive (rather than an opportunity) to the Mexican elites to push for

independence. [15] The liberal (or what can be seen as a Spanish version of the traditional European concept of liberalism) Cádiz Constitution of 1812 that emerged as a reaction to the Napoleonic invasion called for the "introduction of a constitutional monarchy based on notions of popular sovereignty," which, although was not to last, was anathema to the elites in the American colonies. [16] The Cádiz Constitution of 1812 – which "opened up a new horizon […] within the process of European national state-building […] in a way that was open to social change and political mobilization" – was a threat to the established order. [17] The fact that conservatism (in its pre-modern shape) and absolutist rule did not stop being viable political options until the short-lived imperial reign of Maximilian Habsburg came to its bloody conclusion is indication enough that, at least until then, there was no drastic transformation of the institutional arrangement; [18] the basic principle of the whole colonial political economy remained firmly guided by the principles of mercantilism[19] and as such the nature of the institutions remained fairly unchanged (but for the very modest the Bourbon reforms of 1759 which did liberalize trade slightly) until the twentieth century. Although independence was supposed to bring a radical change in the economic structure of the new republics, the reality was that the effects of the Bourbon reforms combined with the "subsequent decline in Spanish and Portuguese authority had already given Latin America many of the advantages of free trade even before independence was attained."[20] Hence, the dream for Latin America that once Spain and Portugal were deprived of their commercial monopolies, all that would be needed to "unlock the natural resource of Latin America's vast unexplored interior" and to gain unrestricted access to the "wealthy markets of Western Europe" was capital and skilled labor, never truly materialized.[21] Instead, the continuation of a deficient institutional arrangement that amplified rather than reduced inequality – combined with inadequate means of transport, political instability and the lack of financial capital – led to an economic collapse in Mexico.[22]

The recovery of the Mexican economy in the late nineteenth century may lead us to think that a serious change in political economy and/or institutional order took place; according to one estimate, the Mexican economy grew "more during the last 20 years of the Porfiriato than it had during the previous 70 years of independence."[23] However, this growth had more to do with the implementation of a liberal international political economy combined with the strengthening (rather than the transformation) of restrictive political institutions; the political stability allowed the recovery of the mining sector and increased the ability of the government to borrow, which in turn, combined with foreign investment, provided the government with much needed capital to improve its railroad network. What is more, the international export

cycles and degree of commodity concentration propelled this export-led economic boom rather than any transformation of domestic institutions or the political environment.[24] However, neither the international economic cycles, the recovery of the mining sector nor the investment in railroads would have made much of a difference to the Mexican economy without the political stability and strict social order maintained by the highly restrictive regime set up by Porfirio Díaz.

By transforming Mexico into a "secure place for doing business,"[25] the regime led to the consolidation of a stable market economy for public debt and allowed for an increase in domestic and foreign financial investment. Although stability and order partly explain the growth in investment and hence Mexico's economic growth, this is only part of the story: during the 1890s and 1900s the regime played a key role in providing a "new institutional framework conducive to the modernization of financial transactions."[26] Yet, there is no evidence to suggest these institutional changes had the intention of achieving anything else than "to create opportunities for mutual self-enrichment" by the Porfirian elites.[27] What is more, although the regime helped to establish a banking sector by introducing institutional reforms, the authoritarian nature of the regime also ended up hindering its development and that of other industries. This is because there were severe restrictions on the banks' funding and operations "in order to protect the interests of an in-group of financial elites." This hindrance on the banking sector combined with the highly politicized nature of the regime "meant that individuals were reluctant to invest in enterprises in which they lacked direct knowledge or control."[28] The Porfiriato, thus, was fairly successful in reforming certain institutions that fostered the "emergence of a modern economy, yet failed utterly to create the political and social bases required to embed that development program."[29] A brief change in fortune for the Mexican economy did not necessarily imply a transformation of its basically extractive institutional arrangement.

Rather than being a clear institutional evolution, so one argument goes, authoritarianism in Mexico was the result of the inability by the liberal elites to "break with authoritarian mental patterns and practices inherited from the colonial period;" an unintended outcome stemming from the difficulty faced by liberal elites in establishing formal and informal institutions that could consolidate national unity whilst avoiding conflict in the competition of power.[30] This view, however, seems to exaggerate the liberal leanings of such elites, whilst it also implies that Iberian, Latin American and European liberalisms meant the same things. More

importantly though, the argument ignores the weight of institutional inertia – both of formal and informal institutions – and assumes that elites (regardless of how liberal or conservative they are) can simply chose to establish institutions in some sort of political vacuum. It also overlooks the common explanation that liberalism, in its European understanding, failed to transform Latin American society in the same way because the region lacked the right pre-conditions for this to happen (no experience with feudalism, a centralized industrialization project that limited dispersion of power and religious nonconformity). Thus, the logic of path-dependence and Historical Institutionalism does suggest that the extractive nature of institutions remained unchanged until the end of the Porfiriato. This institutional legacy has played a big role in shaping Mexico's democratic development.

Spain's path to European Liberalism

Although they were the two opposite ends of the extractive relationship, the nature of the institutions remains the same for those that benefit from them as for those who lose out. Up to a point, it seems likely that the monopolistic and extractive nature of the relationship between the Metropolis and its colonies did not help the economic development of Spain's *Ancien Régime*. To say that the Spanish Crown became accustomed to easy money would be, perhaps, an oversimplification; but, to an extent, the establishment of equally extractive institutions than those set up in America by a "misguided Hapsburg government," played a key part in Spain's economic backwardness. This poor economic policy combined with a relative weak nation-state (even for seventeenth and eighteenth century standards) to stop the articulation of something like a "Spanish national economic interest."[31]

The establishment of similarly extractive institutions in Spain and Mexico push us to ask the question of how, if at all, the colonial institutional legacy helps explain Spain's relative political backwardness. Unlike Mexico, however, an analysis of the historical evolution of its institutions during colonial times is not as relevant to understand the evolution of its modern institutions. This is not to say that the legacy of colonialism did not live long in the institutional memory of Spain, but unlike the Mexican case, the liberal revolution that dominated Spanish politics from the Napoleonic wars until the 1840s did more or less manage to successfully dismantle the entire socioeconomic order of the *Ancien Regime*[32]–even if it failed to immediately (and arguably up until today) consolidate a modern liberal state. The radical nature of the Cádiz Constitution did lead to the radicalization of absolutist forces, which combined

with a division amongst liberal ranks between moderates and radicals in turn led to a relatively simple restoration of the monarchy after the Napoleonic war. Indeed, most of the period between 1814 and 1833 was dominated by a distinctively pre-modern form of conservatism. This type of conservatism, however, was irrevocably removed as a political option after the Carlist War of 1833. The 1837 Constitution thus represented the triumph of the Liberal Revolution over absolutism and a definitive break with the *Ancien Régime*'s institutional structure.[33]

However, it could be argued that, much like in the Mexican case, the 1837 Constitution signified a break in the institutional continuity but not a radical transformation of the nature of the institutions. After all, the Spanish Liberal Revolution did not lead to a representative democracy but to a number of dictatorships, civil war and the emergence of a "staunchly anti-liberal, ultra-Catholic and royalist movement (Carlism) […] which would emerge in militant contexts throughout the twentieth century."[34] One could easily argue, even, that the Franco regime was the continuation of a single "process that had evolved almost uninterruptedly since the end of the Spanish absolute monarchy."[35] Even in the shorter term what followed the 1837 Constitution was an elitist and oligarchic political model that was far from being a democratic or representative regime.

The link between liberalism and democracy is so strong that it makes the idea that one can survive without the other almost unthinkable. Therefore, it is clear that a complete break at institutional level did not take place, but there were, nonetheless, some important institutional changes that marked a departure from the highly restrictive institutions characteristic of the *Ancien Regime*. Again, a quick look at the political economy of the time presents a good example of this process. There is a common view of Spain's nineteenth century economic development, famously defended by Jordi Nadal i Oller's work, [36] that sees Spain's economic "underdevelopment" as a consequence of its clumsy and belated attempt to industrialize during the nineteenth century. A whole section of Spain's historiography has used words such as "stagnation, backwardness and failure" to describe the performance of the Spanish economy during the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth.

However, it was not all bad. Although the loss of empire (and the political instability that in entailed) and the Napoleonic war did hurt Spanish trade and its economy, the loss of Spain's monopolistic trade with the Americas did not prove to be disastrous. Despite the dominant

view that sees the loss of empire as perhaps the biggest reason for Spain's belated economic modernization, Ringrose argues that "the collapse of the Spanish empire revealed that much of its colonial trade had little to do with the peninsular economy;" hence, although the collapse of the Empire hit the merchants of Cádiz and the Crown the hardest, "other peninsular commerce" proved more resilient.[37] More importantly though, the end of the Empire, or most of it anyways, and the end of absolutism led to a reorientation of the Spanish political economy. Commerce had been substituting accumulation as an economic model since the mid 1700s, but the main difference was that "by 1825 the lost colonial markets had been more than replaced by Spanish penetration of European markets."[38] This is not the same as saying that Spain followed a European path of industrialization, of course. Although by the late 1800s Spanish per capita income was not too dissimilar to other European nations that had followed a more European path towards industrialization and modernization (mainly Italy and Germany), Spain's economy remained backward, with a low degree of industrialization and with a large agrarian sector until the early twentieth century.[39] Despite this pessimism though, one should look at Spanish economic performance with due perspective. Clearly Spain did not achieve the level of economic success than some Northern European countries and, in that sense, the economy at the time can be described as backwards. However, for most of the nineteenth and early twentieth century (up until the Civil War) the Spanish economy grew consistently in terms of GDP per capita thanks to population increase and some economic reforms.

Regardless of how successful the economy was, it is clear that nineteenth century Spain experienced some important institutional transformations. The Liberal Revolution, albeit briefly, did manage to establish some sort of representative government and, for all intents and purposes, ended pre-modern conservatism as a political force. In a similar vein, although not an outright process of modernization in the European sense, events in the nineteenth century did lead to a change in focus of the Spanish political economy. The Spanish nineteenth century saw as much instability as Mexico did during its first decades as an independent country. However, Spain did experience more of a revolution in institutional terms rather than mere evolution. What is important to note is that, although some important institutional changes seem to have taken place, neither Mexico or Spain experienced sustained periods of representative rule, manage to completely consolidate a liberal state or indeed attain levels of development comparable with the more developed nations at the time.

Nation-Building, State-Consolidation and Institutional Development: from Modern Liberalism to Authoritarianism

The First Carlist War and the dissolution of Maximilian Habsburg's Second Mexican Empire are key moments in the institutional developments of Spain and Mexico respectively. These two moments represent the end of pre-modern conservatism (i.e. absolutism) as political options in both countries. However, it would be a mistake to assume that simply because absolutist monarchy ceased to be a realistic option it was immediately replaced by a modern state. One of the main characteristics of the modern state is that it takes away the ad hoc justification of authority replacing it with depersonalized public governance that relies on legitimacy. By eliminating personalistic rule based on pre-modern justifications of power (i.e. kinship or religious justifications), the liberal transformation in both countries did take them closer to state/national consolidation. Yet, modern states, in pure Weberian terms, need to comply with other features such as an ability to raise revenue, the monopolization of violence (which can only occur after some legitimacy has been gained), territorial integrity, some modicum of efficient central administration, and new channels of individual loyalty that allow it to affect aspects of individual and social life previously untouched by pre-modern polities.[40] This last feature could be described as the "ideological" or "mass-integrative" aspect of the modern state, which sharply contrasts with the purely "repressive" nature of previous political regimes. Thus, the modern state is unique because it "always operates through extra-bureaucratic and extra-legal means."[41] Generally speaking, this capacity of action is only achieved through the formation of a national identity.

The triumph of liberalism is a step towards representative rule, but they are not synonyms. More importantly for the cases of Mexico and Spain, analyzing liberalism (as an expression of modernity) has more to do with the idea of state consolidation rather than with the characteristics of the sate. Huntington's view that the difference in the type of government (i.e. democracy *vs.* dictatorship) is less relevant than the degree of government is perhaps of more interest for the study of Spain and Mexico in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. [42] At this very particular stage of their institutional development, and up until the 1960s, political instability is better explained by their degree of government rather than its type. How this instability is permanently solved will have long-lasting effects for the construction of democracy. Hence there are two aspects of this process that need to be analyzed in order to understand how power is distributed; the first is the differences in the timing (how long it takes

to achieve) and the second is the overall experience (how it is achieved; violently, institutionally, through dictatorship, etcetera) that leads to the consolidation of the state with its respective source of legitimacy.[43]

Regarding the timing of state-consolidation, we could say that the creation of the modern liberal concept of Spain can be found during the popular mobilization spurred by the French invasion of 1808. It was then that two contrasting versions of the patria (defined by diametrically different political camps) first managed to find some common ground.[44] Soon after though a confrontation between the liberal and the traditionalist conceptions of the nation took over and "was to play an outstanding role throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries." It was, nevertheless, this foreign invasion and subsequent popular mobilization what gave Spanish liberals (as it would to Mexican liberals shortly after) the opportunity to create a "national community in terms of common history and culture."[45] As the emergence of multiple regionalisms before and after the transition to democracy (some more historical and some more opportunistic) can attest, this process was never as successful as it was in Mexico. Certainly, some of these peripheral nationalisms tend to link their claims to those of the pre-modern times, but these nationalisms remain basically modern, and more of a "consequence of the weak effort to nationalize the masses" during the nineteenth century.[46] This indicates that we need to understand nations as a consequence of the concentration of power in one central authority, and thus the level of success of liberal reforms (the success in centralizing this power under new forms of legitimacy) is intrinsically linked to the degree of state consolidation via the construction of national identities. In this sense, the triumph of the Liberal Revolution has to be placed within its context of limited success in forming "a nation-state which reformulated, but did not destroy, the old political, social and cultural characteristics peculiar to the local and regional contexts," which explains, at least to an extent, the historic weakness of the Spanish state and of its subsequent process of nation building.[47] Based on this explanation, the historical weakness of the Spanish state, which represented one of the biggest challenges to its consolidation is explained by the failure of its Liberal Revolution to permeate the regional level.

On the other hand, the main challenge to Mexico's statehood after independence was not so much internal, as it was the case in Spain, but rather external; the young Mexican state seemed unable to maintain its territorial unity. The loss of Texas in 1836, together with other regional secession attempts (Zacatecas, Guadalajara and Yucatan), posed some serious challenges to

the feeble republican ideals. Although the experiment that was the First Mexican Empire was quickly suppressed by a republican (loosely defined) revolt led by Antonio López de Santa Anna, it was not enough to avoid the loss of the territory of what is now El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Honduras. What followed the Empire was an era of almost uninterrupted political instability that saw the government go from liberals to conservatives more that 50 times in less than 30 years. The political instability was not only a reflection of the similar conflict that was taking place in Spain between liberal and conservative forces, but there was also conflict over the best way to structure the administration of the country, as well as a constant threat of losing territory or sovereignty to foreign powers.[48] The Mexican-American War, for example, led to an attempt by the Republic of Yucatan to claim independence, the loss of over half the national territory to the northern hegemon, and a crippling debt that led to further sale of territory. The situation of the country was so precarious that the only opposition in the U.S. Senate to the ratification of The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo – which conceded the territory of what would become California, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico and Arizona in exchange of $15 million – came from those that wanted to annex all of Mexico.[49] Under such precarious conditions it is hard to speak of any sort of concrete institutional evolution, or indeed a concerted effort of nation-building or state consolidation. Much as in the rest of Latin America, those early years were mostly about survival.

It was not until the early 1870s that a process of state consolidation started to take shape in Mexico. Most Latin American nations faced challenges to state formation due to the peculiarities of territory and history; Mexico was no exception. Besides the problem with securing their borders, the new countries in the region shared a similar experience of colonial rule that precluded them of any sort of interstate conflicts up until the wars of independence (which were more like revolutions anyway). Interstate warfare was a key factor in the consolidation of the European states and one that was missing in Latin America.[50] This basic lack of interstate warfare is explained by the presence of organized domestic violent challengers to the state sovereignty. This "preoccupation with 'the enemy within' […] prevented states from engaging in external violence," which in turn deprived the early Latin American state of the countervailing pressure that is typically supplied by the fear of external aggression.[51] This lack of interstate wars, by the way, was also a key characteristic of the Spanish nineteenth century, which compounded the problems of nation building that emerged from the only partial victory of the Liberal Revolution and the slow process of modernization in the country.[52] The fact that there were no major wars between the French invasion of 1808

and the Spanish-American war of 1898 meant that for most of the nineteenth century "the appeal of Nationalism was limited by the absence of an external threat."[53]

Having said this though, the relationship between war and state consolidation may not be straightforward; after all, "only some wars built states, only some states were built by wars."[54] All things being equal, Mexico was involved in at least five (War of Independence in 1810, the conflict over Texas in 1835, the Mexican-American War in 1846 and the Franco-Mexican War of 1862) or possibly six (if we count the short-lived Pastry War of 1838) violent conflicts during the nineteenth century. However, without "several special conditions" such as a need by the state to raise money by increasing domestic extraction (this only happens when an easier alternative is not available) and the capacity to do so (an already consolidated degree of centralization of power and institutionalization), wars will not lead to state consolidation.[55] Mexico did not – nor for that matter Spain – fulfilled these characteristics.

Finally, there were other geographical and demographic factors (such as regional diversity, low population density, and the sheer size and difficulty of the terrain) that also contributed to the slow consolidation of the state in Latin America. Once most of these problems had been solved in Mexico (or at least the threat from foreign invasion and the conflict over two completely conflicting versions of the country) a process of state consolidation could begin. This process was briefly carried out under the radically liberal and semi-representative guidance of Benito Juárez. Although his presidency heralded some important liberal reforms (such as free and compulsory primary education), the situation after his death in 1872 led, after a period of further political instability, to the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. As such, much of the process of nation building, state consolidation and modern institutionalization in Mexico was carried out under the framework of a dictatorship that lasted 34 years.

By all accounts the Porfiriato managed the not at all insignificant feat of consolidating the Mexican state by centralizing power and guaranteeing (within reason) the territorial integrity of the nation. The regime managed to achieve this by implementing a robust program of centralization both in the figure of the dictator and geographically in Mexico City.[56] However, the political institutions and political culture in the country, as said before, remained fairly unchanged. After all, by the time Porfirio Díaz took power, Mexico was being ruled by Liberal Constitution (1857) that guaranteed the right to vote and defined the citizenry in fairly liberal and Modern terms. Yet, elections in Mexico during the 1860s and 1870s were not exactly free

and fair. Juárez won the 1867 election with 72 per cent of the votes and that was before his government, by banning the participation in politics of anyone that had participated with Maximilian's Empire, basically outlawed the participation of conservative factions in politics.[57] Much as his Liberal predecessors, Díaz saw himself as a true democrat. In an interview with an American journalist in March 1908, Díaz claimed that his political ideals had not been "corrupted" by his then 32 years in power, and that he still firmly believed that democracy was the only just type of government, albeit only possible in highly developed nations (Díaz-Creelman Interview).[58] Despite these claims though, his regime was anything but democratic. It undoubtedly achieved a degree of political stability and centralization of power that was without precedence in Mexico but it did not bring Mexico any closer to the establishment of more inclusive institutions. What it did achieve, however, was a national and state consolidation, which is evidenced in the normalization of relationships with the U.S., the biggest threat to Mexico's integrity.

Unlike in Mexico, Spanish struggle for state consolidation under a liberal banner stretches well into the twentieth century. Certainly, since the fall of the monarchy of 1808, there were no prolonged periods of absolutist monarchical rule. This does not mean, though, that there was a "specifically bourgeois consensus as to the form and content considered appropriate for the new state" – or at least not as it existed in Portugal, England, Bismark's Germany or France under Napoleon III.[59] Yet, the first half of the nineteenth century did herald the foundation of the modern Spanish state. The specific shape of this state was still unresolved but, at the very least, Spain's path towards modern statehood was set.

The *Sexenio Revoulucionario*, and the short-lived first Spanish Republic within this period, was very much a continuation of this slow and erratic path towards state-consolidation under a Liberal banner. Although the military revolt that overthrew the Monarchy in 1868 was supported by many political forces, this was under the guidance of a "broad front of Spain's elitists Progressive movement" that was "deeply suspicious of the popular classes."[60] As such, this renewed marriage of convenience was not to last. The Republic was actually the result of a clear vacuum of power left by the abdication of King Amadeo rather than a broad commitment to democratic or republican ideas. The fact that it only lasted 11 months evidences its irrelevance for the democratic evolution of Spain. In fact, this short republican precedent was to set the tone for Spain's mistrust of republicanism. What is more, this Revolutionary government, as well as the preceding Restoration governments, failed to give Spanish

nationalism a modern twist. Even in late nineteenth century Spain, the components of the "national culture" were still "made up of traditional icons of Spanish identity […] Spanish nationalism took pride in asserting old-fashioned imperial values as opposed to those of the new colonial expansionism of other European powers."[61] Unsurprisingly, the loss of the final vestiges of the Empire in 1898 brought about a crisis of national identity, which did not make the process of state consolidation under the national banner any easier.

The era of the Restoration (1875-1914) never really threatened to undo the gains of previous years but it did not consolidate Modern-liberal state either. It may have brought to an abrupt end the rather short-lived experiment with democracy that was the Frist Spanish Republic, but it was not a return to absolutist monarchism or even outright authoritarianism. This was more of a pragmatic arrangement that tried to answer the difficult dilemma presented by the challenges of an ever-declining empire and the need to modernize the state without revolution. The Restoration worked insofar as it led to some calm but only through a loose compromise that, true to Spanish form, really failed to satisfy anyone; it was a very efficient way to avoid conflict by sharing power between the two dominant "political syndicates"– by using elections to justify appointments and the Crown as an impartial arbiter–but it was hardly a permanent solution to the problem of the state.[62] This may have calmed the political waters but it had the rather negative effect of consolidating certain negative participation habits; the ease with which the two main political forces shared power regardless of electoral outcomes led to suffrage in Spain being (for over 25 years) merely a façade that allowed alternation of power but that in reality restricted competition. Furthermore, the Restoration was a rather disastrous time in the international arena. The defeat to the United States and the loss of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898 "severely undermined the legitimacy of the political regime" whilst it also gave a timely boost to the "social and economic movements opposed to the regime."[63] The war, however, did galvanize a nationalist fervor not seen since the Napoleonic invasion, which might help explain why the democratic forces failed to capitalize on the low point of the Restoration.

For all its negative consequences, then, the Disaster of 1898 did lead to a more or less general consensus amongst Spanish elites and society that it was time for a national rebirth. The modernization experienced during the last two decades of the nineteenth century had already planted the seeds for a widespread nationalism that was "modernizing, Republican and increasingly imperial in tendency."[64]; or in other words, a more Modern-European nationalism. Having said this though, although there was certainly a consensus around change, how to reach

this rebirth was a completely different matter. Far from being a coincidence, the re-emergence of nationalist political movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia following the 1898 War with the United States was a symptom of the decreasing appeal of Spain as a project. To say that the emergence of these nationalisms evidenced the existence of a decaying nation that was unable to maintain the loyalty of the industrialized and urbanized areas of the peninsula would not be an exaggeration. Besides, or perhaps partly as a reaction to these nationalisms, a movement that called for a reformulation of the Spanish nation and state emerged strongly within the Iberian geographical core. Yet, even this movement had two different branches. On the one hand the *regeneracionista* movement, led by the intellectuals of the Generation of 1898, that wanted a unified Spain under Castilian cultural predominance and the "Europeanization" (i.e. modernization) of the country.[65] A second movement that had similar goals and shared some of the characteristics of the *regeneracionista* movement was the military nationalism epitomized by the Primo de Rivera Dictatorship. This latter nationalism was more of a "reaction against new social and political movements of early-twentieth century Spain, such as the regional nationalists and the labor movement,"[66] rather than an ideology in its own right.

The fact that the dictatorship was never really a fascist regime supports the notion that this military *regeneracionismo* was a reaction to the ever growing working-class rather than a coherent illiberal alternative vision of the state. The membership of the *Unión General de Trabajadores* (UGT) had been growing at alarming rates–from the perspective of the Catalan industrialists in particular–since the late 1880s. Between 1900 and 1923 the UGT membership grew from a mere 14,737 members to over 220,000.[67] At the same time, whilst the *regeneracionista* intellectuals included the petit-bourgeoisie and had some democratic and liberal values, the military nationalists believed in temporary dictatorship that would guarantee the unity of the nation-state. This military nationalism saw the imperial past with pride and saw it as a springboard for the future. The years preceding the Primo de Rivera dictatorship saw the emergence of a new type of political Right motivated by military nationalism, Spanish Catholicism and some of the values of *regeneracionismo*. The dictatorship saw Spain as a single Catholic and Castilian-dominated nation whilst it also incorporated liberal elements of the state. Primo de Rivera, for instance, considered the nation as composed of a community of citizens with equal rights and duties and the state was understood as the sovereign representation of the nation. The dictatorship also cemented the toxic relationship between the state, the nation and the military that was going to prove so hard to solve during the transition to democracy. It was during the Primo de Rivera Dictatorship that the military consolidated its

view that the state was the nation and, as such, it was the function of the former to defend the latter. After all, "the idea of constructing a modern, efficient and authoritarian state as a tool to regenerate the nation was in the very nature of military nationalism."[68] As such, the dictatorship, by never questioning the value of a single Spanish state and subordinating the role of the sate (and hence the military) to that of protector of the nation, did contribute towards the long process of state consolidation and nation building. In many other ways though, the dictatorship was more about slowing down the transformation of Spain rather than shaping a different future.

Much as it happened in Mexico then, the Spanish liberals were unable to fully consolidate the Spanish nation-state during the early 1800s due both to domestic and international developments. However, the Díaz dictatorship was far more successful at consolidating and modernizing the state than the number of different political regimes that governed Spain between the 1820s and the 1930s. The turbulence and divisiveness that dominated politics in Spain in this time led to a Civil War and the Franco regime, which was similarly unable to consolidate the notion of the nation and merely papered over the cracks with its own brand of virulent authoritarian nationalism.

Institutional legacies and an institutional view of democratization

Institutional arrangements are, by definition, reluctant to change. This explains why, with a few notable exceptions,[69] democratization theories tend to attribute history a secondary role; modernization, culturalist and even multicausal explanations of democracy tend to view history as a secondary factor that merely limits or influences political outcomes. However, following the influential work in economic institutionalism and path-dependence, a new type of historical institutionalism emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. Based on a narrower understanding of path-dependence the new historical institutionalism presented a theory of political evolution shaped by the principles of increasing returns. In essence, the cost of setting up new institutions or organizations – particularly those that look to influence the distribution of public goods (such as political parties or new levels of government) – is very high.[70] So, it could be inferred that "whether you put energy into developing a new party, or join a potential coalition, or provide resources to an interest group may depend to a considerable degree on your confidence that a large number of other people will do the same."[71] Your expectation of other people "doing the same" will depend on what you can predict others will do, and these predictions are based on

the institutions that already exist; hence, existing institutions will always have an impact on how individuals will behave when it comes down to creating new institutions or changing existing ones. What is more, institutions also allocate (invariably unevenly) economic and political power.[72] Once this uneven redistribution is institutionalized it follows a reinforcing dynamic; the elites that enjoy access to resources and knowledge are the only ones who have a realistic opportunity to change the institutional arrangements that would distribute resources better, yet, for obvious reasons, they lack the incentive to do so.[73] This one of the reasons why democratization is never easy to achieve.

Following this key principle, institutional and elite-driven theories of democratization claim that the success of democratic transition has much to do with the decisions, strategies and actions of certain elites during the critical junctures that are transition to democracy. At the same time, the decisions and preferences of the elites would have been shaped, in great measure, by the institutional evolution of the country. This is particularly the case in the two elements that have been analyzed throughout this paper: the history of institutional continuity and break (i.e. the longer a particular set of institutions is in place the harder it becomes to change them, which more often than not dictates the pace of the transition) and the degree of and experience with state formation (stronger states lead to stronger democracies). However, the comparative analysis of the evolutions in Spain and Mexico shows that the greater continuity of a single institutional evolution in Mexico (thus deeply entrenching the extractive nature of the institutions) hindered its democratization efforts due to the regime's deep institutionalization,[74] whilst the relatively weaker level of state consolidation in Spain actually helped its democratization.

On the other hand, the many issues linked with state consolidation, primarily the conflict between liberal and conservative forces, were generally resolved earlier and more effectively in Mexico than in Spain. By the time the Mexican Revolution overthrew Porfirio Díaz in 1911 the integrity of the Mexican state was very much beyond question. Undoubtedly the Mexican Revolution represented an important shift in the Mexican consciousness and the PRI regime constructed a very unique political culture that served its interests. Yet, for all intents and purposes, Mexico was a consolidated nation-state in 1910. Whilst during the earlier decades of the twentieth century the nation-state was firmly being consolidated in much of Europe, the nation-state in Spain was 'increasingly weakened by centrifugal forces'[75]. Even the Primo de

Rivera dictatorship only achieved a partial success in its attempt to make "new Spaniards" based on a "process of state nationalization."[76]

What explains state-consolidation is open to debate but the fact that Mexico was more successful in achieving it that Spain is not. However, although the timing was better and could have contributed towards a democratic evolution, the authoritarian manner in which state consolidation was achieved in Mexico had long lasting effects in the political development of the country. The main ideological legacy of the Porfiriato was that "whatever [its] shortcomings, the real alternative to authoritarianism" in Mexico was not democracy but rather "destructive political instability, a crippled economy and consequent vulnerability to foreign intervention."[77] Another important lesson learned from the Porfiriato by the post-revolutionary leaders of the PRI was that rent-seeking coalitions were a useful alternative to inclusive institutional arrangements. In order to avoid capital fleeing the country, the PRI leaders developed similar links with the capitalist elites to those in place during the Porfiriato; "government policies restricted market competition, and thereby offer[ed] capitalists sufficiently high rates of return on their investment to compensate for the risk of expropriation."[78] For these reasons we can say that the Mexican Revolution "modernized" rather than destroyed the authoritarian nature of Mexican political life.[79] Similarly, but for different reasons, Spain's characteristic ambivalence towards democracy until the 1970s can be explained by a far more fragmented institutional evolution. Although state consolidation in Spain was also achieved, to a lesser extent of course, under Franco's authoritarian grip, the protracted period of state-consolidation did lead to the emergence of competing regional elites. The existence of different elites and a certain degree of fragmentation between them is a *sine qua non* for democracy. The success of the consolidation of the Mexican state, during the Porfiratio and then under the PRI regime, led to an almost complete merger of all elites under a single banner. What is more, much as it happened during the nineteenth century in other Latin American countries,[80] the PRI became such an integral part of the state-making/consolidation process that it became almost impossible to distinguish between the state itself and the party. As such, Mexico's process of democratization has suffered from a lack in real competition between elites. Nevertheless, if we were to assume that a successful state consolidation is a precondition for democratization and that the sooner this is achieved the better, as institutionalists suggest, then the Mexican process of democratization should have been more successful than Spain's, which was clearly not the case.

What helps explain this apparent contradiction is that whilst Spain did fail to consolidate the state to the same degree as Mexico did, its institutional evolution is characterized by greater breaks than continuities. What is more, the fact that there were a number of competing elites (regional as well as economic) vying for power and influence after the liberalization of the Franco regime explains Spain's velvet (and more importantly quick) transition to democracy. Mexico on the other hand, despite achieving a high degree of state consolidation relatively early – a fact that theoretically should have helped with its transition to democracy – suffered from the way in which the state consolidation was achieved. The PRI regime that followed the Díaz dictatorship not only continued with the extractive and restrictive nature of the political institutions, but it also managed to very successfully bring together all the elites under its own brand on revolutionary nationalism. This extreme elite unification is what partly explains the regime's incredible resilience, as well as a high degree of institutionalization, which in turn explains why Mexico's transition became a "war of attrition" at micro-institutional level that lasted at least three decades.[81] If indeed we believe the theory that quick transitions are better transitions, then the successful process of state unification and institutional continuity in Mexico proved to be more of a curse than a blessing, as the case of Spanish relative failure of state consolidation can attest.

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[1] O Omar G. Encarnación, "Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy in Spain." *Political Science Quarterly* 161, no. 1 (2001): 53-79. L Laura D. Edles, "Rethinking Democratic Transitions: A Culturalist Critique and the Spanish Case," *Theory and Society* 24, no. 3 (1995): 355-356. T odd Eisenstadt, "Eddies in the Third Wave: Protracted Transitions and Theories of Democratization", *Democratization* 7, no.3 (200): 4. Josep M. Colomer, "The Spanish "State of Autonomies": Non-institutional Federalism," *West European Politics* 21, no. 4 (2000): 40-52.

[2] See for example: Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (California: Sage Publications, 1963); Ana M. Bejarano, *Precarious Democracies: Understanding Regime Stability and Change in Colombia and*

Venezuela (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011); Reynaldo Y. Ortega Ortiz, *Mobilización y Democracia: España y México* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2008).

[3] José M. Magone, *The Changing Architecture of Iberian Politics (1974-92): An Investigation on the Structuring of Democratic Political Systemic Cultures in Semiperipheral Southern European Societies* (New York: Mellen University Press, 1996).

[4] In simple words, functionalists (i.e. the political culture school) broadly believe that the political regime is a 'function' of a nation's political culture. As such, changes in political culture are reflected onto the political system; transitions to democracy are explained by social transformations and the inevitable reaction to such transformations. Therefore, analysing the cultural evolution of a country becomes or paramount importance to understand its political evolution, since the masses (and their orientations) are at the core of democracy, authoritarianism or any other type of political regime. This paper, however, focuses on the influence of institutional evolution rather than changes in political culture.

[5] R obert W. Jackman, R. W. and Ross A. Miller, "A Renaissance of Political Culture?" *American Journal of Political Science*, 40, no. 3 (1996): 635. Max Weber proposed a linear link between culture (the protestant ethic that is) and economic development (Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Dover Publications, 2003 [1905]); almost a century later Robert Putnam (*Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993) went a step forward and developed a link between culture (social capital) and democratic consolidation, whilst Ronald Inglehart ("The Renaissance of Political Culture," *American Political Science Review*, 82, no. 4 (1988): 1203-1230) proposes culture shapes both economic development and by inference democratic consolidation.

[6] Without fully engaging with the debate on the very definition of democracy, it is important to note that democracy can be seen as more than a mere 'process'. Procedural (or minimalist/Schumpeterian) are the most common definitions in political science but are far from the only ones. Democracy can indeed be understood as a key element of the broader liberal ideology (Jean Grugel, *Democratization: A Critical Introduction*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 12), as an idea rather than a process or even, as famously put by Amratia Sen, as a universal value. Yet, this paper's focus on a procedural definition very much has to do with the focus on institutions and their shaping of preferences and strategies during transitions to democracy; as such, a minimalist definition fits the purpose of this article better.

[7] Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty* (London: Profile Books, 2012), 76.

[8] Robert A. Pastor, *The North American Idea: A Vision of a Continental Future* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 42.

[9] David Landes, "Culture makes almost all the difference," in *Culture Matters, How Values Shape Human Progress*, ed. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 4.

[10] Fernando H. Cardoso, and Enzzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1979). 173-174.

[11] Stephen Haber, ed., *How Latin America Fell Behind. Essays on the Economic Histories of Brazil and Mexico, 14800-1914* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997), 9. In essence this perverse dynamic shows the link between democracy and capitalist development. A view from modernisation theory would even claim that there can be no democracy without a market economy (a rather straightforward argument) but, furthermore, that there can be no market economy without democracy. The idea being that a regime that grants economic

freedom but limits political freedom and participation will eventually face an impossible choice.

[12] Véliz, 69-70.

[13] Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution* (London: Profile Books Ltd., 2011), 372.

[14] Acemoglu and Robinson, 29; Fukuyama, 371

[15] Alejandro Quiroga, *Making Spaniards: Primo de Rivera and the Nationalisation of the Masses, 1923-30* (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).Josefina Z. Vázquez, "De la Independencia a la Consolidación Republicana." in *Nueva Historia Mínima de México* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2008), 253-254.

[16] Gregorio Alonso, "Corporations, subjects and citizens: the peculiar modernity of early Hispanic liberalism," *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies*, 22, no. 1 (2016): 7-22.

[17] Jesús Millán and María C. Romeo, "Was the liberal revolution important to Modern Spain? Political cultures and citizenship in Spanish History", *Social History*, 29 no. 3 (2004): 288.

[18] Ibid., 314.

[19] Victor Bulmer-Thomas, *The Economic History of Latin America since Independence.* 3rd edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 22.

[20] Ibid., 28

[21] Ibid., 2.

[22] Enrique Cárdenas, "A Macroeconomic Interpretation of Nineteenth-Century Mexico," in *How Latin America Fell Behind. Essays on the Economic Histories of Brazil and Mexico, 14800-1914*, ed. Stephen Harper (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997), 65-66.

[23] Ibid., 85.

[24] Bulmer-Thomas, 70-72

[25] Colin M. Lewis, 'Review of Institutions and Investment: The Political Basis of Industrialisation in Mexico before 1911', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 84 no. 2 (2004): 353.

[26] Carlos Marichal, "Obstacles to the Development of Capital Markets in Nineteenth-Century Mexico," in *How Latin America Fell Behind. Essays on the Economic Histories of Brazil and Mexico, 14800-1914*, ed. Stephen Harper (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997), 127.

[27] Lewis, 353.

[28] Haber, 171.

[29] Lewis, 354

[30] Gabriel L. Negretto and José A. Aguilar-Rivera, "Rethinking the Legacy of the Liberal State in Latin America: the Cases of Argentina (1853-1916) and Mexico (1857-1910)," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 32 no. 2 (2000): 362.

[31] David R. Ringrose, *Spain, Europe, and the "Spanish Miracle", 1700-1900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 16.

[32] Isabel Burdiel. and María C. Romeo, "Old and New Liberalism: The Making of the Liberal Revolution, 1808-1844," *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies*, 75 no. 5 (1998): 65-80.

[33]Ibid., 75-76.

[34] Millán and Romeo, 285.

[35] Ibid., 293.

[36] Jordi Nadal i Oller. *El Fracaso de la Revolución Industrial en España, 1814-1913* (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1975).

[37] Ringrose, 137.

[38] Ibid., 146.

[39] César Molinas and Leandro Prados de la Escosura, "Was Spain Different? Spanish Historical Backwardness Revisited," *Explorations in Economic History*. 26 no. 4 (1989): 388.

[40] Hendrik Spruyt, "War, Trade and State Formation" in *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. C. Boix and S. C. Stokes (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2007), 12-13.

[41] Christoph Görg. and Joachim Hirsch.. "Is International Democracy Possible?," *Review of International Political Economy* 5, no.4 (1998), 585-615.

[42] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968 [2006]).

[43] Bejarano, 46.

[44] Millán and Romeo, 286

[45] Quiroga, 7

[46] José Álvarez Junco, "The Formation of Spanish Identity and Its Adaptation to the Age of Nations," *History and Memory* 14, no. 1/2 (2002): 15.

[47] Burdiel and Romeo, 66-67

[48] Vázquez, 282

[49] Pastor, 44

[50] Spruyt, 214-216.

[51] Cameron G. Thies, "War, Rivarly and State Building in Latin America," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (2005): 451-465.

[52] Sebastian Balfour and Alejandro Quiroga, *The Reinvention of Spain: Nation and Identity since Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 9.

[53] Sebastian Balfour, *The end of the Spanish Empire, 1898-1923* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997): 94.

[54] Miguel A. Centeno, "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America," *American Journal of Sociology* 102, no. 6 (1997): 1568.

[55] Ibid., 1598.

[56] Lorenzo Meyer, "Historical Roots of the Authoritarian state in Mexico," in *Authoritarianism in Mexico*, ed. J. L. Reina and R. S. Weinert (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977): 5.

[57] Luis Medina Peña, "México, Historia de una Democracia Difícil," in *Elecciones, Alternancia y Democracia: España-México, una Refelxión Comparativa*, J. Varela Ortega and L. Medina Peña (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2000), 216-218.

[58] Sergio Aguayo Quezada, *La Transición en México. Una Historia Documental, 1910-2010* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica and El Colegio de México, 2010b), 23.

[59] Millán and Romeo, 290

[60] Ibid., 291-292.

[61] Balfour, 2.

[62] JoséVarela Ortega, "Elecciones y Democracia en España: una reflexión comparativa," in *Elecciones, Alternancia y Democracia: España-México, una Refelxión Comparativa*, J. Varela Ortega and L. Medina Peña (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2000), 75.

[63] Balfour, 13.

[64] Ibid., 94.

[65] Quiroga, 16-17.

[66] Balfour, 62.

[67] Ortega Ortiz, 61

[68] Quiroga, 44-4.

[69] See for example Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz. and Seymour M. Lipset (eds.). 1995. *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers).

[70] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1965).

[71] Paul Pierson, 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics', *American Political Science Review*, 94, no.2 (2000), 258.

[72] Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, 'Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism', *Political Studies* 46, no. 5 (1998), 955-956.

[73] Acemoglu and Robinson, 83-87

[74] Ortega Ortiz.

[75] Balfour, 63.

[76] Quiroga, 184

[77] Daniel C. Levy and Kathleen Bruhn, *Mexico: The Struggle for Democratic Development* (Los Angeles and Berkley: University of California Press, 2006), 43.

[78] Stephen H. Haber, Herbert S. Klein, Noel Maurer, and Kevin J. Middlebrook, *Mexico since 1980* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 14.

[79] Meyer, 4.

[80] Bejarano, 5.

[81] Aguayo Quezada 2010a, 25; Todd Eisenstadt, "Eddies in the Third Wave: Protracted Transitions and Theories of Democratization," *Democratization* 7, no. 3 (2000), 3-24.